Introduction:
In a significant judgment addressing the conflict between customary practices and statutory matrimonial law, the Rajasthan High Court has held that the customary practice of “Nata Marriage” cannot be recognised as a valid legal defence to justify a second marriage during the subsistence of a legally valid first marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. The Division Bench comprising Justice Arun Monga and Justice Sandeep Shah observed that recognising such a custom would effectively render the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act meaningless and would amount to judicial approval of bigamy under the guise of social custom.
The ruling came in the case titled Laxmilal v. Parwati, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (Raj) 185. The Court was dealing with a challenge filed by a husband against an order of the Family Court which had rejected his petition seeking dissolution of marriage.
The controversy revolved around the practice commonly known as “Nata Marriage,” prevalent in certain rural communities of Rajasthan, where a person enters into another marital relationship without legally dissolving the first marriage. In many instances, the custom operates outside the formal framework of matrimonial law and is socially accepted within specific communities despite conflicting with statutory provisions governing Hindu marriages.
The petitioner-husband contended before the Court that his wife had deserted him decades ago after obtaining employment at another location and that the parties had been living separately for nearly twenty-seven years. During this prolonged separation, the husband entered into a Nata Marriage with another woman, allegedly with the consent of his legally wedded wife. On this basis, he argued that continuation of the matrimonial relationship served no practical purpose and amounted to mental cruelty.
The case, however, evolved into a broader constitutional and legal examination of whether customary practices permitting second unions could override the mandatory provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act prohibiting bigamy. The Court was also required to consider whether consent of the first spouse or prolonged separation could legitimise such a relationship.
In a strongly worded judgment, the High Court rejected the petitioner’s contentions and observed that acceptance of Nata Marriage as a defence would not only undermine the statutory scheme of the Hindu Marriage Act but would also disproportionately harm women and violate constitutional guarantees of equality and gender justice.
The ruling is now being viewed as an important reaffirmation of the supremacy of statutory matrimonial law over customary practices inconsistent with constitutional values and legislative policy.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner-husband argued that the marital relationship between the parties had effectively broken down long ago and had become a “dead marriage” incapable of restoration. According to him, the respondent-wife had deserted the matrimonial home after being posted elsewhere for employment purposes and the parties had been living separately for nearly twenty-seven years.
It was submitted that due to the prolonged separation and absence of any meaningful marital relationship, the petitioner entered into a Nata Marriage with another woman in the year 1997. The petitioner claimed that this relationship was entered into openly and with the knowledge and consent of the respondent-wife.
The husband contended that the continuation of the formal marital tie despite decades of separation served no social or legal purpose and instead subjected him to mental cruelty. He argued that denial of divorce in such circumstances amounted to forcing parties to remain trapped in a legally existing but practically non-functional relationship.
The petitioner further sought to rely upon the customary practice of Nata Marriage prevalent in certain communities of Rajasthan. According to him, the custom was socially recognised and accepted within the community and therefore deserved legal acknowledgment.
It was argued that Section 29(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act protects certain customs relating to marriage and dissolution and therefore the customary arrangement should not be treated as invalid merely because it does not conform strictly to statutory procedures.
The petitioner also attempted to justify the second relationship on the basis that the respondent-wife had allegedly consented to the arrangement. According to him, once the first spouse had accepted the second union and parties had lived separately for decades, the Court ought to recognise the practical realities of the situation rather than insist upon strict technical compliance with statutory formalities.
The respondent-wife, however, opposed the appeal and defended the Family Court’s order refusing divorce. She argued that the petitioner had entered into a second marital relationship during the subsistence of a legally valid first marriage without obtaining any decree of divorce under law.
The respondent contended that no custom could override the express provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, particularly Sections 5(i) and 11, which clearly prohibit a second marriage during the lifetime of a spouse. According to her, the petitioner’s attempt to rely upon Nata Marriage was nothing but an effort to legitimise an otherwise void and prohibited second union.
The wife further argued that consent of a spouse cannot validate an act prohibited by statute. Matrimonial prohibitions contained in the Hindu Marriage Act are matters of public policy enacted by Parliament and cannot be waived by private agreement between parties.
It was submitted that if customs such as Nata Marriage are recognised as valid defences against bigamy, the entire statutory framework governing Hindu marriages would collapse and legal protections afforded to women under the Act would become illusory.
The respondent also highlighted the gendered consequences of such practices. According to her, women involved in Nata relationships often remain without legal protection, matrimonial rights, inheritance rights, or enforceable claims to maintenance and property. At the same time, the legally wedded first wife is left abandoned without formal dissolution of marriage, unable to rebuild her life or remarry freely.
The case therefore presented a direct conflict between community-based customary practices and the statutory framework of matrimonial law designed to ensure monogamy, certainty of marital status, and protection of women’s rights.
Court’s Judgment:
The Rajasthan High Court dismissed the husband’s appeal and upheld the Family Court’s decision refusing divorce. In doing so, the Court delivered a detailed and strongly reasoned judgment emphasising that customs inconsistent with statutory law cannot be judicially recognised merely because they are socially prevalent in certain communities.
The Division Bench categorically held that Nata Marriage cannot be accepted as a valid defence to justify a second marriage during the subsistence of a legally valid first marriage under the Hindu Marriage Act.
The Court observed that the petitioner’s invocation of the custom was a transparent attempt to shield a void and statutorily prohibited second marriage under the guise of social practice. Justice Arun Monga and Justice Sandeep Shah remarked that no court of law can become an instrument for legitimising conduct expressly prohibited by legislation.
The Court stated:
“A Court of law is not an instrument available to a wrongdoer to consecrate his wrong. The appellant, having made his choice in 1997 with open eyes and without legal authority, must bear its consequences, and those consequences cannot, in law or in conscience, be visited upon the respondent.”
The Bench carefully examined Sections 5(i) and 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act. Section 5(i) lays down that a valid Hindu marriage can take place only if neither party has a spouse living at the time of marriage. Section 11 further declares marriages solemnised in contravention of this condition to be void.
The Court emphasised that these provisions reflect a conscious legislative policy enforcing monogamy among Hindus and preventing bigamous relationships. Recognition of Nata Marriage as a defence would directly undermine this statutory framework and reduce the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act to mere “empty letters.”
The Bench rejected the argument that consent of the respondent-wife validated the second relationship. According to the Court, the prohibition against bigamy is not merely a private right capable of waiver but a matter of public policy embodied in statutory law.
The judgment clarified that even if a spouse voluntarily consents to a second marriage, such consent cannot legalise a union expressly prohibited by statute. Matrimonial law enacted by Parliament cannot be overridden through private arrangements or community customs inconsistent with legislative intent.
The Court also examined the petitioner’s reliance upon Section 29(2) of the Hindu Marriage Act. This provision preserves certain customs relating to dissolution of marriage. However, the Bench held that the saving clause applies narrowly to customs governing dissolution and cannot be stretched to validate customs permitting remarriage without lawful dissolution of an existing marriage.
The Court observed:
“The saving clause cannot, therefore, be stretched to cover a practice that flagrantly violates Section 5(i) by creating a second marriage over an existing, legally intact one.”
The Bench warned that acceptance of Nata Marriage as a valid legal defence would have devastating consequences for the entire statutory scheme of Hindu matrimonial law. It held that such recognition would effectively nullify legislative safeguards against bigamy and create legal uncertainty regarding marital status.
One of the most significant aspects of the judgment was the Court’s focus on gender justice and constitutional values. The Bench observed that practices such as Nata Marriage disproportionately harm women and create vulnerability for both the first wife and the woman entering the second relationship.
The Court noted that the legally wedded first wife often remains trapped in a state of legal uncertainty — abandoned in practice but still married in law. Without formal divorce, she may face social and legal obstacles in rebuilding her life or entering another relationship.
At the same time, the woman in the Nata relationship is denied formal legal recognition and remains without enforceable rights relating to maintenance, inheritance, matrimonial property, or legal marital status. Children born from such relationships may also encounter questions concerning legitimacy and legal entitlements.
The Bench observed that judicial recognition of such customs would violate constitutional guarantees under Articles 14 and 15, which protect equality and prohibit discrimination. The Court also referred to Article 39 of the Constitution, which directs the State to ensure equal rights and opportunities for men and women.
The judgment reflects an important constitutional approach where customary practices are tested against principles of equality, dignity, and statutory legality rather than being accepted solely on the basis of historical or social prevalence.
The Court further rejected the petitioner’s plea that prolonged separation and breakdown of marriage should justify dissolution. While acknowledging that parties had lived separately for many years, the Court held that the petitioner could not rely upon a situation created through his own unlawful conduct to seek equitable relief.
Ultimately, the High Court upheld the Family Court’s decree rejecting the divorce petition and dismissed the appeal.
The ruling stands as a significant reaffirmation that customs inconsistent with statutory law and constitutional values cannot receive judicial endorsement. It also highlights the judiciary’s increasing emphasis on gender justice, protection of women’s rights, and preservation of the integrity of matrimonial legislation in India.