Introduction:

In a significant judgment clarifying the territorial jurisdiction of civil courts in partition suits involving properties situated across different states and jurisdictions, the Kerala High Court in P.V. Surendran v. Kavitha Rajendran and Others, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (Ker) 299, held that a suit for partition can be instituted in any court within whose territorial jurisdiction even a portion of one of the properties sought to be partitioned is situated. The Court reiterated that Section 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, provides a statutory exception to the general rule contained in Section 16 CPC and enables a plaintiff to institute a single partition suit in one competent court even when the properties are spread across multiple jurisdictions.

The judgment was delivered by a Division Bench comprising Justice Sathish Ninan and Justice P. Krishna Kumar while deciding a Regular First Appeal challenging a preliminary decree passed in a partition suit. The dispute arose among the legal heirs of late Velayudhan and his deceased wife, who had left behind several immovable properties situated in different locations. The plaintiffs, being among the legal heirs, instituted a suit seeking partition and separate possession of their respective shares in the family properties.

The trial court, after examining the evidence and the rights of the parties, passed a preliminary decree declaring that the plaintiffs together and each of the defendants were entitled to one-sixth shares in the suit properties. Although the decree covered several properties, the principal challenge before the High Court related to a residential apartment located in Mumbai. The appellant contended that the trial court in Kerala lacked territorial jurisdiction to adjudicate rights concerning a property situated outside its territorial limits.

The appeal raised important questions concerning the interpretation of Sections 16, 17, 21, 99, and 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the scope of territorial jurisdiction in partition suits, and the effect of nomination under cooperative housing laws. The case also required the Court to examine whether disputes among legal heirs regarding succession to a cooperative housing property fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of authorities under the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act or remain within the domain of civil courts.

By addressing these interconnected issues, the Kerala High Court delivered a comprehensive ruling that reinforces settled principles governing partition suits while clarifying several recurring jurisdictional disputes in property litigation.

Arguments of the Parties:

The appellant-defendant primarily challenged the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. It was argued that the court which passed the preliminary decree lacked competence to adjudicate issues relating to the Mumbai apartment because the property was situated entirely outside the territorial limits of Kerala. According to the appellant, the provisions of Section 17 CPC could not be invoked in the facts of the case, and therefore the decree insofar as it related to the Mumbai property was legally unsustainable.

The appellant emphasized that he was a resident of Mumbai and had been closely associated with the management and maintenance of the apartment. He asserted that he had expended considerable amounts and undertaken necessary steps to secure registration and regularization of the apartment in his name. Consequently, he claimed to possess a stronger equitable claim over the property and argued that any partition should take into account his special circumstances and contributions.

Another significant contention advanced by the appellant was based on Section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was submitted that Section 17 CPC could not be applied because properties situated within the original civil jurisdiction of the Bombay High Court were governed by a separate legal framework. Reliance was placed upon the Bombay High Court Rules, particularly the provisions relating to original civil jurisdiction, to argue that disputes concerning immovable properties situated within Mumbai should be adjudicated exclusively by courts having territorial jurisdiction over such properties.

The appellant further contended that the apartment was not available for partition at all. According to him, the deceased owner had transferred his rights in favour of a cooperative housing society and had nominated him in relation to the property. Consequently, it was argued that the cooperative society had become the effective owner or custodian of the property and that the appellant’s rights flowing from the nomination created a superior claim that excluded the rights asserted by the other legal heirs.

Additionally, the appellant raised a statutory objection based on Sections 69 and 100 of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act. It was argued that disputes concerning cooperative societies and rights arising therefrom were required to be resolved through the dispute resolution mechanism established under the Act. Since the apartment was connected with a cooperative housing society, the appellant submitted that the jurisdiction of the civil court stood excluded.

The respondents-plaintiffs resisted all these contentions and supported the decree passed by the trial court. They argued that the suit was fundamentally one for partition among legal heirs and not a dispute concerning the management, business, or internal affairs of a cooperative society. The plaintiffs maintained that all the properties left behind by the deceased formed part of the estate available for partition and that the trial court possessed complete jurisdiction under Section 17 CPC to adjudicate the rights of the parties.

The respondents emphasized that the overwhelming majority of the suit properties were situated within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court. They argued that Section 17 CPC specifically contemplates situations where properties are situated in different jurisdictions and permits the institution of a single suit before a court within whose limits any portion of the property is situated. Requiring separate proceedings in multiple courts would lead to inconsistent findings, unnecessary expenditure, and multiplicity of litigation.

Regarding the issue of nomination, the respondents contended that nomination merely facilitates transmission of the property and does not override the substantive rights of legal heirs under succession law. They maintained that the appellant could not claim exclusive ownership merely because he had been nominated by the deceased.

The respondents also disputed the applicability of the Cooperative Societies Act, arguing that the dispute was purely one relating to inheritance and partition among family members. Since the controversy did not concern the business, constitution, management, or affairs of the society, it could not be treated as a statutory dispute falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of authorities constituted under the Act.

Court’s Judgment:

The Kerala High Court undertook a detailed examination of the statutory provisions governing territorial jurisdiction in partition suits and ultimately rejected all the contentions raised by the appellant.

At the outset, the Court referred to Sections 16 and 17 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It observed that Section 16 embodies the general principle that suits relating to immovable property must ordinarily be instituted before the court within whose territorial jurisdiction the property is situated. A suit for partition unquestionably falls within this category.

However, the Court emphasized that Section 17 CPC operates as a specific exception to this general rule. The provision recognizes the practical difficulty that would arise when immovable properties forming part of a common dispute are situated within the territorial limits of different courts. To address this problem, Section 17 permits institution of the suit in any court within whose jurisdiction any portion of the property is situated.

The Division Bench placed considerable reliance upon the judgment of the Supreme Court in Shivnarayan (D) by LRs v. Maniklal (D) through LRs and Others. In that decision, the Supreme Court categorically held that where multiple immovable properties are situated in different jurisdictions, the suit may be instituted in any court within whose local limits any portion of the property or one or more of the properties are situated.

Applying this principle, the High Court held that the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court could not be doubted merely because one of the properties happened to be situated in Mumbai. The Court observed that most of the properties sought to be partitioned were located within the jurisdiction of the trial court. Even assuming that only a small portion of one property fell within its jurisdiction, that circumstance alone would be sufficient to attract Section 17 CPC.

The Court specifically clarified that the existence of a single property or even a portion of a property within the territorial limits of a court is enough to confer jurisdiction for adjudicating the entire partition suit. Such an interpretation is consistent with the objective of avoiding multiple proceedings and ensuring comprehensive adjudication of family disputes.

Addressing the appellant’s reliance on Section 120 CPC, the Court found the argument to be misconceived. The Bench observed that Section 120 merely excludes the application of certain procedural provisions in suits instituted before High Courts exercising original civil jurisdiction. The present proceedings, however, were not instituted before the Bombay High Court. Therefore, Section 120 had no application to the facts of the case.

The Court also noted that the objection regarding territorial jurisdiction had not been properly raised before the trial court. Referring to Section 21(1) CPC, it observed that objections concerning territorial jurisdiction cannot ordinarily be permitted to be raised for the first time at the appellate stage unless specific statutory conditions are satisfied. The purpose of the provision is to prevent technical objections from being used to unsettle decrees after a full trial has already taken place.

In this context, the Court also referred to Section 99 CPC, which mandates that a decree should not be reversed on account of procedural defects unless such defects affect the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the court. The Bench clarified that territorial jurisdiction occupies a distinct position and cannot be casually invoked to invalidate otherwise valid proceedings.

Turning to the issue of nomination, the Court examined the legal effect of a nominee’s rights in a cooperative housing society. Relying upon the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Indrani Wahi v. Registrar of Cooperative Societies and Others, the Court reiterated that nomination does not create beneficial ownership in favour of the nominee. A nominee merely receives the property or interest as a trustee or representative, subject to the rights of the lawful heirs and successors.

The Court held that even if the cooperative society had acted upon the nomination and transferred records in favour of the appellant, such transfer would not extinguish the inheritance rights of the other legal heirs. The substantive entitlement of the parties would still have to be determined according to the applicable law of succession.

The Bench then addressed the argument based on Sections 69 and 100 of the Kerala Cooperative Societies Act. After carefully examining the statutory definitions and the scheme of the Act, the Court concluded that the dispute did not fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of cooperative authorities.

The Court observed that Section 69 applies only to disputes touching the business, management, constitution, or affairs of a cooperative society. The present controversy, however, was not connected with the functioning of the society. Instead, it involved competing claims among legal heirs regarding ownership and inheritance rights. Such disputes are quintessentially civil disputes falling within the jurisdiction of ordinary civil courts.

The Court held that merely because a cooperative society happened to be a formal party to the proceedings did not transform the dispute into one concerning the business of the society. The real controversy remained a family dispute regarding succession and partition.

With respect to the appellant’s plea that he should receive the Mumbai apartment because of his residence and contributions, the Court observed that such contentions involve considerations of equity and convenience. These issues, according to the Bench, are more appropriately examined during final decree proceedings when actual allotment of specific properties is undertaken. Therefore, the Court declined to express any conclusive opinion on that aspect at the preliminary decree stage.

Having rejected each of the appellant’s objections, the High Court concluded that the trial court had acted entirely within its jurisdiction and that the preliminary decree suffered from no legal infirmity. The appeal was accordingly dismissed.

The judgment is significant because it reinforces the practical and purposive interpretation of Section 17 CPC. By confirming that even a single property situated within the territorial jurisdiction of a court is sufficient to maintain a partition suit involving properties located elsewhere, the Court has strengthened the principle of comprehensive adjudication. The ruling also reiterates settled law concerning nomination, territorial jurisdiction, and the limited scope of statutory bars under cooperative societies legislation. As a result, it serves as an important precedent for partition suits involving multi-jurisdictional properties and succession disputes among legal heirs.