Introduction:

In Maharashtra Police Academy v. Bharati Yashwant Salve (Writ Petition No. 9690 of 2025), the Bombay High Court delivered a significant ruling that expands the judicial understanding of what constitutes an “industry” under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. The case emerged from a challenge by the Maharashtra Police Academy (MPA) against an Industrial Court judgment that ordered the reinstatement of Bharati Yashwant Salve, a Computer Operator engaged on daily wages for over eight years. The Industrial Court had held her termination illegal on the ground that she had completed more than 240 days of continuous service each year and was entitled to the procedural safeguards under Section 25F of the ID Act. The Academy, however, contested this decision by asserting that its functions were sovereign in nature and therefore excluded from the definition of “industry”. Justice Milind N. Jadhav of the Bombay High Court examined the nature of the Academy’s functions, the legislative intent behind the ID Act, and the procedural safeguards for daily-wage workers before affirming the Industrial Court’s direction for reinstatement with continuity of service.

Arguments:

The Maharashtra Police Academy, as the petitioner, strongly argued that its primary role was to train police personnel—a core sovereign function that cannot be equated with commercial or industrial activity. It maintained that being a governmental institution entrusted with the task of preparing police officers and government officials, it operated squarely within the sovereign domain. As such, it contended that the nature of its establishment and purpose inherently excluded it from being considered an “industry” under Section 2(j) of the ID Act. The Academy also argued that regularization or continuation of a daily-wage worker in such an establishment would interfere with public functions and administrative autonomy. Moreover, it attempted to justify the termination on the ground that employment on daily wages conferred no right to continuity, and therefore compliance with Section 25F was not obligatory.

On the opposing side, the respondent, Bharati Yashwant Salve, relied on the statutory framework and factual record to assert that she had completed more than 240 days of continuous service for eight consecutive years. She argued that her work as a Computer Operator was neither sovereign nor unique to governmental authority; instead, it constituted clerical and technical functions that have consistently been held to fall within industrial activity under established case law, including the landmark judgment Bangalore Water Supply vs. A. Rajappa. She contended that the Academy’s engagement in systematic training activities—particularly for private security agencies for a fee—demonstrated elements of organized and profit-oriented functioning characteristic of an “industry”. Salve further argued that her termination was carried out without assigning any reason, without issuing notice, and without paying the mandatory retrenchment compensation, thereby violating Section 25F of the ID Act. These procedural lapses, she submitted, rendered the termination unlawful and entitled her to reinstatement.

Judgment:

After examining the contentions and the nature of activities undertaken by the Maharashtra Police Academy, the Bombay High Court concluded that the Academy indeed qualifies as an “industry” under Section 2(j) of the Industrial Disputes Act. Justice Milind N. Jadhav observed that while the Academy performs certain sovereign functions—such as training police officers of various ranks—it simultaneously engages in activities that are neither sovereign nor incidental to sovereign authority. Specifically, the Academy provides training programs to private security agencies in exchange for fees, operates organized training modules, and levies charges for facilities. These activities, according to the Court, are systematic, structured, and revenue-generating, thereby meeting the criteria of industrial activity as interpreted through established judicial precedents. The Court reiterated that when an organization performs both sovereign and non-sovereign functions, the latter cannot be overlooked, and the establishment may still fall within the sweeping definition of “industry”.

In its detailed assessment of the procedural requirements under Section 25F, the Court emphasized that the Industrial Disputes Act was enacted to ensure protection against arbitrary termination of workmen, including daily-wage employees. The legislature intentionally used broader language—“workman in continuous service for not less than one year”—to remove discrimination between permanent and non-permanent workers. Noting that Salve had rendered continuous service for more than eight years and had fulfilled the requirement of 240 days of work per year, the Court held that she was clearly entitled to the safeguards under Section 25F. The Academy had neither provided notice nor paid retrenchment compensation, nor offered any justification for termination. The Court held that such a termination is illegal per se.

Finding no infirmity in the Industrial Court’s reasoning, the High Court upheld the order directing reinstatement with continuity of service. Justice Jadhav reinforced that institutions such as the Maharashtra Police Academy cannot escape statutory obligations by merely labeling their primary functions as sovereign. When non-sovereign, revenue-based, and systematic activities are undertaken, the obligations under the ID Act necessarily follow. The writ petition was therefore dismissed, and the Industrial Court’s findings affirmed in full.