Introduction:

The Rajasthan High Court in Kailash v. State of Rajasthan [2025 LiveLaw (Raj) 222] delivered a significant verdict addressing the implications of late pleas of juvenility in criminal proceedings. The appeal arose from a conviction recorded more than three decades ago, where the appellant Kailash was sentenced to seven years of rigorous imprisonment for the offence of rape. During the entire trial process before the Sessions Court, no plea of juvenility was raised on behalf of Kailash, who was later revealed to have been less than 13 years of age at the time of the alleged offence. In appeal, filed 33 years post-conviction, the plea of juvenility was raised for the first time, invoking Section 9(2) of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, which allows a claim of juvenility to be raised at any stage, even after final disposal of the case. The case brought forth a fundamental question: does the failure to conduct an inquiry by the Juvenile Justice Board (JJB) at the time of trial render the entire conviction invalid, or is the benefit of the JJ Act limited only to the sentence?

Arguments of the Appellant:

The counsel for the appellant argued passionately that since Kailash was a child below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence—specifically less than 13 years old—he should have been produced before the Juvenile Justice Board and not tried by the Sessions Court. It was submitted that the trial, conviction, and sentence imposed by the Sessions Court were vitiated in law as they were contrary to the mandatory requirement under the JJ Act, 2015, which stipulates that only the JJB has jurisdiction over children in conflict with law. Counsel further argued that failure to conduct an inquiry into the accused’s juvenility before or during trial not only violated statutory protections conferred under the JJ Act but also infringed the constitutional guarantee of fair trial under Article 21. Relying on Supreme Court precedents, particularly Vinod Katara v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the appellant’s counsel contended that the JJ Act’s objective is not just to provide a reduced sentence but to treat children in conflict with law differently from adults, thereby ensuring their rehabilitation and social reintegration. The appellant prayed for setting aside both the conviction and sentence, arguing that continuing with the conviction amounted to an affront to the principles of juvenile justice enshrined in international conventions and adopted by Indian law.

Arguments of the Respondent-State:

Opposing the appeal, the Additional Advocate General appearing for the State argued that the JJ Act’s scheme, as reflected under Sections 9 and 25 of the 2015 Act, did not mandate that a conviction must be set aside if juvenility is established after trial. The State argued that Section 25 of the JJ Act, 2015, explicitly provides that proceedings pending before any court or board before the commencement of the JJ Act would continue as if the Act had not been enacted. Therefore, the Sessions Court had jurisdiction to try the case, and a late plea of juvenility did not automatically nullify the conviction. The State contended that the only consequence of establishing juvenility at a later stage was that the sentence awarded must conform to the maximum sentence permissible under the JJ Act, i.e., three years in a juvenile institution. The State further argued that completely invalidating convictions merely because juvenility was not raised earlier would incentivize convicts to delay raising such pleas for decades, undermining the justice delivery system. The State emphasized that the JJ Act aimed at providing rehabilitative sentencing and care facilities to juveniles but did not intend to let perpetrators of heinous crimes escape accountability.

Court’s Observations and Judgment:

Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand, after an extensive analysis of statutory provisions and relevant precedents, ruled that the mere absence of an inquiry by the Juvenile Justice Board did not vitiate the trial or the conviction recorded by a competent Sessions Court, even if it was subsequently discovered that the accused was a juvenile at the time of the offence. The Court observed that the legislative intent behind the JJ Act was not to provide immunity from conviction but to ensure that a juvenile in conflict with law receives an appropriate sentence aimed at rehabilitation rather than retribution. Referring to Section 25 of the JJ Act, 2015, the Court emphasized that ongoing proceedings before any court would continue unaffected by the enactment of the 2015 Act, and there was no statutory mandate requiring the proceedings to be rendered void if juvenility was established later. The Court noted that if the intention of the legislature was to nullify convictions, the JJ Act would have expressly excluded the jurisdiction of regular courts, requiring re-transfer of trials to the JJB upon discovery of juvenility, which it did not. Justice Dhand relied on Vinod Katara v. State of Uttar Pradesh and other Supreme Court rulings to reiterate that only the sentence imposed contrary to the limits prescribed under the JJ Act would have to be modified. The Rajasthan High Court highlighted that the appellant had already undergone substantial imprisonment spanning several years, and since the maximum permissible sentence for a juvenile under Section 18 of the JJ Act is three years in a special home, no further incarceration was warranted. Accordingly, while upholding the conviction, the Court reduced the sentence to the period of imprisonment already undergone by Kailash. The Court thus balanced the need to maintain the conviction for the offence committed while also extending the statutory benefits intended under the JJ Act to juveniles in conflict with law. The appeal was disposed of with the modified sentence, and the appellant was ordered to be released if not required in any other case.