Introduction:

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has clarified that a trial court cannot reject an application seeking permission to record evidence through video conferencing merely because the applicant has not produced a medical certificate to substantiate physical infirmity. The Court held that the Video Conferencing Rules framed by the High Court already recognise physical infirmity and sickness as circumstances in which a person may be permitted to give evidence through video conferencing. Therefore, the absence of a medical certificate at the preliminary stage cannot, by itself, be treated as a sufficient ground to refuse such a request.

The ruling was delivered by Justice Deepinder Singh Nalwa in Daljitinder Kaur @ Daljit Inder Arora v. Amarinder Singh Brar and Others, CR-6441-2026 (O&M). The dispute arose from an application filed by the petitioner-plaintiff, a 72-year-old woman suffering from arthritis and advised to undergo knee replacement, seeking permission to record her evidence through video conferencing.

The petitioner approached the High Court after the trial court rejected her request. The trial court had declined the application principally on the ground that the petitioner had not furnished a medical certificate to establish the physical difficulty relied upon for seeking video-conferencing facilities.

The High Court found this approach too restrictive. It examined the Video Conferencing Rules framed by the High Court in exercise of its powers under Articles 225 and 227 of the Constitution. These Rules contemplate the recording of evidence through video conferencing in appropriate circumstances, including where a person is unable to reach the Court Point or the Remote Point because of sickness or physical infirmity.

The Court’s interpretation places emphasis on the purpose of the Video Conferencing Rules. The Rules are intended to facilitate the administration of justice while maintaining the reliability and authenticity of judicial proceedings. They do not create an inflexible requirement that every applicant seeking video-conferencing facilities on the ground of physical infirmity must necessarily produce a medical certificate before the court can even consider the request.

The controversy was therefore not whether medical evidence could ever be relevant. Rather, the question was whether the mere absence of a medical certificate should automatically defeat an application despite the applicant’s age, health condition and the existence of a regulatory framework permitting evidence through video conferencing.

The High Court answered that question in the negative.

Justice Nalwa noted that the Rules themselves provide for examination of persons through video conferencing in appropriate cases of sickness or physical infirmity. Consequently, the trial court was required to consider the request in the context of the Rules and the circumstances of the individual applicant instead of treating the absence of a medical certificate as an absolute bar.

The Court also considered the safeguards incorporated in the Video Conferencing Rules. These safeguards are designed to preserve the sanctity of evidence recorded remotely. They include verification of the identity of the person being examined, administration of oath, recording of objections, preservation of the audio-visual recording and incorporation of the signed transcript into the judicial record.

The existence of these safeguards was important to the Court’s reasoning. Allowing a witness to give evidence through video conferencing does not mean abandoning the procedural protections ordinarily applicable to examination before a court. The technological mode changes, but the essential judicial safeguards remain intact.

The case also illustrates the judiciary’s increasing recognition that procedural rules must be applied in a manner that facilitates access to justice. Physical attendance in court can impose significant burdens on elderly or physically infirm litigants. Where technology can enable a person to participate effectively without compromising the integrity of the proceedings, courts must consider whether such a facility is appropriate in the circumstances.

In the present case, the petitioner was 72 years old and suffering from arthritis. She had also been advised knee replacement. These circumstances were considered relevant by the High Court in assessing the reasonableness of her request.

The Court did not, however, grant an unconditional direction that her evidence must necessarily be recorded through video conferencing. Instead, it adopted a balanced approach. The trial court’s order was set aside, and the petitioner was permitted to file a fresh application along with supporting documents.

The High Court directed that if such an application was filed, the trial court should consider it in accordance with law and in the light of the Video Conferencing Rules, particularly the provisions governing examination of persons through video conferencing. The trial court was also specifically directed to take into account the petitioner’s age and medical condition.

Thus, the judgment does not dispense with judicial scrutiny of applications for video-conferencing facilities. Instead, it prevents the application of an overly technical condition that effectively forecloses consideration of the request at the threshold.

The ruling is significant in the context of modern judicial procedure because video conferencing has increasingly become an accepted means of facilitating participation in legal proceedings. The Court’s decision reinforces the principle that procedural mechanisms should not become obstacles to a litigant’s meaningful access to the justice system, particularly when the rules themselves provide a technological alternative.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioner-plaintiff, Daljitinder Kaur @ Daljit Inder Arora, challenged the trial court’s rejection of her request to record evidence through video conferencing. Her case was that her physical condition made personal attendance before the court difficult. At the age of 72, she was suffering from arthritis and had been advised knee replacement.

The petitioner contended that the Video Conferencing Rules framed by the Punjab and Haryana High Court expressly contemplate examination of persons through video conferencing where sickness or physical infirmity prevents them from reaching the Court Point or Remote Point. Therefore, the trial court ought to have considered her application on its merits rather than rejecting it merely because a medical certificate had not accompanied the request.

The petitioner essentially argued that the Rules did not make the production of a medical certificate an absolute precondition for consideration of every application based on physical infirmity. The trial court, according to the petitioner, had therefore introduced an additional procedural requirement that was not found in the Rules.

The petitioner’s age and health condition were also placed before the High Court as relevant circumstances. She was not merely relying upon a vague assertion of inconvenience. Her medical condition included arthritis and a recommendation for knee replacement, which, according to her case, made physical travel to the court substantially burdensome.

The petitioner further relied upon the safeguards incorporated into the Video Conferencing Rules. Since the Rules provide mechanisms for identity verification, administration of oath, recording of objections, preservation of the audio-visual proceedings and maintenance of the signed transcript, permitting evidence through video conferencing would not compromise the integrity of the trial.

The petitioner therefore sought interference with the trial court’s order and permission to pursue her request for remote examination in accordance with the applicable Rules.

The respondents, on the other hand, defended the trial court’s approach. Their position was that a person seeking exemption from physical appearance or seeking to record evidence through video conferencing on the ground of physical infirmity should substantiate the medical condition relied upon.

From the respondents’ perspective, the requirement of supporting material serves an important procedural purpose. A court must be satisfied that the circumstances relied upon genuinely justify departure from the ordinary mode of recording evidence. A medical certificate can provide an objective basis for determining whether the alleged physical condition is sufficiently serious to warrant video-conferencing facilities.

The respondents could therefore contend that the trial court was justified in seeking proof of the petitioner’s physical infirmity before permitting her to give evidence remotely. Without adequate supporting material, the court could reasonably be concerned about whether the request was genuinely necessitated by health circumstances or merely intended to avoid personal appearance.

The underlying concern was also connected with the conduct of judicial proceedings. Recording evidence is a significant stage in a trial, and courts must ensure that witnesses remain properly identified, available for examination and cross-examination, and subject to the procedural safeguards governing testimony.

The respondents could thus argue that permitting video conferencing should not become automatic merely upon an assertion of illness or inconvenience. Some degree of judicial satisfaction regarding the factual basis of the request is necessary.

However, the petitioner’s response was that there is a distinction between requiring a court to be satisfied about the genuineness of a request and treating the absence of one particular document as an absolute ground for rejection. The former is consistent with the Rules; the latter is not.

The High Court ultimately accepted this distinction. It did not hold that medical documentation is irrelevant or that a trial court must grant every application for video-conferencing. Rather, it held that the absence of a medical certificate, at the stage of consideration of the application, cannot by itself be used to reject the request, particularly when the Rules expressly recognise physical infirmity as a relevant ground.

The Court’s approach therefore sought to preserve the trial court’s discretion while preventing that discretion from being exercised mechanically.

The petitioner was consequently permitted to file a fresh application along with other relevant documents. This ensured that the trial court would have an opportunity to evaluate the request comprehensively while being guided by the High Court’s interpretation of the Video Conferencing Rules.

The competing submissions thus reflected two legitimate considerations. On one side was the need for procedural discipline and reliable verification of a litigant’s physical condition. On the other was the need to ensure that procedural requirements do not unnecessarily prevent elderly or physically infirm persons from participating in judicial proceedings.

The High Court’s decision sought to reconcile both concerns by requiring proper consideration of the application rather than imposing an automatic documentary threshold.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice Deepinder Singh Nalwa set aside the trial court’s order rejecting the petitioner’s application and permitted her to submit a fresh application for recording her evidence through video conferencing.

The central issue before the High Court was whether the absence of a medical certificate could, by itself, justify rejection of an application founded upon physical infirmity. The Court answered this question in the negative.

The High Court referred to the Video Conferencing Rules framed by it under Articles 225 and 227 of the Constitution. These Rules specifically contemplate recording evidence through video conferencing where a person is unable to reach the Court Point or Remote Point because of sickness or physical infirmity.

This provision was crucial to the Court’s reasoning. Since the Rules themselves recognise physical infirmity as a legitimate circumstance for permitting remote examination, an application invoking such a circumstance cannot be rejected mechanically merely because one particular form of supporting document has not been filed.

The Court observed that the mere absence of a medical certificate at the stage of consideration of the application could not be made the basis for rejecting the prayer. The trial court was required to examine the request in the context of the Rules and the circumstances placed before it.

The judgment does not mean that medical evidence can never be sought. Rather, it means that the requirement cannot be elevated into an inflexible threshold that prevents the court from considering the substance of the application.

This distinction is particularly important because procedural rules are intended to facilitate the administration of justice, not frustrate it. A court retains the authority to seek appropriate material where necessary, but the absence of a particular document should not automatically defeat a request when the governing Rules themselves contemplate flexibility.

The Court also considered the petitioner’s personal circumstances. She was 72 years old, suffered from arthritis, and had been advised knee replacement. These facts provided a substantial basis for considering whether requiring her to attend the court physically for recording evidence would impose an unreasonable burden.

The Court did not treat age alone as an automatic entitlement to video conferencing. Instead, it considered age and medical condition together with the applicable procedural framework. This approach preserves judicial discretion while ensuring that individual circumstances receive meaningful consideration.

Another significant aspect of the judgment concerns the safeguards available under the Video Conferencing Rules. The Court noted that the Rules contain adequate measures to ensure the sanctity and authenticity of evidence recorded through video conferencing.

These safeguards include verification of the identity of the person being examined, administration of oath, recording of objections, preservation of the audio-visual recording and incorporation of the signed transcript into the judicial record.

The Court’s reference to these safeguards addresses a possible concern about whether remote testimony compromises the reliability of judicial evidence. The Rules provide mechanisms intended to ensure that the person giving evidence is properly identified and that the proceedings are accurately recorded.

The administration of oath remains an integral part of the examination. Similarly, objections raised during the recording of evidence can be recorded, ensuring that the opposing party retains the opportunity to challenge admissibility or procedure in accordance with law.

The preservation of the audio-visual recording further provides an evidentiary and procedural record of the remote examination. The signed transcript can then form part of the judicial record, maintaining continuity between the technology-assisted proceedings and the formal court record.

Thus, the High Court recognised that video conferencing is not an informal substitute for judicial examination. It is a regulated mode of conducting proceedings subject to safeguards designed to preserve procedural integrity.

The judgment also reflects a broader principle of access to justice. A legal system must not only provide courts and remedies in theory but must also make it reasonably possible for litigants to participate in proceedings. For elderly or physically infirm persons, compulsory physical attendance may impose substantial difficulties.

Where the court’s own rules provide an alternative means of participation, that alternative should be considered fairly and in accordance with the governing framework.

The Court therefore rejected a purely technical approach to the petitioner’s request. The trial court’s order had effectively prevented further consideration of the application because a medical certificate had not been produced. The High Court held that this was not a sufficient basis for rejection.

At the same time, the High Court adopted a measured remedy rather than directly ordering the recording of the petitioner’s evidence through video conferencing. It allowed the petitioner to file a fresh application seeking such permission, accompanied by other relevant documents.

This approach preserves the trial court’s role as the court conducting the proceedings. The trial court remains responsible for determining whether video conferencing is appropriate in the circumstances, but it must exercise that discretion in accordance with the High Court’s Rules and without treating the absence of a medical certificate as an automatic disqualification.

The High Court expressly directed that, if a fresh application is filed, the trial court must consider it in accordance with law and in light of the Video Conferencing Rules, particularly the provisions concerning examination of persons through video conferencing.

The trial court was also directed to take into consideration the age and medical condition of the petitioner-plaintiff. This direction ensures that the ultimate decision is based upon the actual circumstances of the litigant rather than a rigid documentary requirement.

The judgment therefore establishes a useful procedural principle: the existence of a rule-based mechanism for video-conferencing must be given meaningful effect, and technical objections should not automatically defeat an application that falls within the scope of that mechanism.

The ruling is also significant because it recognises the difference between procedural safeguards and procedural obstacles. Safeguards such as identity verification, oath, recording of objections and preservation of the proceedings protect the integrity of the judicial process. By contrast, insisting upon a particular document as an absolute precondition, without considering the surrounding circumstances, can unnecessarily restrict access to the process.

The Court’s reasoning is consistent with the broader judicial preference for deciding cases on their merits rather than allowing procedural technicalities to defeat legitimate participation. While procedural requirements remain important, they must ordinarily serve the administration of justice rather than become ends in themselves.

The decision also highlights the evolving role of technology in the justice system. Video conferencing is no longer merely an emergency arrangement or an exceptional convenience. Where appropriately regulated, it can provide a practical means of enabling witnesses and litigants to participate in judicial proceedings despite geographical, medical or physical constraints.

At the same time, the Court’s decision does not suggest that every request for video-conferencing must be accepted. The relevant Rules continue to govern the exercise of discretion, and courts retain the power to examine the facts of each case. The applicant must still establish circumstances that justify the use of the facility, and the court may impose appropriate safeguards.

What the judgment prohibits is the mechanical rejection of an application solely because a medical certificate was not initially furnished.

The distinction is important. A court may ask for a medical certificate or other supporting material if it considers such material necessary. But it cannot assume that the absence of that document automatically ends the matter, particularly when the applicant’s circumstances and the governing Rules warrant consideration.

The judgment also demonstrates the importance of judicial sensitivity towards vulnerablelitigants. A 72-year-old person suffering from arthritis and advis