Introduction:

In a significant reaffirmation of constitutional freedoms, the Karnataka High Court in Hindu Sammelana Samithi v. The Commissioner of Police, Belagavi and Others (Writ Petition Nos. 100782 and 100783 of 2026) set aside police notices that prohibited two invited speakers from addressing a proposed public programme titled “Hindu Sammelana,” scheduled to be held on 6 February 2026 and 8 February 2026 in Belagavi. The matter was heard and decided by Justice Lalita Kanneganti, who emphatically held that the police cannot arbitrarily curtail citizens’ fundamental rights to free speech and peaceful assembly merely on vague apprehensions or past criminal cases, without recording reasons or placing any supporting material on record. The petition was filed by a registered society organising the Hindu Sammelana, which had approached the Assistant Commissioner of Police, Belagavi, seeking permission to conduct the programme and to allow two speakers—Kumari Harika Manjunath and Sri Mithun Chakravathy Devidas Shet @ Chakravathy Sulibeli—to address the gathering. Despite representations made well in advance, the police issued notices rejecting the request solely on the ground that FIRs were registered against the proposed speakers and that their participation might lead to law and order problems. Aggrieved by what they termed an arbitrary, unreasoned, and jurisdictionally flawed action, the petitioners approached the High Court seeking quashing of the notices and protection of their fundamental rights under Articles 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(b) of the Constitution of India.

Arguments on Behalf of the Petitioners:

The petitioners, represented by Senior Advocate Aruna Shyam and Advocate Suraj S. Mutnal, mounted a comprehensive challenge to the police action, contending that the impugned notices—though styled as mere “notices”—were in substance prohibitory orders that directly infringed the fundamental rights of the organisers as well as the invited speakers. It was argued that the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) and the right to assemble peacefully under Article 19(1)(b) are among the most cherished freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution, and any restriction on these rights must strictly conform to the limitations expressly permitted under Article 19(2) and 19(3). The petitioners submitted that the Karnataka Police Act, 1963 does empower the police to regulate public assemblies and processions, but such power is not absolute and must be exercised reasonably, on the basis of tangible material, and for recorded reasons demonstrating a real and imminent threat to public order. In the present case, it was contended, the police had failed to disclose any specific intelligence inputs, past incidents, or contemporaneous material that could justify the prohibition of the two speakers. The mere existence of FIRs against a person, it was argued, cannot automatically render them a threat to public order, especially when there is no conviction and when they have previously addressed similar gatherings without any untoward incident. The petitioners pointed out that both speakers had participated in at least five similar programmes in the past, and at no point had their speeches resulted in violence, disturbance, or breach of peace. This factual aspect, according to the petitioners, completely undermined the speculative apprehensions expressed by the police. It was further argued that the impugned notices were passed without affording any opportunity of hearing to the petitioners or the speakers, thereby violating the principles of natural justice. The police, it was submitted, had effectively assumed the role of a censor, deciding who may or may not speak at a public meeting, which is impermissible in a constitutional democracy. The petitioners also contended that the police lacked jurisdiction to dictate the terms of the programme or to selectively prohibit speakers, especially when permission for the event itself had not been denied on any legally sustainable ground. The action of the police was described as arbitrary, mechanical, and driven by subjective satisfaction rather than objective assessment, warranting interference by the High Court under its writ jurisdiction.

Arguments on Behalf of the State:

Opposing the petitions, the State of Karnataka was represented by Additional Advocate General Gangadhar J.M., who sought to justify the police action on grounds of maintaining public order and preventing potential disturbances. The State submitted that the power of the police to regulate and, in appropriate cases, prohibit public assemblies and speeches flows from the Karnataka Police Act, 1963, which obligates the authorities to take preventive measures to ensure peace and tranquility. It was argued that the decision to prohibit the participation of the two speakers was not arbitrary but was based on previous experiences where their participation had allegedly led to law and order issues. The State contended that the police, being the authority on the ground, are best placed to assess local conditions, sensitivities, and the likelihood of disturbances, and that their preventive action should not be lightly interfered with. It was further submitted that the impugned communication was only a notice and not a final order, and that the petitioners had already responded to the notice. According to the State, the authorities were in the process of considering the petitioners’ reply and would pass further orders after due consideration. The AAG emphasised that the State’s primary concern was to prevent any untoward incident and to safeguard public peace, and that the restriction imposed was a precautionary measure based on past experience. The State thus urged the Court to exercise restraint and not to substitute its own assessment for that of the police authorities, especially in matters concerning law and order.

Court’s Judgment:

After considering the rival submissions, Justice Lalita Kanneganti allowed the writ petitions and quashed the impugned police notices, delivering a reasoned judgment that reaffirmed the constitutional boundaries within which the State must operate while regulating fundamental freedoms. The Court began by reiterating the settled legal position that Article 19(1)(a) guarantees every citizen the right to freedom of speech and expression, while Article 19(1)(b) guarantees the right to assemble peacefully. The Court observed that freedom of speech unquestionably includes the right to express views in a public meeting, and any restriction on this right must fall strictly within the permissible grounds enumerated in the Constitution, such as public order, security of the State, sovereignty and integrity of India, decency, morality, or prevention of incitement to an offence. While acknowledging that the Karnataka Police Act, 1963 empowers the police to regulate public assemblies and even to prohibit them in cases of genuine apprehension of disturbance or violence, the Court made it clear that such power cannot be exercised arbitrarily or mechanically. The Court categorically held that the police cannot stop a person from speaking in a public meeting based on their “whims and fancies,” and that any curtailment of fundamental rights must be supported by reasons and material. Justice Kanneganti placed reliance on the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Anuradha Bhasin v. Union of India, wherein it was held that restrictions on speech must satisfy the test of proportionality and that the State must justify the necessity of such restrictions. Applying these principles, the Court found that the impugned notices were bereft of reasons and did not disclose any concrete material indicating an imminent threat to public order. The mere fact that certain cases were registered against the proposed speakers, the Court held, cannot by itself justify a prohibition on their participation in a public meeting. The Court took note of the petitioners’ submission that the speakers had earlier participated in similar programmes without any untoward incidents, observing that this fact actually strengthened the petitioners’ case. The Court rejected the State’s contention that the notices were only preliminary in nature, holding that even at the stage of issuing such notices, the authorities are required to act in accordance with law and constitutional principles. The absence of reasons, the lack of opportunity of hearing, and the failure to demonstrate proportionality rendered the police action unsustainable. Consequently, the Court quashed the notices dated 22 January 2026 and directed the respondents to consider the representations filed by the petitioners seeking permission for the Hindu Sammelana strictly in accordance with law, particularly the provisions of the Karnataka Police Act. The Court concluded by directing the authorities to act within the confines of the Constitution and the statute, thereby disposing of the writ petitions.