Introduction:

The Orissa High Court, in Smt. Sunita Nayak v. Anup Kumar Tota (MATA No. 154 of 2015), 2026 LiveLaw (Ori) 78, reaffirmed the settled legal principle that a person cannot evade judicial proceedings by deliberately refusing to receive court notices or summons. A Division Bench comprising Justice Manash Ranjan Pathak and Justice Sibo Sankar Mishra held that where an addressee refuses to accept summons and the serving officer affixes the notice on the outer door or another conspicuous part of the house in accordance with the Code of Civil Procedure, the Court can presume valid and sufficient service. Such a presumption flows from Section 27 of the General Clauses Act, Illustration (f) to Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, and Order V Rules 9(5), 17 and 19 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The case arose from an appeal filed under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984, challenging a decree passed by the Family Court, Berhampur, dissolving the marriage between the parties. During the pendency of the appeal, the counsel representing the respondent-husband passed away, making it necessary for the High Court to issue fresh notice to the respondent.

The notice was sent through Speed Post with acknowledgment due and also through a Special Messenger. When the Special Messenger visited the respondent’s residence, the family members refused to accept the notice and asked him to return. Following the procedure prescribed under the CPC, the messenger affixed the notice on the outer door of the house in the presence of witnesses and submitted a report before the Court.

The principal issue before the High Court was whether such service could be treated as valid and sufficient when the respondent or his family members deliberately refused to receive the notice.

Arguments of the Parties:

The appellant-wife contended that every reasonable step had been taken to ensure service of notice upon the respondent. Besides dispatching the notice through Speed Post to the correct address, the Court had also directed personal service through a Special Messenger. It was argued that the respondent’s family members deliberately refused to accept the notice, compelling the serving officer to affix it on the outer door of the house in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Code of Civil Procedure.

The appellant submitted that a litigant cannot frustrate judicial proceedings by intentionally avoiding service. Since the notice was sent to the correct address and the statutory procedure regarding affixture had been duly followed, the Court ought to presume that service was complete. It was further argued that accepting any contrary view would encourage parties to evade judicial proceedings simply by refusing to receive summons.

Although there were no elaborate submissions recorded on behalf of the respondent on the issue of service, the question before the Court was whether refusal to receive notice could prevent the Court from treating the service as sufficient. The Court therefore examined the legal framework governing deemed service of summons and notices.

Court’s Judgment:

The Orissa High Court held that the service of notice in the present case was valid and sufficient. The Court observed that Order VI Rule 14A of the Code of Civil Procedure requires every party to furnish an address for service, and once notice is dispatched to that address, the party cannot avoid legal proceedings by remaining unavailable or refusing to accept communications.

Referring to Order V Rule 9(5) CPC, the Bench observed that where summons is properly addressed, prepaid and sent through registered post with acknowledgment due, the Court is empowered to presume valid service if it is satisfied that the addressee deliberately avoided receiving the notice. The Court further noted that Order V Rule 17 authorizes the serving officer to affix a copy of the summons on the outer door or another conspicuous part of the house where the defendant or his agent refuses to receive it. Once such affixture is properly reported and verified under Order V Rule 19 CPC, the service becomes legally valid.

The Court also relied upon Section 27 of the General Clauses Act and Illustration (f) of Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, which permit the Court to presume that official acts have been regularly performed and that a properly addressed postal article has been duly served unless proved otherwise.

To reinforce these principles, the Bench relied upon the Supreme Court’s decisions in Madan & Co. v. Wazir Jaivir Chand (1988) and C.C. Alavi Haji v. Palapetty Muhammed (2007). The High Court observed that once a notice is properly addressed, prepaid and dispatched through registered post, a presumption of service arises. Actual physical receipt is not always necessary. Deliberate refusal to accept notice or conduct intended to avoid service amounts to sufficient service in the eyes of law. Similarly, postal endorsements such as “house locked,” “not available,” “not in station,” or similar remarks cannot automatically defeat the presumption where the circumstances indicate deliberate avoidance.

The Bench also expressed concern over the growing delay in judicial proceedings caused by disputes relating to service of summons. It observed that a considerable number of cases remain pending because parties intentionally evade service, resulting in prolonged litigation. The Court emphasized that procedural law must be interpreted in a practical and realistic manner so that judicial proceedings are not frustrated by deliberate tactics adopted by litigants.

Applying these principles, the Court found that the appellant-wife had acted bona fide by sending notice through multiple modes and by ensuring personal service through a Special Messenger. Since the respondent’s family members refused to receive the notice and the serving officer thereafter affixed it on the outer door in the presence of witnesses, all statutory requirements stood satisfied. The Court therefore held that the notice had been duly served and treated the service as legally sufficient.

The judgment reiterates that procedural rules relating to service of summons are intended to facilitate justice and not to enable parties to obstruct judicial proceedings. A litigant cannot take advantage of his own refusal to receive notice, and where the prescribed legal procedure has been followed, courts are fully justified in presuming valid service to ensure that the administration of justice is not delayed.