Introduction:

The Calcutta High Court has reiterated an important principle governing the enforcement of judicial orders: merely filing an appeal against an order does not suspend its operation unless the appellate court specifically grants a stay. Applying this principle, Justice Rishad Medora dismissed a fresh writ petition filed by a building owner challenging the direction of the Sub-Divisional Officer (SDO), Baruipur, requiring him to demolish a construction declared illegal by the High Court. The Court found that the SDO had acted within the bounds of the earlier judicial directions and had committed no illegality by proceeding with the demolition process in the absence of any order staying the operation of the judgment dated September 23, 2026.

The dispute arose out of a long-running disagreement concerning the legality of a building constructed by the petitioner. The private respondent had initially approached the High Court in 2018, alleging that the construction was unauthorised and seeking its demolition. Although the original writ petition was disposed of in April 2025 without a specific direction for demolition, the private respondent challenged that decision before a Division Bench. The subsequent proceedings led to directions requiring the local authority to examine the construction records, hear the concerned parties and take appropriate action in accordance with law.

On August 25, 2025, the Division Bench directed the SDO, Baruipur, to undertake the necessary examination and pass an appropriate order after granting the parties an opportunity of personal hearing. Significantly, the Division Bench also recorded its prima facie view that the construction appeared to be ex facie illegal and contrary to the provisions of the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973, and the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. It further observed that the Panchayat Act did not contain any provision permitting the regularisation of an illegal construction.

Pursuant to those directions, the SDO passed an order on November 11, 2025, holding that the construction was legal and authorised. The private respondent was dissatisfied with this decision and challenged it before the High Court. On September 23, 2026, the High Court quashed the SDO’s order, declared the construction illegal and unauthorised, and directed the SDO to take the necessary steps for demolition in accordance with law within ten days from the communication of the order.

The petitioner challenged the September 23 decision by filing an appeal bearing MAT 1714 of 2026. When the appeal came up for consideration on October 5, 2026, the petitioner sought an adjournment. The matter was consequently directed to be listed after the Puja Vacation. However, no interim order staying the operation of the September 23 judgment was obtained.

Meanwhile, the SDO proceeded with the implementation of the High Court’s directions. A hearing notice was issued for October 13, 2026, and the SDO subsequently passed an order requiring the petitioner to demolish the construction by October 28, 2026. The authority specifically recorded that although an appeal had been filed against the High Court’s earlier decision, there was no stay preventing its implementation.

The petitioner then instituted another writ petition, this time challenging the SDO’s October 13 order. His principal grievance was that the authority should not have proceeded with demolition while his appeal against the September 23 judgment remained pending. He also alleged that the SDO had misunderstood the earlier High Court order and sought interim protection until his appeal could be heard.

The central legal question before Justice Rishad Medora was therefore whether the mere pendency of an appeal could prevent an administrative authority from implementing an operative judicial direction when no stay had been granted by the appellate court. The decision also raised the broader question of the limits of writ jurisdiction when a petitioner seeks to challenge administrative action taken to implement an existing judicial order.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioner challenged the SDO’s order dated October 13, 2026, primarily on the ground that the underlying dispute had not attained finality because his appeal against the September 23 judgment was still pending before the High Court. According to his contention, the filing of MAT 1714 of 2026 meant that the legality of the construction and the direction for demolition remained under consideration. The SDO, therefore, ought not to have proceeded with the demolition process before the appeal was taken up and decided.

The petitioner sought to establish that the authority’s decision to require demolition by October 28 was premature. His position was that the SDO should have taken into account the pending appellate proceedings instead of proceeding on the assumption that the September 23 judgment could immediately be implemented. He also contended that the SDO had misinterpreted the earlier High Court order and had consequently issued a direction that went beyond what was legally warranted.

An important aspect of the petitioner’s grievance was his request for interim protection. He sought an order preventing demolition until his pending appeal was taken up for hearing. In substance, he wanted the writ court to protect the existing construction while the appellate proceedings continued, thereby preventing the consequences of the September 23 judgment from being implemented in the meantime.

The petitioner’s challenge, however, had to be considered against the procedural history of his appeal. When MAT 1714 of 2026 came up on October 5, 2026, he had sought an adjournment, and the matter was directed to be listed after the Puja Vacation. More importantly, no interim order had been passed staying the September 23 judgment. The petitioner had also not taken any further steps in the appeal after October 5 to obtain protection against the proposed demolition.

The respondents opposed the fresh writ petition and maintained that the SDO’s order had been passed in accordance with law. Their position was that the authority was acting in compliance with the High Court’s earlier directions, which had expressly declared the construction illegal and unauthorised and required necessary steps to be taken for its demolition. Since the operation of that judgment had not been stayed, the SDO was justified in proceeding with its implementation.

The respondents’ opposition rested on the distinction between the pendency of an appeal and the grant of interim relief. Merely approaching an appellate forum does not, by itself, prevent the implementation of the judgment under challenge. Unless the appellate court passes an appropriate order staying the judgment or otherwise protecting the appellant, the operative directions continue to remain enforceable.

They accordingly maintained that the petitioner could not use a fresh writ petition to obtain indirectly the protection that he had not secured in his pending appeal. If he believed that demolition should be deferred, the appropriate course was to seek an interim order in MAT 1714 of 2026. In the absence of such protection, the SDO could not be faulted for complying with the earlier judicial directions.

The respondents further supported the decision-making process adopted by the SDO, arguing that the authority had acted within the framework of the High Court’s judgment and had not exercised its powers arbitrarily or contrary to law. The dispute before the writ court, therefore, was not an occasion to reopen the merits of the earlier declaration of illegality, particularly when that decision was already under challenge in a separate appeal.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice Rishad Medora dismissed the fresh writ petition, finding no legal or procedural basis to interfere with the SDO’s order dated October 13, 2026. The Court held that the authority had correctly recognised that the September 23 judgment remained operative and enforceable because the petitioner had not obtained any stay against it, notwithstanding the filing of MAT 1714 of 2026.

The Court placed particular emphasis on the fact that the September 23 judgment had expressly declared the construction illegal and unauthorised and had directed the SDO to take the necessary steps for demolition in accordance with law. Once that judgment was communicated, its directions were required to be implemented unless a competent court granted an order restraining their operation.

The SDO’s order dated October 13 reflected this legal position. The authority had noted that the petitioner had filed an appeal against the September 23 judgment but had not obtained any stay. Justice Medora found no error in this approach. The Court observed that the SDO had rightly recorded the absence of an interim order and had proceeded on the basis that the earlier judicial directions continued to operate.

The Court’s reasoning reinforces the settled distinction between filing an appeal and obtaining a stay. An appeal is a legal remedy through which an aggrieved party can seek reconsideration of a decision. However, the mere institution of appellate proceedings does not automatically suspend the judgment under challenge. The party seeking protection must obtain an appropriate interim order from the appellate court.

This distinction is significant because an automatic suspension of every challenged order would substantially affect the enforceability of judicial decisions. A litigant could otherwise prevent the implementation of an order simply by filing an appeal, regardless of whether the appellate court had found any reason to grant interim protection. The legal position instead requires the aggrieved party to approach the appellate forum and establish grounds for obtaining a stay.

In the present case, the petitioner had already invoked the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court by filing MAT 1714 of 2026. The appropriate forum for seeking protection against demolition was therefore the Bench hearing that appeal. The Court specifically observed that the petitioner could have obtained protection only through an appropriate order in the pending appeal. However, he had taken no steps in the appeal after October 5, 2026, to secure such relief.

The Court’s observation was particularly relevant in light of the procedural history. When the appeal was taken up on October 5, the petitioner sought an adjournment, and the matter was directed to be listed after the Puja Vacation. The adjournment did not, however, amount to a stay of the September 23 judgment. Nor could the petitioner treat the mere continuation of the appellate proceedings as an order preventing the SDO from acting.

The High Court consequently rejected the petitioner’s attempt to secure interim protection through a separate writ petition. The existence of a pending appeal did not create an automatic legal bar against the implementation of the judgment. If the petitioner considered demolition to be premature or otherwise unjustified, he was required to pursue the appropriate remedy before the appellate Bench and obtain an express order restraining the proposed action.

Another important aspect of the judgment concerned the limited scope of judicial review under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court explained that a writ court is generally concerned with examining the legality of the decision-making process rather than substituting its own view on the merits of every administrative decision. The exercise of writ jurisdiction is directed towards identifying illegality, arbitrariness, procedural impropriety or other recognised grounds for judicial intervention.

Justice Medora observed that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate any illegality or impropriety in the process adopted by the SDO. The authority was not acting independently of the High Court’s directions or attempting to decide an issue that had already been settled by the September 23 judgment. It was taking steps to comply with the directions issued by the Court.

The judgment records the Court’s observation that, “The writ court is generally not concerned with the merits of a decision but with the decision-making process.” Applying this principle, the Court found that the petitioner had not established any defect in the manner in which the SDO had reached the decision to require demolition.

This approach reflects the established distinction between judicial review and an appeal on merits. Judicial review ordinarily examines whether the authority acted within its legal powers, followed the required procedure, considered relevant material and avoided arbitrary or irrational action. It is not intended to provide a fresh opportunity to challenge the substantive correctness of a decision merely because a party disagrees with its consequences.

Here, the SDO’s action had a direct foundation in the September 23 judgment. The High Court had already quashed the earlier administrative order that treated the construction as legal and authorised. It had also declared the construction illegal and unauthorised and directed the authority to take the necessary steps for demolition in accordance with law. The SDO’s subsequent order was therefore an implementation measure arising from an existing judicial direction.

The Court accordingly found no basis to conclude that the SDO had acted beyond the scope of the earlier judgment. The petitioner’s allegation that the authority had misinterpreted the September 23 order was not sufficient to establish procedural illegality, particularly when the authority had correctly noted that no stay had been granted against that judgment.

The legislative context of the dispute also formed part of its background. The earlier Division Bench, while issuing directions on August 25, 2025, had referred to the West Bengal Panchayat Act, 1973, and the West Bengal Land Reforms Act, 1955. It had recorded the view that the construction appeared to be ex facie illegal and contrary to the applicable statutory provisions. The Division Bench had also observed that the Panchayat Act did not contain any provision permitting the regularisation of an illegal construction.

Those observations were followed by the SDO’s order dated November 11, 2025, which treated the building as legal and authorised. That administrative decision was subsequently quashed by the High Court on September 23, 2026. The fresh writ petition, however, was not an appropriate proceeding for reopening the merits of that declaration, especially when the petitioner had already challenged it through a separate appeal.

It is important to distinguish the issue decided in the present proceedings from the substantive question of whether the construction could ultimately withstand the petitioner’s challenge in MAT 1714 of 2026. Justice Medora did not decide the merits of that pending appeal. Nor did the dismissal of the fresh writ petition amount to a separate appellate determination of every issue concerning the legality of the building. The immediate question was whether the SDO could proceed with the implementation of the September 23 judgment in the absence of a stay. The Court answered that question in the affirmative.

The ruling therefore underscores the importance of seeking timely interim relief when challenging an operative judicial order. A party cannot assume that the filing of an appeal will, by itself, preserve the existing position or prevent the other side from acting on the judgment. Where immediate consequences are likely to follow, the litigant must approach the appellate court and obtain appropriate protection rather than rely solely on the pendency of the proceedings.

The decision also highlights the responsibility of administrative authorities to comply with judicial directions unless their operation is suspended by a competent court. An authority cannot ordinarily be expected to disregard an operative judgment merely because one of the affected parties has challenged it. Doing so without an express stay could itself amount to a failure to implement the court’s directions.

Ultimately, the Calcutta High Court dismissed the petition, holding that the petitioner had failed to establish any illegality or procedural impropriety in the SDO’s order. It found that the SDO had correctly proceeded on the basis that the September 23, 2026 judgment remained operative despite the pendency of MAT 1714 of 2026. The fresh writ petition was dismissed without costs, leaving the petitioner to pursue any appropriate relief in the pending appeal.