Introduction:
In Smti. Legitha v. State of Meghalaya (WP(C) No. 664 of 2025, decided on June 18, 2026), the Meghalaya High Court reaffirmed an important principle governing the regulation of liquor trade in India. Justice H.S. Thangkhiew held that although there is no fundamental right to trade in liquor, a person who has obtained a valid licence under the Meghalaya Excise Act and the Meghalaya Excise Rules acquires a legal right to carry on such business. That right cannot be curtailed merely because certain sections of the public object to the business on moral or religious grounds, unless there is a violation of the statutory provisions or the licence is cancelled in accordance with law.
The petitioner was a licensed Indian Made Foreign Liquor (IMFL) retailer operating a wine shop at Jengjal Market in the West Garo Hills district. Having obtained a retail licence in 2022, she later sought permission from the Excise Department to shift her outlet to Danakgre for better business prospects. Before seeking permission, she secured a No Objection Certificate (NOC) from the local Nokma (Headman), as required under the Meghalaya Excise Rules. Following a spot inspection, the Excise Department approved the relocation on January 29, 2025.
Despite obtaining every statutory approval, the petitioner was subsequently directed orally by the Superintendent of Excise to close the relocated shop following objections raised by certain Church representatives and members of the local Development Committee. Aggrieved by the closure despite possessing a valid licence and official approval, the petitioner approached the High Court seeking protection of her legal rights and permission to continue operating her business.
The case presented an important question regarding the extent of governmental power in regulating liquor trade and whether administrative authorities can prevent a licensed establishment from functioning solely because of moral or social objections, even when the establishment satisfies all statutory requirements.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner contended that she had complied with every legal requirement prescribed under the Meghalaya Excise Act and the Meghalaya Excise Rules. She submitted that her retail licence remained valid and that the competent authority had expressly permitted the relocation of her wine shop after conducting the necessary inspection.
It was further argued that the mandatory No Objection Certificate from the local Nokma had been obtained in accordance with Rule 191 of the Meghalaya Excise Rules. The petitioner also maintained that the relocated premises satisfied Rule 183(2)(a), which prohibits the establishment of liquor outlets within 200 metres of educational institutions, hospitals, and places of worship.
According to the petitioner, despite fulfilling all statutory conditions, she was prevented from operating the shop solely because of objections raised by Church representatives and members of the Development Committee. She argued that such objections were based purely on moral considerations and not on any violation of law. Therefore, the oral direction issued by the Superintendent of Excise directing closure of the shop was arbitrary, unsupported by law, and violative of her legal rights as a licence holder.
The State authorities explained that objections had been received from local Church representatives and members of the Development Committee regarding the operation of the wine shop in the locality. These objections reflected concerns about the social impact of liquor sales and the sentiments of the local community.
However, there was no material before the Court showing that the petitioner’s licence had been suspended or cancelled in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the Meghalaya Excise Act. Nor was there any allegation that the petitioner had violated any statutory condition attached to her licence or that the shop was located within the prohibited distance prescribed under the Rules.
Court’s Judgment:
Allowing the writ petition, the Meghalaya High Court held that the authorities had no legal justification for preventing the petitioner from operating her licensed wine shop.
Justice H.S. Thangkhiew began by examining the statutory framework governing liquor trade in Meghalaya. The Court reiterated the settled constitutional position that there is no fundamental right to carry on trade or business in intoxicating liquor. Such trade remains entirely within the regulatory domain of the State, which may impose restrictions, conditions, or even prohibit it altogether in accordance with law.
However, the Court emphasised that once the State itself creates a statutory licensing framework and grants a licence after satisfying itself that all legal requirements have been fulfilled, the licence holder acquires a corresponding legal right to conduct the licensed business. That legal right cannot be withdrawn arbitrarily or merely because of changing public opinion. Any interference with such right must strictly conform to the procedure established under the governing statute.
Examining the facts of the present case, the Court found that the petitioner had fully complied with the Meghalaya Excise Rules. She possessed a valid IMFL retail licence, had obtained the mandatory No Objection Certificate from the local Nokma, and had secured permission from the competent authority to relocate the shop from Jengjal Market to Danakgre.
The Court also carefully considered Rule 183(2)(a) of the Meghalaya Excise Rules, which prescribes distance restrictions between liquor outlets and sensitive institutions such as schools, hospitals, and places of worship. On the basis of the inspection records, the Court found that the petitioner’s shop was situated well beyond the prohibited 200-metre radius.
The objections raised by the Church representatives therefore did not disclose any statutory violation. Instead, the Court found that they were founded entirely upon moral and social considerations regarding the sale of liquor.
Justice Thangkhiew observed that while moral concerns may reflect the sentiments of a section of society, they cannot override statutory rights lawfully granted under a valid licence. Administrative authorities are bound to act in accordance with the provisions of the Meghalaya Excise Act and Rules and cannot substitute personal or community preferences for the legal standards prescribed by law.
The Court further noted another important factual circumstance. An establishment holding an “ON” liquor licence was already operating approximately 105 metres away from the petitioner’s proposed outlet. This demonstrated that the locality was not completely free from licensed liquor establishments and weakened the basis of the objections directed specifically against the petitioner’s business.
The Court also observed that permitting the licensed shop to function could actually assist the authorities in controlling illegal liquor trade in the locality by providing consumers access to a regulated and lawfully licensed outlet. Preventing legitimate licence holders from operating while illegal liquor sales continue would defeat the very objective of the excise regulatory framework.
Justice Thangkhiew reiterated that although citizens cannot claim a fundamental right to engage in liquor trade under Article 19(1)(g) of the Constitution, a licence validly granted under the statutory scheme creates enforceable legal rights. Such rights cannot be taken away except through due process contemplated by the Meghalaya Excise Act and Rules.
The Court found that no proceedings had been initiated for suspension or cancellation of the petitioner’s licence. Nor had any statutory violation been established against her. In these circumstances, the oral direction issued by the Superintendent of Excise directing closure of the wine shop had no legal foundation and could not be sustained.
Accordingly, the High Court held that the petitioner was entitled to continue operating her IMFL retail outlet at the approved location in accordance with the licence granted by the competent authority.
The judgment reinforces an important principle of administrative law that statutory authorities must exercise their powers strictly within the limits prescribed by legislation. Once a citizen satisfies all legal requirements under a licensing regime, administrative decisions affecting that licence must be based on law rather than moral objections or public sentiment. The ruling also underscores that while liquor trade remains a regulated privilege rather than a fundamental right, a validly granted licence creates legal rights that deserve protection against arbitrary executive interference.