Introduction:

The Madhya Pradesh High Court has held that a woman’s education, financial independence and professional position cannot, by themselves, determine whether her consent to sexual relations was allegedly obtained through deception or a false promise of marriage. The Court also observed that the fact that marriage negotiations took place between the parties does not conclusively establish that the accused had an honest intention to marry her. Whether the promise was genuine when it was made, or whether it was allegedly used to obtain consent without any intention of fulfilment, is a question that must ordinarily be examined through evidence during trial.

Justice Himanshu Joshi made these observations while dismissing a petition filed by a man seeking quashing of a First Information Report (FIR) registered against him under Section 69 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS). The provision addresses sexual intercourse with a woman through specified deceptive means, including a promise to marry made without the intention of fulfilling it, where the circumstances fall within the statutory requirements. The accused sought to bring the criminal proceedings to an end at the threshold, contending that the allegations did not disclose the offence and that the FIR had been filed as a counterblast.

The case arose from the relationship between two employees of the State Bank of India. According to the prosecution, the prosecutrix was working as a bank manager and was acquainted with the applicant, who was also employed as a manager at the same bank. The two developed a friendship and remained in contact. Their relationship subsequently became the subject of allegations concerning a promise of marriage and repeated instances of physical intimacy.

The prosecutrix alleged that on January 23, 2023, when she was posted in Gwalior, the applicant came there and established physical relations with her. According to her account, she had insisted on marriage before entering into the relationship, and the applicant assured her that he would marry her. She further alleged that the applicant later asked her to approach his family regarding the proposed marriage. Marriage negotiations followed, but his mother declined the proposal.

The prosecution’s case was that the applicant continued to assure the prosecutrix that he would persuade his family to agree to the marriage. She alleged that he established physical relations with her on several occasions while giving those assurances. In November 2025, however, the applicant allegedly informed her that his family had selected another woman for him to marry and that he intended to proceed with that decision. The prosecutrix claimed that she attempted to persuade him to reconsider, but he refused. She subsequently lodged the FIR on January 17, 2026.

The applicant disputed the allegations. His counsel argued that he had never made a false promise of marriage and that the FIR was a counterblast. The defence also relied on the fact that the applicant himself had asked the prosecutrix to approach his family for marriage negotiations, contending that this conduct was inconsistent with the allegation that he had deceived her from the beginning.

The State opposed the petition, submitting that the FIR contained specific allegations and that the applicant’s intention at the time the promise was allegedly made could not be conclusively determined without examining the evidence. The State argued that whether the applicant had acted dishonestly from the outset was a matter for trial.

After considering the rival submissions, the High Court found that the FIR contained detailed allegations, including references to particular instances when physical relations were allegedly established. It therefore rejected the contention that the complaint was vague or lacked material particulars. The Court reiterated that not every unfulfilled promise of marriage amounts to a criminal offence. The prosecution must establish the requisite dishonest intention at the time the promise was made and a direct connection between the alleged deception and the woman’s consent to the sexual acts.

Nevertheless, the Court held that the allegations, taken at face value, prima facie disclosed the ingredients of the offence alleged. Since the chargesheet had already been filed and the trial was pending before the competent court, the High Court declined to conduct a mini-trial while exercising its inherent jurisdiction. It accordingly dismissed the petition seeking quashing of the FIR.

The decision, reported as 2026LiveLaw(MP)4352026 LiveLaw (MP) 435, highlights the distinction between a relationship that ends in a refusal to marry and a relationship in which a promise of marriage is alleged to have been dishonest from its inception. It also underscores the limited nature of the High Court’s inquiry at the stage of considering a request to quash criminal proceedings. The Court did not decide whether the allegations were ultimately true; it held that their credibility and the accused’s intention required consideration in the ordinary course of trial.

Arguments of the Parties:

The applicant sought the quashing of the FIR registered under Section 69 of the BNS. His principal contention was that the allegations did not justify continuing the criminal proceedings because he had not made any false promise of marriage. The defence challenged the prosecution’s version and maintained that the complaint had been lodged as a counterblast.

Advocate Ravi Shankar Yadav, appearing for the applicant, argued that the applicant had never promised marriage with a dishonest intention. The defence sought to distinguish the circumstances of the relationship from a case in which a person allegedly makes a promise of marriage solely to secure sexual relations while having no intention of honouring that promise. The applicant’s position was that the prosecution had failed to establish a sufficient basis for treating the relationship as one involving deception.

A central part of the defence submission concerned the marriage negotiations between the parties. It was argued that the applicant himself had asked the prosecutrix to approach his family regarding marriage. According to the applicant, this conduct undermined the allegation that he had deliberately misled her from the beginning. The fact that marriage discussions had taken place was presented as a circumstance supporting the contention that the prospect of marriage had been genuine rather than a device used to obtain consent.

The defence also relied on the allegation that the FIR was a counterblast. In seeking the extraordinary relief of quashing, the applicant effectively asked the High Court to conclude that the allegations did not warrant a criminal trial. His case required the Court to consider whether the complaint, even if its allegations were accepted at face value for the limited purpose of the quashing petition, disclosed the essential elements of the offence under Section 69 of the BNS.

The defence arguments raised an important legal distinction. A relationship may involve discussions of marriage, mutual expectations and subsequent disappointment without necessarily giving rise to criminal liability. A person’s eventual refusal to marry does not automatically prove that an earlier promise was false. The relevant question in a prosecution based on an alleged deceptive promise is whether the promise was dishonest when made, rather than whether the relationship ultimately resulted in marriage.

The applicant’s reliance on the marriage negotiations therefore went to the question of intention. If the negotiations genuinely reflected an intention to marry at the relevant time, their existence could be a circumstance bearing on the prosecution’s allegation of deception. However, the existence of negotiations does not necessarily settle that question. The defence sought to rely on those circumstances to support its case that the FIR should not proceed, while the prosecution maintained that the accused’s intention had to be evaluated through evidence.

The State opposed the petition and argued that the FIR contained specific allegations against the applicant. The Government Advocate, Raghuvar Prajapati, submitted that the prosecution’s case was not based merely on the fact that the parties had been in a relationship that ultimately failed. Instead, the FIR alleged that the applicant repeatedly assured the prosecutrix of marriage and that those assurances were connected to the establishment of physical relations.

The State’s position was that the applicant’s intention at the time the promise was made could not be conclusively determined at the preliminary stage. Whether he genuinely intended to marry the prosecutrix or allegedly used the promise dishonestly to obtain her consent was a factual question that required an assessment of the evidence. According to the prosecution, that question should be addressed during trial rather than determined by the High Court in proceedings seeking quashing of the FIR.

The State also relied on the details contained in the complaint. The FIR referred to the parties’ acquaintance through their employment at the State Bank of India, their developing friendship, the alleged physical relationship on January 23, 2023, the subsequent marriage negotiations, the refusal of the applicant’s mother to accept the proposal, and the further assurances allegedly given by the applicant. It also described the alleged development in November 2025, when the applicant reportedly informed the prosecutrix that his family had selected another woman for him to marry.

These allegations, according to the State, provided a sufficient factual basis for the criminal proceedings to continue. The prosecution’s argument was not that the allegations had already been proved, but that they raised questions that could not properly be resolved without examining the evidence. The State therefore urged the Court not to terminate the proceedings before the trial court had an opportunity to assess the rival versions.

The prosecutrix was represented by Advocate Shankar Dayal Mishra. The case summary does not reproduce the full submissions made on her behalf, and it would therefore be inappropriate to attribute additional arguments to her counsel. Her position in the proceedings was that of respondent no. 2, in a petition seeking to quash the FIR arising from her allegations.

The opposing submissions thus centred on two related questions: whether the complaint disclosed the ingredients of an offence under Section 69 of the BNS and whether the applicant’s intention could be determined without a trial. The defence relied on the absence of a false promise, the alleged counterblast and the fact that marriage negotiations had occurred. The State relied on the specific allegations in the FIR and maintained that the question of dishonest intention required an evidentiary assessment. The High Court had to decide whether the case justified the exceptional intervention of quashing at that stage, not whether the prosecution had already proved its allegations beyond reasonable doubt.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice Himanshu Joshi dismissed the applicant’s petition, holding that the FIR could not be quashed at the preliminary stage on the grounds advanced by the defence. The Court found that the complaint contained specific allegations concerning the alleged promise of marriage, the circumstances in which physical relations were established and the subsequent developments in the relationship. It therefore could not be characterised as vague or devoid of material allegations.

A significant part of the Court’s reasoning concerned the difference between an unfulfilled promise of marriage and a promise allegedly made dishonestly from the outset. The Court reiterated that the mere fact that a person ultimately does not marry someone to whom a promise was allegedly made does not automatically establish criminal liability. A failed relationship, a change of circumstances or a subsequent refusal to marry cannot, without more, be treated as proof that the original promise was false.

For an allegation of this nature to attract Section 69 of the BNS, the prosecution must establish the elements required by the provision. In particular, where the allegation concerns a promise of marriage, it is necessary to show that the promise was false when made, that the person making it had no intention of fulfilling it at that time, and that the deception had a direct nexus with the woman’s consent to the sexual acts in question. The issue is not simply whether the promised marriage eventually took place, but whether the promise was allegedly used as a deceptive means of obtaining consent.

This distinction is crucial to the legal analysis. A promise may be made honestly and later remain unfulfilled because of changed circumstances, family opposition or a subsequent breakdown in the relationship. Such an outcome does not, by itself, prove that the promise was dishonest at the time it was made. Conversely, the fact that discussions about marriage occurred does not conclusively rule out the possibility that a promise was allegedly made without a genuine intention to fulfil it. The intention accompanying the promise must be assessed in the context of the facts and evidence.

The High Court applied that distinction to the applicant’s argument concerning the marriage negotiations. The defence had emphasised that the applicant himself asked the prosecutrix to approach his family about marriage. The Court did not consider that circumstance sufficient, on its own, to establish that the applicant lacked dishonest intentions. The fact that negotiations took place might form part of the evidence, but it could not conclusively determine whether the promise had been genuine throughout the relevant period.

The Court observed that the central question was whether the conduct demonstrated a genuine intention to marry at the relevant time. That question required an appreciation of evidence and could not be resolved merely by pointing to the existence of marriage discussions. The Court therefore declined to treat the negotiations as decisive proof in favour of either party at the stage of considering the quashing petition.

The Court also rejected the suggestion that the prosecutrix’s professional and financial circumstances determined the issue of consent. The prosecutrix was an educated, financially independent woman working as a bank manager. The Court held that these attributes did not, by themselves, establish whether her consent had or had not been obtained through deception.

The observation is significant because it keeps the legal inquiry focused on the alleged conduct and the circumstances in which consent was given, rather than on assumptions about how an educated or financially independent person would respond to a promise of marriage. Professional status, education and economic independence do not automatically resolve the factual question of whether a particular representation was deceptive. Nor do they establish, without evidence, that deception necessarily occurred.

The Court’s reasoning did not amount to a finding that the prosecutrix had been deceived. Rather, it rejected the proposition that her professional position alone could determine the issue against the prosecution. The legal question remained whether the alleged promise was dishonest when made and whether it had the required connection with her consent. That determination depended on the evidence relating to the parties’ conduct and the circumstances of the relationship.

The Court’s approach was also informed by the limits of its inherent jurisdiction. A petition seeking quashing asks the High Court to intervene before the criminal trial has concluded. Such jurisdiction is intended to prevent criminal proceedings from continuing where the legal requirements for intervention are met; it is not ordinarily an avenue for conducting a full assessment of disputed facts or deciding the credibility of competing accounts.

Justice Joshi emphasised that the High Court could not undertake a mini-trial or conduct a comparative assessment of the rival versions while exercising its inherent jurisdiction. The applicant’s contentions concerning the genuineness of the promise, the significance of the marriage negotiations and the allegation that the FIR was a counterblast raised questions that could not be conclusively decided merely by weighing the competing factual narratives at this preliminary stage.

The distinction between a threshold review and a trial is particularly important in cases involving allegations of deceptive promises. Whether a person had an intention to marry when making a promise is often a question of fact that must be assessed in light of the surrounding circumstances. A court considering a quashing petition must examine whether the allegations, taken at face value, disclose the ingredients of the alleged offence. It should not ordinarily decide disputed questions of intention by preferring one party’s version over the other’s when those questions require evidentiary examination.

In the present case, the Court found that the FIR contained detailed allegations rather than a bare assertion that the applicant had failed to marry the prosecutrix. The complaint referred to a particular date on which physical relations were allegedly established, the assurance of marriage said to have preceded those relations, the subsequent marriage negotiations and the repeated assurances allegedly given after the applicant’s mother declined the proposal. It also described the alleged decision communicated in November 2025 to marry another woman selected by his family.

The Court considered these allegations sufficient to prevent the FIR from being characterised as vague or lacking material particulars. Their truth, reliability and legal significance remained matters for the trial court. At the quashing stage, however, the Court was not required to determine whether every allegation had been established. It had to assess whether the allegations, if accepted at face value, prima facie disclosed the ingredients of the offence alleged.

On that question, the Court concluded that the FIR prima facie contained the necessary ingredients of the offence under Section 69 of the BNS. The allegations described a promise of marriage said to have been made before physical relations were established, repeated assurances allegedly given thereafter, and circumstances in which the promise ultimately was not fulfilled. Taken together, those allegations warranted examination through the criminal process rather than termination at the threshold.

The Court’s conclusion must be understood within these limits. A finding that the FIR prima facie discloses an offence is not a finding that the accused is guilty. It does not establish that the promise was false when made, that the applicant lacked an intention to marry from the beginning, or that the prosecution has proved the necessary connection between the alleged deception and the prosecutrix’s consent. Those are matters to be determined through the applicable trial process on the evidence presented before the competent court.

The fact that the chargesheet had already been filed and the trial was pending also formed part of the procedural context. The matter had progressed beyond the initial registration of the FIR, and the competent court was seized of the case. The High Court declined to use its inherent jurisdiction to assess the rival factual versions in place of the trial court’s evidentiary process. It found no sufficient basis, on the grounds raised, to quash the proceedings.

The judgment also clarifies the lmited role of circumstances that may be rel