Introduction:

In the case of Imran Khan vs. State of U.P. and Another, reported as 2025 LiveLaw (AB) 138, the Allahabad High Court delivered a significant judgment on the interpretation of Section 67 of the Information Technology Act, 2000. A single-judge bench led by Justice Saurabh Srivastava ruled that simply liking a social media post cannot be equated to publishing or transmitting obscene content in electronic form. This order was passed in light of a petition filed by Imran Khan seeking to quash the criminal proceedings initiated against him for allegedly liking a provocative post on Facebook, which was believed to have incited a large public gathering.

Arguments of Both Sides:

The petitioner, Imran Khan, was accused of liking a post made by one Chaudhari Farhan Usman, which allegedly urged people to gather before the collectorate to submit a memorandum to the Hon’ble President of India. This post purportedly led to the assembly of 600-700 individuals from the Muslim community without official permission, raising concerns of public disorder. The prosecution claimed that this act of liking the post amounted to a transmission of provocative content, thereby invoking Section 67 of the IT Act, which penalises the electronic publication or transmission of obscene material. The Additional Government Advocate (AGA), relying on the case diary, argued that the applicant had deleted the post, but the content continued to circulate on WhatsApp and other platforms. However, the defence asserted that there was no provocative or obscene material traceable to Imran Khan’s Facebook account and no direct evidence linking him to any inciting message. They emphasised that Section 67 specifically pertains to obscene material—defined as lascivious or appealing to prurient interests—and does not extend to general provocative or political content. Justice Srivastava agreed with the petitioner’s stance, clearly delineating the meaning of publication and transmission under the IT Act.

Judgement:

The bench held that mere liking of a post does not amount to publication or transmission, which requires a more proactive engagement, such as posting or sharing the content. Furthermore, the court emphasised that Section 67 was exclusively applicable to obscene material and not political mobilisation, even if deemed provocative. Finding no concrete material in the case diary that directly implicated Imran Khan with any unlawful post or suggested that he actively participated in the alleged assembly, the Court quashed the proceedings. The judgment underscored the importance of nuanced understanding in the application of cyber laws, particularly in the context of user behaviour on social media platforms, and reaffirmed the protection of individual expression unless a direct act of transmission or publication is evident.