Introduction:

The Madras High Court, in S. Kumaradevan v. The Inspector of Police (CRL O.P. No. 29214 of 2018, 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 342), quashed criminal proceedings against an advocate who was accused of making a provocative speech during a public meeting by using the expression “Hindu Terrorism.” The judgment was delivered by Justice Bharatha Chakravarthy, who held that the mere use of an inappropriate expression, without any accompanying act or intention to promote communal disharmony or violence, does not attract the offences alleged under the Indian Penal Code or the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967.

The case arose from a public meeting held on December 19, 2016, organised by members of the National League Party. The petitioner, an advocate and member of the Dravidar Kazhagam, addressed the gathering and allegedly called upon people to oppose “Hindu Terrorism” while urging the elimination of forces that divide society. Based on his speech, the Pulianthope Police registered a criminal case under Sections 153, 153A(1)(a) and (b), 504, 505(1)(b), 505(1)(c), and 505(2) of the Indian Penal Code, along with Sections 2(o) and 13(1)(b) of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.

Aggrieved by the registration of the case, the petitioner approached the High Court seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings. The principal issue before the Court was whether the isolated use of the expression “Hindu Terrorism,” viewed in the context of the entire speech, constituted an offence promoting communal hatred or public disorder.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioner contended that the criminal case was based on an incomplete and selective reading of his speech. It was argued that the address, when read in its entirety, was intended to promote communal harmony and concluded with an appeal for unity among people. According to the petitioner, the expression objected to by the prosecution was used only in the course of political criticism and was not intended to provoke hatred or violence against any religious community.

The petitioner further argued that none of the essential ingredients of the offences under Sections 153, 153A, 504 or 505 of the IPC, or the provisions of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, were made out. It was submitted that there was neither any incitement to violence nor any material showing that the speech had resulted in public disorder. The continuation of criminal proceedings, nearly a decade after the alleged incident, was therefore an abuse of the process of law.

The State opposed the petition and relied on the allegations contained in the First Information Report. It was submitted that the petitioner had used the expression “Hindu Terrorism” in a public meeting, which was capable of hurting religious sentiments and creating communal tension. The prosecution maintained that the speech attracted the penal provisions invoked and that the matter should proceed to trial so that evidence could be examined.

Court’s Judgment:

The Madras High Court allowed the petition and quashed the criminal proceedings. Justice Bharatha Chakravarthy held that the speech must be examined in its entirety and not by isolating one expression from its overall context. The Court observed that although the petitioner had used the expression “Hindu Terrorism,” the speech ultimately concluded with an appeal for unity among the people and did not encourage communal division or violence.

The Court noted that the offences under Sections 153 and 153A of the IPC require an intention to promote enmity between different groups or to disturb public tranquillity. Similarly, offences under Sections 504 and 505 require deliberate provocation or statements likely to incite public disorder. In the present case, the Court found no material indicating that the petitioner intended to divide people on communal lines or provoke violence.

Justice Chakravarthy observed that the petitioner had merely used an inappropriate expression and that such usage, by itself, was insufficient to constitute a criminal offence. The Court emphasised that when the allegation relates only to a speech and is not accompanied by any overt act or conduct capable of disturbing public order, the stringent provisions invoked by the prosecution cannot be attracted.

The Court also referred to earlier precedents of the High Court, which require the surrounding circumstances and the prevailing social context to be considered while assessing whether a speech amounts to a criminal offence. Applying those principles, the Court concluded that the petitioner’s speech, read as a whole, reflected a call for social unity rather than communal hostility.

Another significant factor considered by the Court was the prolonged pendency of the case. The criminal proceedings had remained pending since 2017, and the Court observed that no useful purpose would be served by permitting the prosecution to continue when the allegations themselves did not disclose the commission of any offence.

Accordingly, the High Court exercised its inherent powers to quash the FIR and all consequential proceedings against the petitioner. The judgment reiterates that criminal liability for speech cannot arise merely because a controversial or inappropriate expression has been used. Courts must examine the entire speech, the speaker’s intention, the surrounding circumstances, and whether the statement was capable of inciting violence or promoting communal hatred before invoking penal provisions. The decision reinforces the principle that freedom of speech may be restricted only where the statutory ingredients of the alleged offences are clearly established.