Introduction:

The Calcutta High Court, in Md Danish Farooqui v. The State of West Bengal & Ors., WPA(P) 401 of 2026, considered an important issue concerning the maintainability of a Public Interest Litigation based on allegations of police interference with the use of loudspeakers by mosques. A Division Bench comprising Acting Chief Justice Tapabrata Chakraborty and Justice Atarup Banerjee was called upon to examine allegations that police authorities in West Bengal had orally directed mosque committees to remove loudspeakers, allegedly without establishing any violation of the permissible noise limits prescribed under the law and judicial directions.

The petition raised questions at the intersection of public interest litigation, freedom of religious practice, regulation of noise pollution and the limits of police authority. The petitioner alleged that police officials had conducted meetings with representatives of mosques and orally instructed them to remove loudspeakers. According to the petitioner, such directions were contrary to the legal framework governing the use of sound-amplifying devices because the existing Supreme Court guidelines permit their use subject to compliance with prescribed decibel limits and other regulatory requirements.

The petitioner approached the High Court through a PIL seeking judicial intervention against what was alleged to be an arbitrary administrative practice. The grievance was not presented merely as a private dispute between an individual and the police. Rather, the petitioner sought to place before the Court an alleged issue affecting mosque committees and persons using loudspeakers in several places. The petitioner’s case was that police authorities could not impose a blanket prohibition or demand removal of loudspeakers merely through oral instructions when the law permits their use subject to prescribed conditions.

The State of West Bengal strongly disputed the factual foundation of the PIL. At the hearing, the Advocate General, appearing for the State, stated on instructions that “nothing was done” by the police authorities as alleged by the petitioner. The State further denied that meetings had even been held with representatives of mosque committees for the purpose alleged in the petition.

The Bench specifically questioned the State on this aspect, asking whether even the alleged meetings had taken place. The Advocate General answered in the negative. According to the State, therefore, the petition was founded upon an allegation concerning an event which had neither been established nor supported by reliable documentary material.

The State raised a preliminary objection to the maintainability of the PIL. It argued that the petitioner, a practising advocate, had relied primarily upon alleged verbal instructions from an unidentified authority and newspaper reports. The State contended that the petition did not identify which police or administrative authority had allegedly issued the directions, when the alleged meetings had taken place, where they had occurred, or which particular officers were responsible.

The State also pointed out that although the petitioner referred to information allegedly received from Imams and mosque committee representatives, none of those persons had approached the Court or filed supporting material confirming the alleged police directions. In the State’s submission, the absence of such particulars and supporting evidence rendered the allegations vague and incapable of forming a proper foundation for extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction.

The petitioner, represented by Senior Advocate Kalyan Bandopadhyay, opposed the preliminary objection. He emphasized that a PIL cannot be treated in exactly the same manner as ordinary civil litigation. According to the petitioner, the purpose of public interest jurisdiction is to enable the Court to examine grievances involving a larger public interest, particularly where persons affected by the alleged action may themselves be reluctant or unable to approach the Court.

The petitioner argued that the Court should focus upon the substance of the grievance rather than insist upon the strict evidentiary standards applicable to a civil trial at the threshold stage. He submitted that the petitioner need only place before the Court a sufficient factual foundation or “skeleton of facts” warranting judicial examination.

Despite these submissions, the Division Bench ultimately dismissed the PIL. The Court found that the allegations were not supported by sufficiently specific or reliable material to justify judicial intervention. The decision does not establish a general prohibition on PILs concerning religious institutions or loudspeaker regulation. Instead, it underscores the requirement that public interest litigation must have a credible factual foundation and cannot rest merely on vague assertions, unverified reports or allegations concerning unidentified authorities.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioner, Md Danish Farooqui, approached the Calcutta High Court claiming that police authorities in West Bengal were allegedly interfering with the use of loudspeakers by mosque committees. The petitioner’s central contention was that certain police officials had conducted meetings with representatives of mosques and orally instructed them to remove loudspeakers. According to the petitioner, such directions amounted to an unlawful restriction because the use of loudspeakers is not prohibited in absolute terms under the applicable legal framework.

The petitioner relied upon the existing Supreme Court directions regulating the use of loudspeakers and public-address systems. His position was that the law establishes permissible noise limits and provides a regulatory mechanism for dealing with violations. Therefore, where a loudspeaker is being used within the permissible limits and in accordance with the applicable rules, the police cannot simply direct its removal without identifying a statutory violation.

The petitioner’s argument was consequently based upon the distinction between regulation and prohibition. He did not contend, as presented before the Court, that loudspeakers could be used without restrictions. Rather, his submission was that authorities must act within the framework of the law. If excessive noise or another statutory violation occurs, appropriate legal action may be taken. However, an oral direction to remove loudspeakers merely because they are installed or used by a mosque would, according to the petitioner, be inconsistent with the regulatory scheme.

Senior Advocate Kalyan Bandopadhyay, appearing for the petitioner, strongly opposed the State’s attempt to characterize the PIL as unsupported. He argued that public interest litigation is different in nature from ordinary adversarial proceedings. The petitioner was not expected to produce the equivalent of a full civil trial record before the Court could examine the grievance.

He questioned the State’s insistence upon documentary proof at the threshold stage and asked whether a PIL should be rejected merely because the petitioner could not place before the Court every piece of evidence that might ultimately be required to establish the allegations. According to the petitioner, the evolution of PIL jurisprudence has deliberately relaxed traditional procedural requirements in appropriate cases so that courts can examine matters affecting sections of society who may not themselves be in a position to approach the judiciary.

The petitioner submitted that the essential question was whether there existed a sufficient factual basis indicating a genuine public grievance. He described this as the “skeleton of facts” necessary for the Court to undertake an inquiry. In his submission, a PIL should not be subjected to the same technical standards as an ordinary civil suit, particularly at the initial stage.

Another important argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner concerned the absence of direct participation by the alleged affected persons. The State repeatedly questioned why the Imams or members of mosque committees allegedly subjected to the police directions had not themselves approached the Court. The petitioner resisted this line of argument by emphasizing that such a requirement would undermine the very nature of PIL jurisdiction.

He submitted that if every person allegedly affected by an administrative action were required to personally appear before the Court, the proceeding could begin to resemble ordinary adversarial litigation. According to him, the essence of a PIL is that a person may bring a matter of public importance to the Court’s attention even when the persons directly affected are not themselves litigating.

The petitioner further argued that the Court should not allow technical objections to defeat consideration of a genuine public grievance. During the hearing, the Bench itself observed that “grievance has to be seen” and that technicalities could not simply determine the outcome of a public interest proceeding. The petitioner relied upon this approach to argue that the substance of the alleged interference should be examined rather than the PIL being rejected at the threshold.

The petitioner maintained that the existing Supreme Court guidelines provided a clear legal framework for loudspeaker use. His submission was that compliance with the prescribed limits should ordinarily determine whether intervention is warranted. In substance, he argued that if the use of a loudspeaker remained within the legally permissible limits, there could be no general police direction requiring its removal merely because it was being used by a mosque.

The State of West Bengal, represented by the Advocate General, adopted a fundamentally different position. The State denied that the police authorities had acted in the manner alleged. On instructions, the Advocate General informed the Court that “nothing was done” by the police authorities as alleged in the petition.

The State’s denial went beyond the alleged issuance of formal directions. When the Bench specifically asked whether meetings between police officials and mosque representatives had even taken place, the Advocate General answered that no such meeting had been held. This became a central factual issue because the principal allegation in the PIL rested upon the existence of such meetings and alleged oral instructions.

The State therefore argued that the petition lacked a factual foundation. The Advocate General pointed out that the petition did not identify the authority that had allegedly issued the verbal instructions. If a police officer or administrative authority had supposedly ordered mosque committees to remove loudspeakers, the petition should, according to the State, have identified the relevant authority and provided particulars concerning the alleged incident.

The State also objected to the petitioner’s reliance upon newspaper reports. It argued that press reports, without independent supporting material, could not automatically establish the truth of allegations against public authorities. A constitutional court exercising PIL jurisdiction must be satisfied that the petition contains credible material demonstrating a genuine public grievance rather than merely reproducing unverified allegations.

The Advocate General further submitted that the petitioner referred to information allegedly obtained from Imams and mosque representatives but did not produce any of those persons before the Court. No affidavit or supporting statement from the persons said to have experienced the alleged police conduct was placed before the Bench. This, according to the State, further weakened the factual basis of the petition.

The State consequently urged the Court to reject the PIL at the threshold. Its argument was not that PIL jurisdiction could never be invoked concerning the regulation of loudspeakers or the rights of religious communities. Rather, its objection was directed at the manner in which the particular petition had been framed. The State contended that constitutional jurisdiction cannot be invoked merely by making broad allegations against unidentified officials without specific facts or documentary support.

The State also relied upon judicial precedents concerning the standards applicable to pleadings in PIL proceedings. It maintained that although PILs are treated more flexibly than ordinary litigation, they are not exempt from the requirement of responsible and credible pleadings. Public interest jurisdiction, according to the State, cannot become a vehicle for conducting an inquiry into allegations that have no identifiable factual foundation.

Court’s Judgment:

The Calcutta High Court ultimately dismissed the PIL filed by Md Danish Farooqui in WPA(P) 401 of 2026. The Division Bench comprising Acting Chief Justice Tapabrata Chakraborty and Justice Atarup Banerjee was not persuaded that the allegations placed before it were sufficiently specific or supported by material capable of justifying judicial intervention.

A significant feature of the proceedings was the State’s categorical denial of the alleged conduct. The Advocate General informed the Court that, on instructions, the police authorities had done nothing of the kind alleged in the petition. More importantly, when the Court specifically tested the factual assertion by asking whether even the alleged meetings with mosque representatives had taken place, the State answered in the negative.

This response exposed the central difficulty with the petition. The allegation was not supported by a specific identification of the authority allegedly responsible for issuing the directions. There was no clear identification of the police personnel involved, no particulars concerning the dates or locations of the alleged meetings and no documentary record establishing that the alleged oral directions had actually been issued.

The Court’s approach reflects a basic principle governing public interest litigation: although procedural requirements may be relaxed in appropriate cases, the foundational facts of a PIL must still be credible and sufficiently identifiable. Public interest jurisdiction is extraordinary in nature. It cannot ordinarily be invoked on the basis of assertions that are so vague that the Court is unable to determine who allegedly acted, what was allegedly done and when the alleged conduct occurred.

The petitioner’s submission that PILs are not equivalent to ordinary civil or criminal trials was not rejected as a general proposition. Indeed, during the hearing, the Bench recognized that PIL proceedings cannot be reduced to rigid technical exercises and observed that the grievance must be examined and that technicalities should not unnecessarily stand in the way.

However, that principle does not mean that factual specificity is irrelevant. The relaxation of procedural rules in PIL proceedings is intended to advance access to justice and address genuine matters of public concern. It is not intended to eliminate the requirement that allegations against public authorities have some credible foundation.

The Court was therefore required to balance two considerations. On one side was the petitioner’s contention that PIL jurisdiction should remain accessible and should not be defeated by technical objections. On the other was the State’s submission that the petition contained vague allegations against unidentified authorities and lacked supporting material.

The Court ultimately accepted the State’s objection in the factual circumstances of the case. The allegations were considered insufficiently specific and unsupported by adequate material. The absence of direct confirmation from the persons allegedly affected further weakened the petitioner’s case.

The judgment is particularly relevant because the subject matter involved religious institutions and the use of loudspeakers. Regulation of sound-amplifying devices is not legally dependent upon the religious identity of the institution using them. The governing framework is concerned with issues such as permissible noise levels, public order and prevention of noise pollution. The Supreme Court has previously laid down regulatory principles concerning the use of loudspeakers and sound-amplifying equipment.

The petitioner attempted to rely upon those principles by arguing that police authorities could act where the prescribed limits were breached but could not impose an unqualified prohibition through oral instructions. The Bench also engaged with this aspect of the petition and considered the existing framework governing loudspeaker use.

Nevertheless, the existence of a legal framework regulating loudspeakers did not automatically establish the factual allegations made in the PIL. There are two distinct questions: what the law permits and whether the alleged unlawful police conduct actually occurred. The Court could recognize the former without necessarily accepting the latter.

This distinction is central to understanding the judgment. The Court did not hold that police authorities are free to disregard Supreme Court directions or statutory noise regulations. Nor did it hold that religious institutions have no legal protection concerning the use of loudspeakers. Instead, the Court dismissed the particular PIL because the allegations that triggered the requested judicial intervention were not sufficiently established.

The judgment therefore reinforces the difference between a legal proposition and a factual assertion. A petitioner may correctly state that the law regulates loudspeakers through prescribed limits, but that proposition alone cannot prove that a particular police authority violated those legal limits or issued an unlawful direction.

The Court’s decision also demonstrates why specificity is particularly important in PIL proceedings. A PIL may have consequences extending beyond the immediate parties. It can call upon the State to explain administrative conduct, require public authorities to produce records and potentially result in directions affecting broader governmental policy. Courts must therefore ensure that such jurisdiction is invoked responsibly.

The petitioner’s argument that the absence of affected Imams or mosque committee members should not defeat a PIL reflects a legitimate aspect of public interest jurisprudence. Direct victims need not always be the petitioners in a genuine PIL. However, the absence of those persons may become relevant where the petitioner’s factual assertions are themselves based upon information allegedly supplied by them and no supporting material is produced.

The State’s reliance upon newspaper reports was also significant. Media reports can sometimes provide the initial basis for judicial attention to a public issue, but the Court must be cautious before treating unverified reports as conclusive proof of alleged administrative misconduct. Where serious allegations are made against police authorities, the Court must have enough material to identify the alleged action and assess whether an actual legal violation has occurred.

The decision consequently does not diminish the constitutional importance of PIL jurisdiction. Instead, it reinforces responsible PIL practice. Public interest litigation is intended to provide access to justice and protect public rights, but the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be converted into a mechanism for conducting an open-ended inquiry based solely on generalized allegations.

The judgment also reflects the constitutional balance between judicial oversight and administrative functioning. Courts have an important role in ensuring that executive authorities act according to law. At the same time, judicial intervention ordinarily requires an identifiable grievance and