Introduction:

In a significant reaffirmation of settled principles governing election law, the Jharkhand High Court on 3 February 2026 upheld the election of Chandradeo Mahato from the Sindri Assembly Constituency, underscoring that democracy cannot be unsettled on the basis of trivial, technical, or inconsequential discrepancies unless they demonstrably affect the electoral outcome or amount to a legally defined corrupt practice. The judgment was delivered by a Single Judge Bench of Justice Gautam Kumar Choudhary while adjudicating an election petition filed under Sections 80 and 81 read with Section 100(1)(a), (b) and (d)(i) & (iv) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The election petition challenged the result of the 2024 Jharkhand Assembly Elections from Constituency No. 38, Sindri, where the returned candidate secured 1,05,136 votes, narrowly defeating the BJP candidate who secured 1,01,688 votes, while the election petitioner, contesting on behalf of the All India Forward Bloc, secured only 737 votes. Despite the petitioner’s marginal electoral performance, four principal allegations were raised seeking to invalidate the election, ranging from alleged procedural lapses in the nomination process to claims of misleading election propaganda and non-disclosure of criminal antecedents. The High Court, however, rejected the petition at the threshold, holding that the pleadings failed to disclose any cause of action under Section 100 of the Act and imposed costs of ₹50,000, reiterating that election results reflecting the will of the electorate cannot be lightly interfered with.

Arguments of the Election Petitioner:

The election petitioner assailed the validity of the election on four broad grounds, contending that the cumulative effect of these alleged violations vitiated the electoral process and warranted the setting aside of the returned candidate’s election under the Representation of the People Act, 1951. First, it was argued that the mandatory security deposit of ₹10,000, required under Section 34(2) of the Act, was not deposited in the manner prescribed by law. According to the petitioner, the amount was deposited with the Nazir instead of being deposited before the Returning Officer or directly into the Government treasury, rendering the nomination invalid and non est in the eye of law. It was submitted that compliance with Section 34 is mandatory and any deviation, irrespective of intent or consequence, strikes at the root of the nomination process. Second, the petitioner contended that the affidavit accompanying the nomination papers was defective as it did not bear the prescribed stamps. It was urged that the affidavit is a vital document aimed at ensuring transparency and disclosure, and non-compliance with statutory formalities relating to affidavits undermines the sanctity of the nomination process, thereby invalidating the election. Third, the petitioner alleged that the returned candidate indulged in misleading election propaganda by projecting himself as a candidate of CPI (ML), whereas the official name of the political party is CPI (ML) (Liberation). The omission of the word “Liberation” from pamphlets and campaign materials, it was argued, amounted to a misrepresentation calculated to mislead voters, especially those belonging to the left ideological spectrum, and thus constituted a corrupt practice under Section 123(4) of the Act. Fourth, the petitioner alleged non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of publishing details of pending criminal cases of the returned candidate in two leading newspapers, as mandated by law and judicial directions. It was contended that such non-disclosure deprived voters of their right to informed choice and materially affected the election result. On the basis of these allegations, the petitioner sought a declaration that the election of the returned candidate was void and prayed for appropriate consequential reliefs.

Arguments of the Returned Candidate:

The returned candidate, represented by senior counsel, strongly opposed the election petition, contending that it was frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of the process of law, filed without any real prospect of success and with the sole intent of unsettling a democratically expressed mandate. It was argued that election law is a complete code in itself and that an election can be declared void only on the specific and limited grounds enumerated under Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The respondent submitted that the petitioner had failed to plead or establish that any of the alleged irregularities had materially affected the result of the election, which is a sine qua non for interference with an election outcome. With respect to the security deposit, it was argued that the amount had admittedly been deposited and that the objection related only to the mode or channel of deposit, which was, at best, a technical irregularity incapable of invalidating the nomination. On the issue of stamps on the affidavit, it was contended that the alleged omission, even if assumed to be correct, was attributable to the Notary and not to the candidate, and in any event did not cause any prejudice to any candidate or voter. Regarding the alleged omission of the word “Liberation” from campaign materials, the respondent argued that CPI (ML) is a commonly understood abbreviation and that no voter could reasonably have been misled by such omission, particularly when the petitioner himself polled only 737 votes, making it absurd to suggest that such omission materially altered the electoral outcome. As to the alleged non-publication of criminal antecedents, it was submitted that the petition lacked specific pleadings, particulars, and proof, and did not even assert that the returned candidate had been convicted of any offence. The respondent thus urged the Court to dismiss the petition at the threshold with exemplary costs.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice Gautam Kumar Choudhary, after a detailed examination of the pleadings, statutory framework, and settled jurisprudence on election disputes, dismissed the election petition at the threshold, holding that it disclosed no cause of action warranting trial. The Court reiterated that an election is a solemn democratic exercise reflecting the will of the electorate and cannot be lightly interfered with on the basis of vague, technical, or inconsequential allegations. The Court emphasised that Section 100 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951 exhaustively enumerates the grounds on which an election may be declared void, and that the burden squarely lies on the election petitioner to specifically plead and strictly prove that the alleged non-compliance either constituted a corrupt practice or materially affected the result of the election. Dealing with the allegation regarding the deposit of security money, the Court noted that the pleadings did not allege that the deposit had not been made at all, but only that it was deposited with the Nazir instead of before the Returning Officer or in the treasury. The Court characterised this objection as “very peripheral” and held that such a hyper-technical plea, devoid of any allegation of prejudice or material effect, could not invalidate an election. On the issue of missing stamps on the affidavit, the Court termed the objection “equally flippant”, observing that the alleged omission was attributable to the Notary and that the returned candidate could not be penalised for such a lapse, particularly when no prejudice was demonstrated. Addressing the allegation of misleading voters by omitting the word “Liberation” from campaign materials, the Court laid down an important principle, holding that each and every discrepancy in an election campaign cannot, by itself, amount to a corrupt practice. The Court categorically observed that for a statement or omission to constitute a corrupt practice under Section 123(4), it must be reasonably calculated to prejudice the prospects of other contesting candidates by misleading voters and must have the potential to qualitatively influence the election result. The Court found it impossible to comprehend how the omission of a single word from the party’s name could have materially affected the election result, especially when the petitioner’s own vote count was negligible. On the allegation relating to criminal antecedents, the Court noted the complete absence of pleadings asserting any conviction of the returned candidate or demonstrating how any alleged publication misled voters. The Court held that the petition lacked foundational facts necessary to draw even a prima facie inference of corrupt practice or material non-compliance. Concluding that the election petition was devoid of merit, frivolous, and an abuse of process, the Court rejected it at the threshold and imposed costs of ₹50,000 on the petitioner, reinforcing the principle that election challenges must be responsibly litigated and not used as tools of harassment.