Introduction:
The Punjab and Haryana High Court has clarified that the mere fact that one of the parties to a civil dispute is a practising advocate before the same court cannot, by itself, constitute a valid ground for transferring the proceedings under Section 24 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC). The Court held that a transfer application must be supported by cogent and tangible material demonstrating a genuine likelihood of prejudice, bias or interference with the fair conduct of judicial proceedings. A litigant cannot seek the transfer of a case merely by expressing apprehension arising from the professional standing or influence of the opposite party.
Justice Mandeep Pannu made these observations while dismissing an application seeking the transfer of a civil recovery suit pending before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Panipat, to another competent court in Haryana. The applicant had sought the transfer primarily on the ground that respondent No. 1 was a senior practising advocate at the District Courts, Panipat, and that his professional influence could adversely affect the applicant’s ability to secure effective legal representation and a fair hearing.
The dispute originated from a civil suit for recovery instituted in 2022 by respondent No. 1 against the applicant and respondent No. 2. The proceedings were pending before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Panipat. During the pendency of the suit, the applicant expressed apprehension regarding the fairness of continuing the litigation before the courts at Panipat because the plaintiff was an advocate practising in the same district judiciary.
According to the applicant, the professional standing and influence enjoyed by respondent No. 1 within the local legal community created circumstances in which the applicant might not be able to obtain effective legal assistance. The applicant further pointed out that he had been proceeded against ex parte on two occasions because his counsel had failed to appear before the court. He also referred to the failure of his counsel to file a reply on his behalf to an application under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act.
These circumstances, according to the applicant, justified transferring the pending civil suit to another court where the influence allegedly exercised by the opposite party would not affect the proceedings.
Respondent No. 1 opposed the transfer application, maintaining that professional status alone could not be treated as a ground for shifting a judicial proceeding. It was also pointed out that both ex parte orders had subsequently been set aside with respondent No. 1 expressing no objection to their recall. The respondent further argued that if the applicant lacked confidence in the local Bar at Panipat, he could engage an advocate practising in the neighbouring District Courts at Karnal.
The controversy therefore required the High Court to examine the scope of its discretionary jurisdiction under Section 24 CPC and determine whether the professional position of a litigant, without any specific allegation of bias or demonstrated interference, could justify transferring a pending civil suit.
Section 24 CPC empowers the High Court and District Court to transfer or withdraw suits, appeals and other proceedings at any stage, subject to the conditions prescribed by the provision. The power is intended to facilitate the proper administration of justice and ensure that judicial proceedings are conducted fairly and conveniently. However, it is not an unrestricted power that can be invoked merely because a litigant feels uncomfortable with the existing forum.
Rejecting the applicant’s apprehension as insufficiently supported, the High Court reiterated that the administration of justice cannot operate on speculative assumptions concerning the professional influence of members of the legal fraternity. The Court accordingly dismissed the transfer application.
Arguments of the Parties:
The applicant sought transfer of the pending recovery suit on the ground that respondent No. 1 was a senior practising advocate before the District Courts at Panipat. According to the applicant, the professional standing and influence of the respondent within the local legal community created a reasonable apprehension that the proceedings might not be conducted in an atmosphere where the applicant could effectively protect his legal interests.
The applicant’s counsel argued that the presence of a practising advocate as the opposite party could place the applicant at a disadvantage, particularly when the advocate was professionally connected with the same judicial establishment before which the dispute was pending.
It was submitted that the applicant was concerned not merely about the formal conduct of the proceedings but also about his ability to obtain effective legal assistance. The applicant apprehended that the professional influence of respondent No. 1 could make it difficult for him to secure proper representation and pursue his defence effectively before the courts at Panipat.
To substantiate this apprehension, the applicant relied upon the procedural developments that had taken place in the pending suit.
It was pointed out that the applicant had been proceeded against ex parte on two separate occasions because his counsel had failed to appear before the trial court. According to the applicant, these incidents demonstrated the difficulties he was facing in effectively defending the proceedings.
The applicant also referred to an application under Section 73 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, in respect of which no reply had been filed on his behalf. This was relied upon as another circumstance suggesting that the applicant was not receiving adequate legal assistance in the ongoing proceedings.
On the basis of these circumstances, the applicant contended that continuing the litigation at Panipat would place him at an unfair disadvantage. He therefore requested the High Court to exercise its powers under Section 24 CPC and transfer the civil suit to another competent court in Haryana.
On the other hand, respondent No. 1 strongly opposed the application and argued that the professional status of a litigating party could not, by itself, justify the transfer of a judicial proceeding.
Counsel for respondent No. 1 submitted that practising advocates are entitled to approach courts and participate in litigation in the same manner as other citizens. Their professional association with the local judiciary cannot automatically become a reason for denying them the opportunity to litigate before the courts where they ordinarily practise.
It was further argued that the applicant had failed to identify any specific incident demonstrating that respondent No. 1 had misused his professional position or exercised influence to prejudice the applicant’s interests.
Respondent No. 1 also addressed the applicant’s reliance on the two ex parte orders. It was pointed out that both orders had subsequently been set aside by the concerned court and that respondent No. 1 had expressed no objection to their recall.
Therefore, according to the respondent, the applicant could not rely upon those orders as evidence of prejudice, particularly when the procedural disadvantage arising from them had already been addressed by the trial court.
The respondent also argued that the applicant’s alleged difficulty in obtaining legal representation at Panipat did not justify transferring the entire suit. If the applicant lacked confidence in the advocates practising at Panipat, he remained free to engage an advocate from another district.
In this regard, counsel specifically submitted that the applicant could seek legal assistance from advocates practising before the neighbouring District Courts at Karnal. Thus, the alleged difficulty in obtaining representation could be addressed without disturbing the territorial and procedural arrangement governing the pending litigation.
Respondent No. 1 accordingly maintained that the transfer application was based on a general apprehension rather than any objective material establishing a genuine threat to the fairness of the proceedings.
The parties’ competing submissions consequently centred on whether the professional standing of an advocate, coupled with procedural difficulties experienced by the opposite party, could satisfy the legal threshold required for exercising the transfer jurisdiction under Section 24 CPC.
Court’s Judgment:
The Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the transfer application, holding that the mere fact that respondent No. 1 was a practising advocate at the District Courts, Panipat, did not provide sufficient justification for transferring the pending civil suit.
Justice Mandeep Pannu emphasised that the power conferred under Section 24 CPC must be exercised judiciously and on the basis of relevant considerations. A transfer cannot be ordered merely because one party expresses apprehension about the professional position or influence of the opposite party.
The Court explained that the purpose of transfer jurisdiction is to protect the fairness of judicial proceedings and ensure that litigants receive an effective opportunity to present their respective cases. However, the existence of a genuine apprehension must be established through material capable of demonstrating that the continuation of the proceedings before the existing court could result in prejudice or undermine the administration of justice.
Mere apprehension cannot justify transfer under Section 24 CPC
The Court began by reiterating the settled principle that a transfer application cannot succeed merely on the basis of a litigant’s subjective apprehension.
It observed that the power under Section 24 CPC is discretionary and must be exercised after considering the circumstances of the particular case. Relevant considerations may include actual hardship faced by the parties, the convenience of conducting the proceedings and, most importantly, the overarching requirement of ensuring a fair trial.
The provision is intended to prevent situations in which the continuation of proceedings before a particular court may genuinely compromise the fairness of the adjudicatory process. At the same time, the power cannot be invoked as a routine measure whenever a party expresses dissatisfaction with the existing forum.
The Court observed:
“It is trite that a mere apprehension, unsupported by cogent and tangible material, cannot form the basis for transferring judicial proceedings. Accepting such a plea solely on the ground that one of the litigating parties happens to be a practising Advocate would not only be contrary to the settled legal position but could also result in an unwarranted exclusion of members of the legal fraternity from litigating before the Courts where they ordinarily practise.”
This observation reflects the distinction between a genuine apprehension of prejudice and a general assumption based on the professional identity of a litigant.
The Court made it clear that the law does not presume that an advocate practising before a particular court will necessarily enjoy an improper advantage over the opposing party. Such an assumption, without supporting material, would undermine the equality of litigants before the law.
The professional status of an advocate cannot be treated as an automatic disqualification from participating in litigation before the courts where that advocate ordinarily practises.
If such a principle were accepted, advocates could effectively be prevented from pursuing their own legal disputes before their local courts merely because of their professional association with the Bar. The Court considered such a consequence unacceptable.
Reliance on DAV College, Hoshiarpur Society (Regd.) v. D.M. Sharma
In reaching its conclusion, the High Court relied upon its earlier decision in DAV College, Hoshiarpur Society (Regd.) v. D.M. Sharma, reported in 2005(1) RCR (Civil) 71.
In that decision, the High Court had examined whether the fact that a litigant was a practising advocate could independently justify the transfer of proceedings.
The earlier judgment recognised that circumstances may arise in which a particular relationship or association between an advocate and the Presiding Officer could create a genuine apprehension regarding the fairness of the proceedings. Where such a relationship is established through appropriate material, it may constitute a relevant consideration while deciding a transfer application.
However, the mere fact that one party happens to be a practising advocate, without anything further, cannot be considered sufficient.
The earlier decision had cautioned against adopting a general rule that would require all cases involving members of the legal fraternity to be contested outside the places where those advocates ordinarily practise.
The Court had observed:
“In a given case there may be the possibility of establishing the relationship of a particular Advocate with the Presiding Officer and the same may constitute a ground for transfer but merely because the litigant is a practicing Advocate without anything more would not constitute a valid ground for transfer of the case.”
It further explained that accepting such a general proposition would result in an impermissible exclusion of members of the legal fraternity from litigating before their ordinary courts.
The Supreme Court’s broader principles concerning fair trial and transfer of proceedings were not separately invoked in the present decision; rather, the High Court applied its own earlier ruling to the factual circumstances before it.
By relying on DAV College, the Court reaffirmed that the relevant consideration is not whether a litigant is professionally connected with the local judiciary, but whether there is credible material showing that such a connection is likely to affect the fairness of the proceedings.
No allegation of bias against the Presiding Officer
Applying the above principles to the facts, the Court found that the applicant had failed to establish any specific circumstances demonstrating that the proceedings before the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Panipat, were likely to be influenced by the professional position of respondent No. 1.
The Bench acknowledged that respondent No. 1 was indeed a practising advocate at the District Courts, Panipat. However, this fact alone could not justify transferring the civil suit.
More importantly, the applicant had not alleged any specific bias on the part of the Presiding Officer.
The Court also noted that there was no allegation identifying any particular relationship or association between respondent No. 1 and the Presiding Officer that could reasonably give rise to an apprehension that the proceedings would not be conducted fairly.
This distinction was important because a transfer application based on apprehended prejudice must identify circumstances that connect the alleged influence with the administration of the proceedings.
A general assertion that an advocate enjoys professional standing or influence within the local legal community does not establish that the Presiding Officer would act unfairly or that the judicial process would be compromised.
The Court further found that the applicant had not pointed out any specific instance in which respondent No. 1 had misused his professional position to interfere with the proceedings or adversely affect the applicant’s interests.
Consequently, the applicant’s apprehension remained unsupported by the kind of objective material required to justify the exercise of transfer jurisdiction.
Two ex parte orders did not establish prejudice
The High Court also examined the applicant’s reliance on the two occasions when he had been proceeded against ex parte because his counsel failed to appear.
The applicant had attempted to use these incidents to demonstrate the difficulties he faced in defending the suit before the Panipat courts.
However, the Court found that this argument did not establish any connection between the ex parte orders and the alleged professional influence of respondent No. 1.
It was particularly significant that both orders had subsequently been set aside by the court concerned. Respondent No. 1 had also expressed no objection to their recall.
The Court observed:
“Although the applicant has been proceeded against ex parte on two occasions, it is equally noteworthy that the orders in question were subsequently set aside by the Court concerned, with respondent No. 1 having expressed no objection to the same.”
The Bench therefore held that the mere passing of such orders, especially when they had subsequently been recalled, could not establish that the applicant had suffered prejudice because of the opposite party’s professional standing.
The Court’s reasoning indicates that procedural difficulties occurring during litigation must be examined in their proper context. Every adverse procedural order does not necessarily demonstrate bias, interference or an unfair trial.
Where an order has subsequently been recalled and the applicant has not established any improper conduct attributable to the opposite party, the incident cannot automatically become a ground for transferring the entire proceeding.
The applicant was required to demonstrate more than the existence of procedural setbacks. He had to establish a reasonable connection between those setbacks and the alleged influence of respondent No. 1.
No such material was placed before the Court.
Difficulty in securing legal representation was not sufficient
The Court also considered the applicant’s contention that he was unable to obtain effective legal assistance at Panipat because respondent No. 1 was a senior practising advocate there.
The respondent had countered this submission by pointing out that the applicant was free to engage an advocate practising in the neighbouring District Courts at Karnal.
The Court found no sufficient basis to conclude that the applicant’s alleged difficulty in obtaining legal representation required the transfer of the civil suit.
The existence of professional relationships within a local Bar cannot, without supporting circumstances, be presumed to prevent a litigant from securing legal assistance.
The applicant had not demonstrated that respondent No. 1 had actively obstructed his efforts to engage counsel or had used professional influence to prevent him from effectively participating in the proceedings.
Therefore, the applicant’s concerns regarding legal representation did not satisfy the threshold for exercising jurisdiction under Section 24 CPC.
Section 24 CPC is a discretionary power, not an automatic remedy
The decision also reiterates the nature and purpose of Section 24 CPC.
The provision empowers the High Court or District Court to transfer or withdraw a suit, appeal or other proceeding pending before a subordinate court, subject to the statutory requirements. Such power may be exercised at any stage of the proceedings and is intended to facilitate the proper administration of justice.
However, the existence of this power does not mean that a litigant can demand transfer as a matter of right.
The Court must examine whether the circumstances genuinely warrant such an order. The convenience and hardship of the parties, the possibility of prejudice and the need to preserve confidence in the fairness of judicial proceedings are relevant considerations.
The overriding objective is to ensure that justice is administered fairly, rather than to accommodate unsupported apprehensions or speculative allegations.
In the present case, the applicant had failed to establish any specific bias, improper association, misuse of professional influence or nterference with the proceedings. The two ex parte orders had also been recalled, and n