Introduction:

The Madras High Court has dismissed the bail appeal of an accused booked under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, in connection with an alleged terror conspiracy involving support for ISIS and Daesh. The Court held that materials such as potassium nitrate, sugar and batteries cannot be viewed in isolation when the prosecution alleges that they were collectively procured as part of preparations to operate an improvised explosive device (IED) in furtherance of a violent extremist conspiracy.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Anita Sumanth and Justice Sunder Mohan delivered the ruling in B. Syed Ali @ Zubair @ Anees @ Abu Backer v. Union of India, CRL.A. No. 202 of 2026, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (Mad) 407. The appeal arose from an order of the Special Court under the National Investigation Agency Act rejecting the appellant’s request for bail.

The appellant was arraigned as Accused No. 13 in a case investigated by the Kochi Branch of the National Investigation Agency. The prosecution alleged that he was involved in a wider conspiracy supporting ISIS and Daesh and had participated in activities intended to further the objectives of those organisations. The case involved allegations under Sections 120-B, 471 and 201 of the Indian Penal Code, Sections 18, 38 and 39 of the UAPA, and Sections 4 and 5 of the Explosive Substances Act.

According to the prosecution, the allegations were not confined to the possession or purchase of ordinary household or agricultural materials. The NIA alleged that the appellant had purchased potassium nitrate, sugar and other substances, including batteries, as part of preparations for operating an IED. The alleged procurement, when considered together with other material collected during the investigation, was said to form part of a larger conspiracy connected with violent jihad and the activities of ISIS and Daesh.

The appellant, however, contended that the prosecution had attempted to criminalise the purchase of items that were otherwise innocuous and commonly available. Potassium nitrate, it was argued, has legitimate agricultural uses, while sugar and batteries are everyday articles. The defence therefore maintained that the mere purchase or possession of such materials could not, by itself, establish involvement in a terrorist conspiracy or preparation for an explosive act.

The High Court rejected this approach, holding that the evidentiary significance of an article cannot always be determined by considering it separately from the surrounding circumstances. An item may have an entirely legitimate use when viewed independently, yet its significance may change when it is alleged to have been acquired along with other materials as part of a specific unlawful design.

The Court also considered the fact that this was not the appellant’s first attempt to obtain bail. An earlier bail plea had been dismissed in 2024 after the Court found that a prima facie case had been made out. At that stage, the Court had taken note of material including witness statements concerning alleged secret meetings, discussions relating to ISIS, alleged plans connected with Hijrah and establishing ISIS activities in India, and the alleged destruction of pen drives containing incriminating material.

In the present proceedings, the appellant renewed his plea primarily on the grounds that the subsequent bail rejection order was cryptic, that the prosecution had not made out a prima facie case against him, and that he had remained in custody since December 21, 2020 without sufficient progress in the trial.

The case thus brought two important considerations into focus. On one hand was the stringent statutory framework governing bail under the UAPA and the seriousness of allegations concerning terrorist activities. On the other hand was the constitutional concern arising from prolonged incarceration and delay in the commencement or completion of trial.

The prosecution informed the High Court that the Special Court had taken cognisance of the offences, charges had been framed and the trial had commenced. It further assured the Court that all efforts would be made to complete the trial within six months.

Taking note of the prima facie material against the appellant and the prosecution’s assurance regarding the progress of the trial, the Madras High Court declined to grant bail.

Arguments of the Parties:

The appellant challenged the order of the Special Court refusing bail on several grounds. A principal submission was that the order rejecting his application was cryptic and did not adequately consider the arguments advanced on his behalf. According to the appellant, the Special Court had failed to examine the evidence and circumstances in their proper perspective before continuing his detention.

The appellant strongly disputed the prosecution’s reliance on the alleged purchase of potassium nitrate, sugar and batteries. It was argued that potassium nitrate has legitimate uses and is commonly associated with agriculture as a fertilising substance. Similarly, sugar and batteries are ordinary articles of daily use.

The defence submitted that it would be legally unsound to infer involvement in terrorist activities merely because a person had purchased items capable of legitimate use. In the absence of convincing evidence connecting those materials with an actual explosive device or a specific unlawful act, the appellant contended that their purchase could not justify continued incarceration.

The appellant further argued that the prosecution had failed to establish a prima facie case demonstrating his active participation in a conspiracy supporting ISIS or Daesh. According to the defence, the allegations were either based on inference or were insufficient to establish the appellant’s individual role in the alleged conspiracy.

Another substantial ground concerned the period of incarceration. The appellant had been arrested on December 21, 2020 and had remained in custody for several years. It was argued that although the prosecution had filed charges, the matter had not progressed with sufficient speed.

The appellant contended that the State could not indefinitely justify pre-trial detention while failing to ensure that the trial moved forward. Continued incarceration without meaningful progress, according to the appellant, would result in punishment before conviction.

The argument concerning delay was particularly significant because the right to personal liberty and the right to a speedy trial remain relevant even in prosecutions involving serious offences. The defence therefore urged the Court to examine whether the length of detention had become disproportionate, particularly when the appellant had not yet been convicted.

The appellant also relied on the fact that a substantial period had passed since his arrest and argued that the purpose of pre-trial detention could not be converted into an indefinite period of imprisonment merely because the allegations were serious.

The prosecution, represented by the Special Public Prosecutor for NIA cases, opposed the appeal and maintained that the allegations against the appellant were supported by sufficient material to satisfy the statutory threshold applicable at the stage of bail.

The prosecution argued that the Court was required to examine the prosecution case in its entirety and not assess individual pieces of evidence in isolation. The alleged procurement of potassium nitrate, sugar and batteries, according to the NIA, formed only one part of the larger prosecution case.

The prosecution emphasised that its case was that these items had been acquired collectively for the purpose of operating an IED and as part of preparations for violent jihad. Their individual innocent uses, therefore, could not by themselves negate the alleged criminal purpose behind their procurement.

It was further submitted that the allegations had to be viewed in the context of the other material relied upon by the prosecution. This included evidence concerning alleged secret meetings, discussions involving ISIS, alleged plans relating to Hijrah and the establishment of ISIS activities in India, as well as the alleged destruction of electronic material containing incriminating information.

The prosecution pointed out that the appellant’s earlier bail plea had already been rejected after the Court found a prima facie case against him. According to the NIA, there was no substantial change in circumstances warranting a different view.

On the question of prolonged incarceration, the prosecution informed the High Court that the case had advanced. Cognisance had been taken by the Special Court, charges had been framed and the trial had commenced.

The prosecution also placed an affidavit or assurance before the Court stating that all efforts would be made to complete the trial within six months. It was therefore submitted that the concern regarding indefinite delay no longer justified interference with the Special Court’s order refusing bail.

According to the prosecution, the seriousness of the allegations, the appellant’s alleged role and the material supporting the charge of involvement in a terrorist conspiracy outweighed the grounds urged for release at the present stage.

Court’s Judgment:

The Madras High Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the refusal of bail. The Court was not persuaded that the appellant had demonstrated any ground sufficient to displace the earlier prima facie assessment or to warrant release in the circumstances of the case.

A significant part of the Court’s reasoning concerned the appellant’s attempt to explain the purchase of potassium nitrate, sugar and batteries by referring to their ordinary and legitimate uses.

The Court accepted that, when viewed separately, the articles might not necessarily appear incriminating. Potassium nitrate may have agricultural applications, while sugar and batteries are common everyday items. However, the Court held that this was not the correct manner in which the prosecution’s case could be assessed.

The central question was not whether each article, considered independently, was lawful to purchase or possess. Rather, the Court had to examine the prosecution’s allegation regarding why those materials were allegedly obtained and how they allegedly fit into the larger conspiracy.

The Court accordingly held that apparently ordinary articles may acquire legal significance when considered collectively and in the context of the surrounding evidence. If the prosecution’s case is that several items were procured together for operating an IED, the innocent character of each individual item cannot, at the stage of bail, automatically defeat the prosecution’s allegation.

The Court therefore rejected the appellant’s submission that the ordinary nature of the articles was sufficient to establish the absence of a prima facie case. The defence explanation could ultimately be tested during trial, but at the bail stage the Court was required to consider the prosecution material as a whole.

This approach is particularly relevant in conspiracy cases. A conspiracy is ordinarily not proved through a single isolated act. The prosecution may rely upon the cumulative effect of communications, meetings, preparations, recoveries and other surrounding circumstances to establish the alleged unlawful agreement or common design.

The High Court’s reasoning recognised that the alleged procurement of the materials could not be detached from the other circumstances relied upon by the prosecution. The Court considered the allegations relating to the appellant’s association with the wider conspiracy and the material that had earlier been taken into account while rejecting his previous bail application.

The earlier proceedings had recorded a prima facie case based on witness depositions and other materials. The allegations included secret meetings involving the appellant and others in connection with ISIS, discussions concerning travel to Bengaluru and alleged plans associated with Hijrah and the establishment of ISIS activities in India.

The prosecution had also relied upon allegations concerning the destruction of pen drives containing incriminating material. Such allegations, if established, could be relevant to the prosecution’s case regarding concealment of evidence and consciousness of involvement in unlawful activities.

The High Court found that the appellant’s renewed assertion that no prima facie case existed could not be accepted in light of the material already considered and the prosecution’s continuing case.

The decision also reflects the statutory approach to bail under the UAPA. Offences under the anti-terror legislation are subject to a more stringent framework than ordinary criminal offences. At the same time, courts must ensure that the seriousness of the allegation does not become a substitute for judicial scrutiny.

The Court therefore considered whether the prosecution case, at the present stage, disclosed sufficient prima facie material. Having examined the nature of the allegations and the surrounding circumstances, the Bench found no reason to conclude that the case against the appellant had become so weak as to justify bail.

The Court also considered the appellant’s argument regarding prolonged incarceration. This aspect required careful consideration because the appellant had been in custody since December 21, 2020.

Prolonged detention before the conclusion of trial raises serious concerns relating to personal liberty. The criminal justice system proceeds on the principle that an accused is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Pre-trial custody is therefore not intended to become a substitute for punishment.

At the same time, the High Court noted the prosecution’s submission that the case had moved beyond the earlier stage of investigation. The Special Court had taken cognisance, charges had been framed and the trial had commenced.

This was a material factor in the Court’s assessment of the delay argument. The case was not one in which the investigation remained indefinitely pending or where the prosecution had failed to take the matter forward altogether.

The prosecution further assured the Court that all efforts would be made to complete the trial within six months. The Court took note of this undertaking while considering whether the period of incarceration independently justified the grant of bail.

The assurance regarding the completion of the trial played an important role in the final outcome. Since the trial had commenced and the prosecution had placed a specific timeline before the Court, the Bench was not inclined to release the appellant solely on the basis of the length of his detention.

The Court thus balanced the competing considerations of liberty and national security. The allegations concerned an alleged terror conspiracy involving support for internationally recognised terrorist organisations and preparations for the use of an IED. At the same time, the Court addressed the concern regarding delay by recording the prosecution’s position that the trial was already underway and would be pursued for completion within six months.

Ultimately, the High Court found that the prosecution case, at the stage of bail, could not be dismissed as lacking a prima facie basis. The Court also found that the appellant’s explanation regarding the allegedly ordinary nature of the materials did not sufficiently weaken the prosecution case when the articles were viewed together with the allegations concerning their intended use.

The Bench therefore declined to interfere with the order of the Special Court. The appeal was dismissed and the appellant’s bail plea was rejected.

The ruling highlights the contextual approach courts may adopt while examining material in terrorism and conspiracy prosecutions. An article that is entirely lawful and ordinary in one setting may become relevant in another when the prosecution alleges that it was acquired as part of a coordinated unlawful plan.

At the same time, the judgment does not mean that the mere possession of potassium nitrate, sugar or batteries is inherently criminal. The Court’s reasoning was specifically tied to the prosecution’s broader allegation that the materials were procured together for operating an IED and were connected with preparations for violent jihad.

The decision therefore rests on the principle that evidence must be assessed within its factual setting. At the bail stage, courts do not ordinarily conduct a mini-trial or conclusively decide whether the accused’s explanation is ultimately correct. The Court examines whether the prosecution material, taken at face value and considered as a whole, satisfies the applicable threshold for refusing bail.

In this case, the Madras High Court concluded that the threshold was met. The earlier finding of a prima facie case, the allegations concerning meetings and preparations, the alleged destruction of incriminating electronic material and the alleged procurement of substances for an IED collectively persuaded the Court that the appellant was not entitled to bail.

The judgment also underscores the importance of ensuring that trials in serious offences are completed without unnecessary delay. The prosecution’s assurance that efforts would be made to conclude the trial within six months was significant because a stringent bail regime cannot justify indefinite incarceration without progress in the proceedings.

The final outcome was therefore a dismissal of the bail appeal, with the Court relying on the prima facie strength of the prosecution case and the progress already made in the trial. The ruling reinforces that in alleged terror conspiracies, courts may assess seemingly ordinary acts and materials not in isolation, but against the larger factual narrative presented by the prosecution.