Introduction:

In Daljit Singh Grewal alias Bhola and others v. State of Punjab and others, the Punjab and Haryana High Court was called upon to examine whether an FIR registered in 2015 against former MLA Simarjeet Singh Bains and others, arising out of protests connected to the Bargari sacrilege incident, could be quashed on the ground that offences mentioned in the FIR required compliance with Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. The petitioners sought to invalidate not only the FIR but also the subsequent orders passed by the Judicial Magistrate First Class directing further investigation and the supplementary chargesheet filed under Section 173(8) CrPC. The controversy centered around the alleged violation of Section 144 CrPC, obstruction of police personnel, and an alleged attempt to evade arrest by directing a driver to run the vehicle over the police party. Justice Tribhuvan Dahiya examined whether the bar under Section 195 CrPC—which restricts courts from taking cognizance of certain offences except upon a complaint by a public servant or the court concerned—could be invoked at the FIR or investigation stage. The case also involved references to inquiry commission recommendations and objections raised by the accused based on a Supreme Court judgment in Devendra Kumar, which clarified the scope of Section 195 CrPC.

Arguments of the Petitioners:

The petitioners argued that the FIR was liable to be quashed because it pertained to offences for which compliance with Section 195 CrPC was mandatory. According to them, the alleged offences involved obstructing public servants and disobeying lawful orders, falling within the fold of Section 195(1)(a), and therefore, the Magistrate could not have taken cognizance unless a written complaint was made by the public servant concerned. They contended that the FIR was lodged merely on the basis of a report from the Assistant Commissioner of Police Control Room, and such a report could not substitute for a formal complaint contemplated under Section 195. Furthermore, they emphasized that the continuation of investigation or filing of chargesheets without such a complaint rendered the entire process void and an abuse of law. The petitioners also relied heavily on the inquiry commission’s recommendation that the FIR be cancelled, arguing that the police and prosecution had ignored the findings of the commission and persisted in pursuing a case devoid of legal foundation. They challenged the Magistrate’s 2019 order directing further investigation, asserting that there was no fresh material to justify reopening of the probe and that such an order amounted to an arbitrary exercise of authority. The petitioners further alleged mala fides, political vendetta, and misuse of criminal process, submitting that the protests in question were peaceful expressions of public anguish following the highly sensitive Bargari sacrilege incident. They also insisted that the supplementary chargesheet filed in 2021 was illegal because it attempted to bolster a fundamentally defective FIR. In essence, the petitioners’ stand was that non-compliance with Section 195 CrPC at the very inception of the case rendered all subsequent proceedings untenable and liable to be quashed to prevent harassment and needless prosecution.

Arguments of the State and Respondents:

The State of Punjab and other respondents opposed the plea for quashing and asserted that the petitioners had misconstrued the scope and application of Section 195 CrPC. The respondents maintained that Section 195 restricts only the court’s power to take cognizance of specific offences and does not bar the registration of an FIR, the conduct of police investigation, or the filing of a chargesheet. They cited the Supreme Court’s judgment in Devendra Kumar to demonstrate that the statutory bar operates at the stage when a Magistrate decides whether to take cognizance but has no relevance at the preliminary stages of criminal proceedings. According to them, the petitioners’ argument that the FIR was vitiated from its inception was legally untenable. The State also contended that the allegations in the FIR—violating prohibitory orders under Section 144 CrPC, obstructing police personnel, and attempting to flee arrest—were serious and required thorough investigation. They pointed out that the petitioners’ conduct during the protest was not peaceful but amounted to active defiance of lawful police orders, threatening the safety of officers and disturbing public order. Regarding the inquiry commission recommendations, the respondents emphasized that such reports are advisory in nature and do not bind either the police or the Magistrate. The Magistrate was well within jurisdiction to direct further investigation in 2019, especially when the material on record warranted a deeper probe. The State further argued that the petitioners’ attempt to invoke Section 195 at the investigation stage was premature and intended to derail the legal process. They insisted that the proper time to raise such objections would be when the Magistrate considers whether to take cognizance on the final police report. Thus, the respondents contended that the petitioners’ plea was misguided, premature, and designed to obstruct the legitimate prosecution of allegations arising from a sensitive public order situation.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice Tribhuvan Dahiya of the Punjab & Haryana High Court delivered a detailed judgment rejecting the petitioners’ plea to quash the FIR, the Magistrate’s order for further investigation, and the supplementary chargesheet. The Court held unequivocally that Section 195 CrPC does not bar the registration of an FIR or the conduct of a police investigation. Rather, it restricts only the Court’s power to take cognizance of certain specified offences unless a written complaint is filed by the public servant or court concerned. This distinction, the Court observed, is critical to maintaining the proper functioning of criminal procedure. Referring to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Devendra Kumar, the High Court reiterated that the statutory bar applies solely at the stage of cognizance. Therefore, any alleged non-compliance with Section 195 at the FIR or investigation stage is irrelevant and cannot constitute a ground for quashing proceedings. The judgment emphasized that procedural compliance with Section 195 must be examined only when the Magistrate is called upon to decide whether to take cognizance of the offences alleged in the police report. Since that stage had not yet arisen in this case, the petitioners’ objections were premature. The Court further noted that the inquiry commission’s recommendations to cancel the FIR had no binding force on either the investigating agency or the Magistrate. The Magistrate’s 2019 direction for further investigation was held to be proper and within legal bounds, especially since the Magistrate is empowered under the CrPC to require deeper investigation when necessary to uncover the truth. The Court also observed that the allegations in the FIR, particularly those involving violation of Section 144, obstruction of police officials, and attempting to flee arrest by allegedly instructing a driver to “run the vehicle over the police party,” could not be lightly brushed aside or quashed without trial. These allegations, the Court held, merited thorough investigation and judicial scrutiny at the appropriate stage. Ultimately, the High Court dismissed the petition, reaffirming that the criminal process need not be stifled at a premature stage, especially when a statutory bar is wrongly invoked to halt proceedings that are otherwise legally permissible. The judgment reinforces the legal position that Section 195 CrPC protects judicial process but does not shield accused persons from investigation into genuine allegations.