Introduction:
In a significant judgment concerning judicial administration and the scope of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, the Madras High Court has held that an advocate cannot invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court merely to obtain an out-of-turn listing of cases pending before the Court. Emphasizing that case listing is an administrative function governed by established procedures designed to ensure fairness among litigants, the Court observed that permitting individual advocates to seek writs against the Registry for expedited listing would inundate the Court with internal litigation and seriously disrupt the administration of justice.
The decision was rendered by a Division Bench comprising Chief Justice S.A. Dharmadhikari and Justice G. Arul Murugan in L.K. Charles Alexander v. The Registrar General and Others, W.P. No. 24309 of 2026, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 303.
The petitioner, an advocate appearing in person, approached the High Court seeking a writ of mandamus directing the Registry of both the Principal Seat at Chennai and the Madurai Bench to list several matters in which he was appearing as counsel. According to the petitioner, despite repeatedly submitting written requests to the Registry, his cases continued to remain unlisted at different procedural stages. He alleged that the Registry’s inaction had not only delayed adjudication of his clients’ cases but had also caused him considerable professional anxiety and mental distress, as he remained accountable to litigants awaiting progress in their matters.
The petition required the Court to examine whether an advocate or litigant possesses an enforceable legal right to demand priority listing of pending matters through writ proceedings. It also called upon the Court to balance individual concerns regarding delays with the institutional necessity of maintaining an orderly, transparent, and equitable listing system capable of handling the enormous volume of litigation pending before constitutional courts.
Recognising the practical realities of judicial administration, the Bench examined the nature of the Registry’s functions, the scope of the writ of mandamus, and the remedies ordinarily available to advocates seeking urgent listing of matters. While expressing empathy for the petitioner’s professional concerns, the Court ultimately concluded that Article 226 cannot be transformed into an administrative mechanism for circumventing the High Court’s established procedures governing listing of cases.
The judgment therefore serves as an important precedent clarifying the limits of judicial intervention in matters concerning internal court administration and reinforces the principle that procedural fairness in listing must be preserved for the benefit of all litigants rather than individual parties.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner, appearing in person, contended that despite making repeated written representations to the Registry at both the Principal Seat and the Madurai Bench, several matters in which he represented litigants had not been listed for hearing. According to him, the prolonged failure to list these cases reflected an administrative lapse on the part of the Registry, resulting in avoidable delays in adjudication.
The petitioner argued that as an advocate, he remained professionally accountable to his clients, who expected timely progress in their cases. The continued non-listing of matters had placed him in a difficult professional position, compelling him to repeatedly explain delays that were allegedly beyond his control. He submitted that such circumstances caused significant mental distress and adversely affected his professional responsibilities.
On this basis, the petitioner sought issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the Registry to list all his pending matters. His grievance was essentially that despite approaching the Registry through administrative channels, no effective action had been taken to ensure that his cases were brought before the appropriate Benches for hearing.
Although the Registry’s detailed submissions were not extensively reproduced in the judgment, the respondents opposed the maintainability of the writ petition by defending the existing system of case listing. The Registry maintained that listing of matters is governed by established administrative procedures applicable uniformly to all litigants and advocates. It was submitted that no individual advocate possesses a legal right to insist that his matters be listed ahead of other pending cases.
The respondents emphasized that the Registry processes an enormous number of fresh filings and pending matters on a daily basis. The listing process therefore involves careful administrative management rather than a simple mechanical exercise. Any deviation from the established queue without legally recognized urgency would inevitably prejudice other litigants whose matters were instituted earlier and were awaiting hearing in accordance with the prescribed procedure.
The respondents further maintained that the petitioner had alternative administrative remedies available for seeking urgent listing wherever circumstances genuinely warranted such intervention. Consequently, invocation of the extraordinary writ jurisdiction was neither necessary nor legally maintainable.
Court’s Judgment:
Dismissing the writ petition, the Madras High Court held that the petitioner had failed to establish any enforceable legal or statutory right capable of being protected through a writ of mandamus. The Court observed that Article 226 cannot be invoked merely to obtain preferential listing of pending matters or to bypass the well-established administrative mechanism governing listing before the High Court.
At the outset, the Division Bench examined the nature and scope of the writ of mandamus. The Court reiterated the settled legal principle that mandamus is a discretionary constitutional remedy intended to enforce a clear legal right and compel performance of a corresponding statutory or public duty. Unless there exists a definite legal obligation coupled with a corresponding legal right in favour of the petitioner, the extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 cannot be exercised.
Applying this principle, the Court found that neither an advocate nor a litigant possesses any fundamental or statutory right to insist that his or her matter be listed ahead of other cases pending before the Court. Merely because an advocate considers his matters deserving of early hearing does not create an enforceable legal entitlement requiring the Registry to depart from its established listing procedures.
The Bench observed that acceptance of the petitioner’s contention would have far-reaching institutional consequences. If every advocate whose matters were awaiting listing were permitted to institute writ proceedings against the Registry, the High Court would soon become overwhelmed with litigation concerning its own administrative functioning. Such an approach would divert valuable judicial time away from substantive adjudication and seriously impair the efficient administration of justice.
The Court therefore observed that permitting such writ petitions would effectively paralyse the functioning of the judicial system by transforming ordinary listing grievances into constitutional litigation. The extraordinary remedy of mandamus cannot be converted into an administrative instrument for securing preferential treatment within the Court’s own internal processes.
The Bench nevertheless acknowledged the practical difficulties faced by advocates in explaining delays to their clients. The Court expressly recorded that it appreciated the professional anxieties experienced by young members of the Bar who remain answerable to litigants regarding the progress of pending cases. However, the Bench clarified that sympathy for such concerns cannot justify expanding the scope of Article 226 beyond its settled constitutional limits.
According to the Court, the Registry performs an exceptionally demanding administrative function involving management of thousands of fresh filings together with an extensive backlog of pending matters. The listing process is not merely an exercise in entering data into a computer system but requires careful consideration of numerous administrative factors, including categorization of cases, compliance with procedural requirements, allocation before appropriate Benches, and maintenance of chronological fairness among litigants.
The Court observed that fairness in judicial administration demands that cases ordinarily be listed according to chronological order or category-wise priorities established by the Court. This system ensures equality among litigants and prevents arbitrary preference being extended to individual parties. Allowing advocates to secure priority listing through writ petitions would undermine this carefully balanced administrative structure and unfairly disadvantage other litigants whose matters had been pending for longer periods.
Importantly, the Court clarified that dismissal of the writ petition did not leave the petitioner remediless. The Bench pointed out that where a matter genuinely requires urgent listing, the established procedural framework itself provides appropriate remedies.
The Court observed that an advocate may submit a formal praecipe or mention memo before the concerned Judge explaining the urgency of the matter. The Judge concerned retains inherent judicial discretion to examine the circumstances of the case and determine whether it deserves expedited listing. This mechanism ensures that genuine urgency is addressed through judicial assessment rather than administrative preference.
The Bench also identified another available remedy. It observed that where an advocate believes that a listing discrepancy has occurred due to administrative oversight, a detailed representation may be submitted before the Registrar (Judicial). The Registrar possesses the administrative authority to examine such grievances and rectify listing anomalies wherever appropriate.
By referring to these alternative remedies, the Court emphasized that the existing procedural framework already provides adequate mechanisms for addressing exceptional situations without requiring invocation of constitutional writ jurisdiction.
The judgment also reflects an important institutional principle regarding judicial self-governance. Internal administrative matters concerning roster management, listing of cases, and scheduling of hearings constitute essential components of judicial administration. Unless there exists manifest arbitrariness, discrimination, or violation of a legal right, constitutional courts ordinarily refrain from entertaining challenges that seek to interfere with these internal administrative processes.
The Court further observed that judicial time is a scarce public resource which must be allocated fairly among all litigants. Every direction granting preferential listing to one litigant necessarily affects the rights and expectations of numerous other litigants awaiting hearing in the ordinary course. Therefore, any departure from established listing procedures must remain strictly confined to situations recognized by law or justified by compelling urgency.
Ultimately, the Division Bench concluded that no breach of statutory duty had been established on the part of the Registry. Since the petitioner had failed to demonstrate any enforceable legal right entitling him to out-of-turn listing, the essential conditions for issuance of a writ of mandamus were entirely absent.
Accordingly, the High Court dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable while observing that the petitioner remained free to avail himself of the ordinary administrative and judicial remedies available under the existing procedural framework whenever genuine urgency arose.
The judgment reinforces several important principles governing constitutional and procedural law. It reiterates that Article 226 cannot be employed to circumvent internal administrative procedures of the High Court, clarifies that neither advocates nor litigants possess a vested right to preferential listing of pending matters, recognizes the enormous administrative responsibilities discharged by the Registry, and underscores the importance of maintaining equality, transparency, and fairness in judicial case management. At the same time, the Court balanced these institutional concerns with practical realities by reminding members of the Bar that established mechanisms such as mention memos and representations before the Registrar continue to remain available for genuinely urgent cases.