Introduction:

In the matter of Murugesan v. The Inspector of Police, Crl.A(MD) No. 117 of 2018, reported as 2025 LiveLaw (Mad) 272, the Madras High Court recently delivered a significant judgment that clarified the scope of Section 354 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) relating to outraging the modesty of a woman. Justice RN Manjula, presiding over the matter, held that although pulling the hands of a woman may shock her sense of decency, such an act would not automatically amount to outraging her modesty unless accompanied by clear evidence of criminal intent. The Court emphasized that vague or generalised statements, without concrete proof of intent, would entitle the accused to the benefit of doubt. This ruling came in the context of an appeal against a conviction and sentence of three years’ rigorous imprisonment imposed on a man accused of pulling the hands of a mentally challenged woman while she was grazing her cattle. The case raised questions about the evidentiary threshold for proving intent in offences under Section 354 IPC, as well as the importance of assessing witness credibility and corroboration in sexual offence cases.

Arguments of the Appellant:

The appellant, Murugesan, challenged his conviction by arguing that the prosecution had failed to produce credible and conclusive evidence to establish that he had acted with the intention of outraging the modesty of the victim. He contended that the records contained no proof that he had abused the victim, made any indecent advances, or pulled her hand with a wrongful motive. Importantly, the victim herself was not examined before the court, as she was a mentally retarded person, which deprived the defence of the opportunity to directly challenge her version of events. The appellant pointed to contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution’s key eyewitness and argued that the trial court had overlooked these inconsistencies while convicting him. He stressed that even if the allegation of pulling the victim’s hand was accepted, such an act in itself would not constitute the offence under Section 354 IPC without evidence that it was done with the requisite intent to outrage modesty. According to him, the act could have been incidental, accidental, or for a reason unrelated to sexual intent, and mere assumptions or vague inferences should not lead to a criminal conviction. Murugesan thus urged the High Court to set aside the conviction, arguing that the benefit of doubt, a fundamental principle in criminal jurisprudence, had not been extended to him by the trial court.

Arguments of the Respondent:

On behalf of the State, Government Advocate (Crl. Side) Mr. K. Gnanasekaran defended the trial court’s decision, asserting that the evidence on record was sufficient to uphold the conviction. It was submitted that the victim was not examined due to her mental condition, which rendered her incapable of speaking in court, and this should not weaken the prosecution’s case when other credible evidence existed. The prosecution relied heavily on the testimony of the eyewitness, who informed the victim’s mother that she had seen the accused pulling the victim’s hands, leading the victim to scream. It was argued that the accused’s subsequent act of fleeing the scene upon the arrival of the victim’s mother indicated consciousness of guilt and supported the inference of wrongful intent. The prosecution maintained that the trial court had properly appreciated both the oral and documentary evidence, and that the contradictions pointed out by the defence were minor discrepancies that did not affect the core of the prosecution’s case. It was also contended that in cases involving women, particularly those with mental disabilities, courts should be sensitive to the inherent difficulties in securing direct testimony and should rely on circumstantial and eyewitness evidence to secure justice. The State therefore urged the High Court to dismiss the appeal and affirm the conviction and sentence.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice RN Manjula, after carefully examining the submissions and evidence, began by reiterating the legal position that an offence under Section 354 IPC requires not just physical contact but also the intention to outrage the modesty of a woman. While acknowledging that pulling a woman’s hand could indeed shock her sense of decency, the Court held that such an act, in the absence of evidence of criminal intent, could not automatically be classified as an offence under Section 354. The Court emphasized that intention is a critical element, and its absence cannot be substituted by mere assumptions based on the act itself. Analysing the evidence, the Court found that the victim’s mother’s account was based entirely on what she was told by the eyewitness and that the victim herself had not testified due to her mental condition. The eyewitness stated that she saw the accused pull the victim’s hands, causing her to scream, and that the accused ran away when the mother arrived. However, the Court observed significant contradictions in the eyewitness’s testimony, including inconsistencies in describing the sequence of events. These discrepancies, coupled with the absence of corroborating evidence, weakened the prosecution’s case. The Court further noted that there was no evidence of any conversation, abusive language, or other conduct accompanying the act that could indicate sexual intent or an intent to outrage modesty. Without such indicators, the mere act of pulling a hand could be explained by reasons unrelated to the offence alleged — for instance, to prevent the victim from harm or to assert control in a non-sexual context. Given these factors, the Court concluded that the prosecution had failed to discharge its burden of proving the requisite intent beyond reasonable doubt. Applying the principle that in criminal law the benefit of doubt must go to the accused, the Court set aside the trial court’s conviction and sentence. The appellant was acquitted of all charges, and the Court reiterated that while courts must be sensitive to offences against women, this sensitivity must not override the foundational principles of criminal jurisprudence, particularly the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt.