Introduction:

The Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court, in the matter of Sushant Khajuria vs. J&K Bank, reinforced a crucial tenet of service jurisprudence—that mere participation in a recruitment process or securing merit close to the cut-off does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment in public employment. The petitioner, Sushant Khajuria, had approached the Court with a writ petition challenging his non-selection for the post of Probationary Officer (PO) in Jammu and Kashmir Bank, despite claiming to have scored higher than some of the selected candidates and pointing out the existence of unfilled vacancies. However, the bench of Justice Javed Iqbal Wani firmly dismissed the petition, reiterating the legal position upheld by the Supreme Court that unless a candidate is empaneled in the final select or waiting list and recruitment rules require filling of all vacancies, the employer has no legal obligation to appoint. This decision reaffirmed the principle that employment in public service is not a matter of right unless the selection process results in a candidate being validly placed in the select list as per rules, and the employer is bound to offer the appointment within the validity period of such list.

Arguments by the Petitioner:

The petitioner, Sushant Khajuria, contended that the recruitment process initiated by the Jammu and Kashmir Bank for the appointment of Probationary Officers had originally advertised 175 vacancies. Following the conclusion of the selection process, only 138 candidates were appointed. In addition, a waiting list of 18 candidates was prepared, out of which 16 candidates joined. Thus, 37 posts remained unfilled. The petitioner claimed that his score of 61.22 was higher than the score of some of the appointed candidates and was very close to the last candidate on the waiting list, who had secured 61.27 marks. Khajuria submitted that since substantial vacancies were left unfilled and his merit was not far from the final cutoff, the Bank should have exercised discretion to consider him for appointment. He asserted that he had made multiple representations to the authorities, but no response was received, leaving him with no alternative but to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226. The petitioner also argued that the failure to fill up all advertised vacancies was arbitrary and unjust, especially when eligible candidates like him, who had narrowly missed the cut-off, were denied consideration.

Arguments by the Respondents (J&K Bank):

The writ petition was strongly opposed by the Bank through Assistant Advocate General Mr. Raman Sharma, who represented the institution. The respondent pointed out that the petitioner did not feature in either the final selection list or the waiting list. The petitioner’s score of 61.22 fell below the final cut-off scores for the selection list and even for the waiting list. Specifically, the last selected candidate had secured 61.65 marks and the last candidate on the waiting list had obtained 61.27. Thus, the petitioner’s score placed him beyond the zone of consideration, and the selection process was conducted strictly in terms of the advertisement’s provisions, which did not contemplate the inclusion or appointment of candidates beyond the notified lists. The Bank emphasized that the waiting list was valid only till 31.03.2021, and post that date, no appointments could be made from that list. The Bank further maintained that recruitment processes must be governed strictly by the notified terms and judicial interference in administrative discretion is impermissible unless arbitrariness or mala fides are evident. In this case, the Bank argued that its actions were fully consistent with legal norms and administrative discipline.

Judgment by the High Court:

Justice Javed Iqbal Wani began his analysis by reiterating a well-established principle in service law jurisprudence—participation in a recruitment process or even being declared successful does not automatically grant an enforceable right to appointment. Citing the landmark decision of the Supreme Court in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India [(1991) 3 SCC 47], the Court underscored that a candidate merely included in a list of selected candidates does not acquire an absolute right to be appointed to a post unless the rules so mandate or unless mala fides or arbitrariness are demonstrated. Further, the Court quoted from the same judgment to observe: “It is not correct to say that if a number of vacancies are notified… the successful candidates acquire an indefeasible right to be appointed… Unless the relevant recruitment rules so indicate, the State is under no legal duty to fill up all or any of the vacancies.” This categorical judicial principle formed the foundation of the Court’s reasoning in dismissing Khajuria’s petition.

The Court further referred to State of Orissa vs. Bhikari Charan Khuntia [(2003) 10 SCC 144], which emphasized that the question of whether to fill or not to fill a post is a matter of policy, and unless such a policy decision is arbitrary or discriminatory, the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere. Justice Wani acknowledged that while the petitioner’s grievance of being very close to the final cutoff might have some emotional resonance, it could not override the legal reality that he was not part of the select or waiting list. Thus, he had no legally enforceable right to appointment. In the eyes of the law, merely scoring marginally below the cutoff did not entitle him to be “considered” for the leftover vacancies. The Bench held that once a candidate participates in a recruitment process that is governed by a specific notification and does so voluntarily, they are bound by the terms of that process. The terms clearly laid down that only those in the select list or waiting list could be offered appointment, and the validity of that waiting list had expired.

Justice Wani categorically ruled, “Undoubtedly, the petitioner has neither figured in the select list nor in the waiting list, as such, the petitioner cannot, in law, seek his selection and appointment against the leftover vacancies…” The Court remarked that judicial intervention in recruitment matters is strictly limited to cases where there is a demonstrable violation of statutory rules, arbitrariness, or mala fides, none of which were present in the current case. In light of these observations and legal findings, the writ petition was held to be “grossly misconceived” and was dismissed accordingly, including the connected miscellaneous applications.

Legal Significance and Broader Implications:

The judgment reinforces the importance of respecting the terms and cutoffs in recruitment processes. It makes clear that unfilled vacancies do not automatically imply that those marginally outside the merit list can claim a right to appointment. The decision reflects judicial restraint in recruitment matters, emphasizing that courts cannot create new rights where none exist in law. It also affirms that recruitment authorities are entitled to limit appointments to the notified number of candidates and act in accordance with the advertisement, especially in the absence of arbitrariness or malice. The ruling is particularly relevant for aspirants who, despite narrowly missing selection, seek to claim appointments based on unfilled positions—a practice which, if permitted, could distort the integrity of merit-based selections. The judgment promotes administrative certainty, discourages unwarranted litigation, and upholds the sanctity of publicly notified recruitment rules.