Introduction:

In a significant ruling, the Allahabad High Court has held that when a marriage is declared null and void under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, such declaration relates back to the date of the marriage, rendering the marriage void ab initio. Consequently, the husband is not liable to pay maintenance to the wife under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, as the parties do not share a domestic relationship as defined under Section 2(f) of the Act. The ruling came in Rajeev Sachdeva v. State of U.P. and Another [2025 LiveLaw (AB) 253], decided by Justice Rajeev Misra in Criminal Revision No. 1351 of 2023. The case revolved around a dispute where the wife had concealed her first subsisting marriage at the time of marrying the revisionist in 2015. This concealment later led to a series of criminal and domestic violence proceedings. After the marriage was declared null and void on the husband’s application, the wife withdrew her appeal against that declaration. However, despite this, interim maintenance was awarded to her under Section 23 of the DV Act. The husband challenged this order, leading to the present revision before the High Court.

Arguments on Behalf of the Husband (Revisionist):

Counsel for the revisionist, Advocates Nipun Singh and Sumit Suri, argued that once the marriage between the parties was declared null and void under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, the relationship stood void from its inception. As a result, the parties ceased to have any legal relationship akin to marriage. Therefore, the wife could not claim maintenance under Section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act or under the Domestic Violence Act, as the latter requires the existence of a “domestic relationship” under Section 2(f).

The counsel further argued that the declaratory decree passed by the competent court had attained finality after the wife withdrew her appeal against the order. Hence, the finding that the marriage was void ab initio could not be questioned. The logical consequence of such a declaration is that the marriage never existed in the eyes of law, and therefore, no obligation of maintenance arises.

It was also contended that the order granting maintenance under Section 23 of the DV Act was erroneous, as the court below itself recorded a finding that the marriage had been dissolved. The grant of interim maintenance in such circumstances amounted to a legal contradiction. The revisionist emphasized that the DV Act provides protection to women who are in a “domestic relationship,” but where the marriage is void from inception, such a relationship never legally existed.

The revisionist also pointed out the conduct of the wife, highlighting that she had lodged multiple FIRs under Sections 498A, 406, 313, 354(A)(1), 509, 323, 34 IPC, and later under Sections 451, 323, 34 IPC. Further, the wife concealed her first marriage and misled the court, thereby approaching the forum with unclean hands. This concealment demonstrated bad faith and disentitled her from claiming any equitable relief such as maintenance.

Arguments on Behalf of the Wife (Opposite Party):

Advocates Arvind Kumar Trivedi, Balbeer Singh, Dhruv Kumar Dhuriya, G.A., and Saurabh Shukla, appearing for the wife, contended that the DV Act is a welfare legislation enacted to provide protection to women from domestic violence and economic abuse. It was argued that the Act should be interpreted liberally to achieve its objective. The wife, having cohabited with the revisionist and shared a household, was entitled to protection under the Act, irrespective of whether the marriage was subsequently declared void.

The wife’s counsel emphasized that the marriage was solemnized in 2015, and the parties lived together for a considerable time. During this period, she suffered physical and mental harassment, as evidenced by the FIRs filed against the husband and his family members. Therefore, the relief of maintenance under the DV Act was justified to protect her from economic deprivation.

It was further argued that the declaratory decree under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act does not retrospectively negate the lived experience of the woman or her vulnerability to domestic violence during the subsistence of the relationship in fact, if not in law. Denying maintenance on the ground of annulment would defeat the purpose of the DV Act and leave women in similar circumstances without recourse to justice.

Court’s Judgment and Analysis:

Justice Rajeev Misra, after hearing both sides, allowed the criminal revision and set aside the order granting maintenance to the wife. The Court began by examining the legal consequences of a decree passed under Section 11 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955, which declares a marriage null and void on grounds such as bigamy under Section 5(i) of the Act.

The Court observed that polygamy is prohibited under Hindu law, and any marriage solemnized during the subsistence of a prior valid marriage is void. In the present case, it was undisputed that the wife’s first marriage was subsisting when she married the revisionist in 2015. This fact was initially denied by the wife but later admitted during the anticipatory bail proceedings. Consequently, the trial court rightly declared the marriage between the parties null and void.

Justice Misra held that such a declaratory decree operates retrospectively and relates back to the date of marriage. Therefore, in the eyes of law, the marriage never existed, rendering the subsequent relationship between the parties legally inconsequential. The Court emphasized:

 “Since by means of the declaratory decree, the marriage of the parties has been declared null and void, it shall relate back to the date of marriage. The logical outcome of the same shall be that once the marriage of the parties itself has been declared void-ab-initio, the subsequent relationship between the parties is of no consequence.”

Turning to the Domestic Violence Act, the Court analyzed the definition of “domestic relationship” under Section 2(f), which refers to a relationship between two persons who live or have lived together in a shared household when they are related by marriage, consanguinity, or through a relationship in the nature of marriage. Since the marriage was void from inception, the Court concluded that there was no valid domestic relationship between the parties after the declaration. Accordingly, the DV Act could not be invoked to claim maintenance.

The Court also considered the equitable aspect, noting that the wife had suppressed material facts about her first marriage and approached the court with unclean hands. This conduct further disentitled her from claiming discretionary relief. The Court held that the impugned order granting maintenance despite acknowledging the annulment of marriage was legally unsustainable.

Finally, the Court allowed the revision, quashed the order granting maintenance under Section 23 of the DV Act, and held that the husband was not liable to pay maintenance. The Court observed that while women must be protected from domestic violence, such protection cannot extend to relationships that never existed in the eyes of law.