Introduction:
In a significant judgment upholding the protective spirit of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, the Rajasthan High Court, in A v. State of Rajasthan & Another (S.B. Criminal Revision Petition Nos. 1371/2025 and 1217/2025), set aside an order passed by the Appellate Court remitting a POCSO case against two juveniles to the Children’s Court for trial as “adult accused.” The case was decided by Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand, who meticulously examined whether the alleged offences fell within the definition of “heinous offences” under Section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice Act. The Court ultimately concluded that since none of the charges carried a minimum sentence of seven years or more, the offences could not be categorized as “heinous,” and therefore, the juveniles could not be tried as adults. Referring to the Supreme Court’s authoritative pronouncement in Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2020), Justice Dhand reiterated that an offence without a statutory minimum punishment of seven years cannot be treated as heinous merely because its maximum punishment may extend beyond that limit. The ruling reaffirmed the legislative intent of the JJ Act—to reform and rehabilitate, not penalize—while underscoring the importance of differentiating between the varying levels of gravity in juvenile offences.
Arguments of the Petitioners:
The petitioners, both juveniles at the time of the alleged incident, were represented through counsel who contended that the Appellate Court had erred in remitting the matter to the Children’s Court for trial as adults. The petitioners were charged under various sections, including Sections 376/511 (attempt to commit rape), 354-A (sexual harassment), 354-D (stalking), 384 (extortion), 306 (abetment of suicide), and 120-B (criminal conspiracy) of the Indian Penal Code, along with Sections 7/8 and 11/12 of the POCSO Act, and Section 67-A of the Information Technology Act, 2000. Their counsel argued that none of these offences, either individually or collectively, qualified as “heinous offences” within the meaning of Section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015, since none carried a minimum sentence of seven years or more.
The petitioners emphasized that Section 511 IPC, which prescribes punishment for attempting to commit offences punishable with imprisonment for life or other imprisonment, allows for punishment up to half of the longest term provided for the offence attempted. Therefore, in the context of an attempt to commit rape under Section 376/511, the maximum punishment could be half of the statutory minimum prescribed under Section 376 IPC, which is seven years—meaning the punishment could extend up to three and a half years. Thus, the alleged offence of “attempt to commit rape” cannot be deemed a “heinous offence,” as it does not meet the statutory threshold of a minimum seven-year imprisonment.
The petitioners’ counsel argued that the Appellate Court, in remitting the case to the Children’s Court for trial as adult accused, had completely overlooked the definition of “heinous offences” under the JJ Act, 2015, and the binding precedent laid down by the Supreme Court in Shilpa Mittal. The counsel further contended that the Juvenile Justice Board had rightly taken cognizance of the matter and decided to conduct an inquiry under the provisions applicable to juveniles, as the petitioners were both below the age of eighteen at the time of the alleged crime. The impugned order of the Appellate Court, it was argued, amounted to a jurisdictional error, as it directed an adult trial contrary to the legislative scheme and spirit of the JJ Act.
Moreover, the counsel submitted that the JJ Act clearly distinguishes between “petty,” “serious,” and “heinous” offences to ensure proportionate treatment of juvenile offenders based on the nature and gravity of their conduct. The Act’s rehabilitative focus, the counsel argued, would be entirely defeated if every offence carrying a potential punishment exceeding seven years—even without a minimum term—were to be classified as “heinous.” Such an interpretation would lead to harsh and unjust outcomes, stripping juveniles of statutory protections designed to reform rather than punish. The petitioners therefore prayed that the High Court quash the Appellate Court’s order and restore the Juvenile Justice Board’s decision to try them as juveniles.
Arguments of the Respondents:
The State, represented by the Public Prosecutor and the complainant’s counsel, contended that the nature of the alleged offences was grave, involving serious sexual misconduct and acts under the POCSO Act and IPC that had caused irreparable harm to the victim. The respondents argued that given the nature of the allegations—attempted sexual assault, abetment of suicide, extortion, and use of explicit digital material—the petitioners’ conduct demonstrated sufficient maturity and awareness to justify their being tried as adults under the Children’s Court. The prosecution maintained that Section 15 of the Juvenile Justice Act provides for a preliminary assessment of juveniles aged between 16 and 18 years in cases of “heinous offences,” enabling the Board to evaluate whether they possess the mental and physical capacity to understand the consequences of their acts.
The respondents further argued that while the minimum punishment of seven years is a criterion under Section 2(33) for classifying an offence as “heinous,” the legislative intent cannot be confined to a rigid mathematical formula. Instead, the focus must also lie on the gravity of the act, its social impact, and the moral culpability of the juvenile involved. They contended that the offences of attempted rape, abetment of suicide, and extortion, though not carrying a statutory minimum punishment of seven years, reflect severe moral and psychological harm, warranting a more stringent judicial approach. The complainant’s counsel also emphasized that the Appellate Court’s decision was guided by the need for deterrence in cases involving serious sexual offences against minors and that a lenient view under the guise of the JJ Act could embolden similar acts by other juveniles.
It was further submitted that while the Juvenile Justice Act is rehabilitative, it does not grant blanket immunity to juvenile offenders, especially those who display adult-like awareness of their criminal acts. Therefore, the respondents urged the Court to uphold the Appellate Court’s order and allow the trial before the Children’s Court to proceed, arguing that the broader interpretation of “heinous offences” should include serious attempts to commit crimes of a heinous nature, even if the statutory minimum punishment is less than seven years.
Court’s Judgment:
Justice Anoop Kumar Dhand, after carefully considering the submissions and the legal framework, delivered a detailed judgment reaffirming the narrow and precise interpretation of “heinous offences” under Section 2(33) of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. The Court began by clarifying that the statutory definition leaves no ambiguity: an offence can be categorized as “heinous” only if the minimum punishment prescribed under the law is imprisonment for seven years or more. The judge emphasized that while many offences may have a maximum punishment exceeding seven years, the legislature’s deliberate use of the term minimum in Section 2(33) reflects an intention to confine “heinous offences” to only the most egregious categories of crimes.
The Court examined each charge against the petitioners and noted that none of them carried a minimum sentence of seven years. Specifically, for offences under Sections 376/511 IPC (attempt to commit rape), the punishment is limited to half the minimum sentence prescribed for the actual offence, meaning a possible maximum of three and a half years. Similarly, Sections 354-A, 354-D, 384, 306, and 120-B IPC do not carry mandatory minimum sentences of seven years. The offences under Sections 7, 8, 11, and 12 of the POCSO Act and Section 67-A of the IT Act also did not meet the statutory threshold for being labeled as “heinous.” Consequently, the Court held that the petitioners’ case could not be treated as involving heinous offences warranting trial as adult accused.
Justice Dhand drew extensively from the Supreme Court’s ruling in Shilpa Mittal v. State (NCT of Delhi) (2020), where the Apex Court had categorically held that “an offence which does not prescribe a minimum sentence of seven years cannot be considered a heinous offence, even if the maximum punishment exceeds seven years.” The High Court observed that the JJ Act’s framework is intentionally structured to protect juveniles from being subjected to the rigors of an adult trial unless the offence is unmistakably heinous, and the juvenile’s mental and physical capacity, as well as the circumstances of the offence, justify such a course.
The Court underscored that the JJ Act’s philosophy is not punitive but rehabilitative. It aims to reintegrate children in conflict with the law into society rather than expose them to the adult criminal justice system. The Court rejected the State’s argument that the seriousness of the allegations alone warranted treating the juveniles as adults. It noted that the legislature has consciously created three categories—petty, serious, and heinous offences—to ensure proportionality in handling juvenile delinquency. Expanding the definition of “heinous offences” to include cases without a minimum punishment of seven years would blur these distinctions, undermining the very object of the Act.
Justice Dhand further clarified that the JJ Act does not classify offences solely by their potential maximum punishment but by their statutory minimums. The absence of a minimum term of seven years precludes an offence from being termed “heinous,” even if the sentencing court could, in theory, impose a longer term. To interpret otherwise, the Court held, would render the statutory classification meaningless and could result in children being exposed to disproportionate punitive processes. The Court also highlighted that the Act takes into account the evolving neurological and psychological development of children aged between 16 and 18, acknowledging that their decision-making and moral reasoning differ fundamentally from those of adults.
In conclusion, Justice Dhand set aside the order of the Appellate Court (Special Judge, POCSO Act, dated June 16, 2025) that had remitted the case to the Children’s Court. The matter was remitted back to the Juvenile Justice Board to conduct an inquiry strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2015. The High Court directed that the Board must treat the petitioners as juveniles in conflict with the law and proceed with the inquiry in the manner prescribed under Section 14 of the Act. The petitions were accordingly allowed, reaffirming the principle that every child, irrespective of the gravity of accusation, is entitled to the rehabilitative protections guaranteed under the JJ framework unless the case clearly satisfies the statutory test of “heinous offence.”