Introduction:

In Ramjanbhai Hasambhai Khraj v. State of Gujarat & Ors., the Gujarat High Court delivered a significant ruling clarifying the mandatory operation of Section 427(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure in cases where a person already undergoing life imprisonment is subsequently convicted and sentenced. The petitioner had originally been convicted under Sections 302 and 498A of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced to life imprisonment. During his incarceration, he was granted temporary bail for 30 days in March 2003 but failed to surrender within the stipulated time, resulting in a separate prosecution under Section 51(B) of the Prisons Act for absconding. He was convicted in February 2004 and sentenced to two years simple imprisonment. The trial court and the appellate court directed that the two year sentence would commence after completion of the life sentence. Years later, after the petitioner was granted remission in his life sentence and formally released in July 2025 in respect of the murder and cruelty convictions, he continued to remain in custody to serve the two year sentence, as it had been ordered to run consecutively. Challenging this, he approached the High Court contending that the subsequent sentence was required to run concurrently by virtue of Section 427(2) CrPC and that his continued detention had become illegal.

Arguments:

On behalf of the petitioner, learned counsel argued that the second conviction under Section 51(B) of the Prisons Act arose while he was already undergoing life imprisonment. Therefore, Section 427(2) CrPC squarely applied, mandating that when a person already undergoing a sentence of life imprisonment is subsequently sentenced to imprisonment for a term or another life term, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently with the previous sentence. It was contended that the language of Section 427(2) is mandatory and leaves no discretion with the court. The trial court and appellate court, in directing the two year sentence to run after completion of the life imprisonment, had acted beyond their statutory powers. The petitioner further relied upon the decision in Prabhatji Sukhaji Dabhi v. State of Gujarat to submit that any subsequent sentence imposed on a life convict must run concurrently and that failure to do so renders continued detention illegal once the life sentence is completed or remitted. It was emphasized that the petitioner had already undergone the entirety of his life sentence as modified by remission and that jail remarks confirmed he had completed all sentences imposed upon him. Therefore, his continued incarceration violated his personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution. On the other hand, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor opposed the petition contending that Section 427(2) CrPC should not be read as stripping courts of all discretion. The State argued that the petitioner had absconded while on temporary bail, thereby committing a separate offence during the subsistence of his life sentence, and such conduct disentitled him from equitable relief. It was submitted that the court should consider the gravity of absconding and the need to deter such misconduct. Reliance was placed on Mohd. Zahid v. State through NCB to argue that sentencing principles must take into account the conduct of the accused and that concurrency is not automatic in all situations. The State therefore urged dismissal of the petition and continuation of the two year sentence as directed by the lower courts.

Judgment:

Justice M. R. Mengdey, after hearing both sides and examining the statutory framework, held that the petitioner’s case was clearly governed by Section 427(2) CrPC. The Court observed that the provision creates a specific rule applicable to life convicts, distinct from Section 427(1), which confers discretion in other cases. Under Section 427(2), when a person already undergoing life imprisonment is subsequently sentenced to imprisonment for a term or another life sentence, the subsequent sentence shall run concurrently. The Court emphasized that neither the trial court nor the appellate court had any power or discretion to direct that the subsequent two year sentence would commence after the life imprisonment was over. Such a direction was contrary to the statutory mandate and constituted a grave error. The High Court held that the detention of the petitioner in the second offence after completion of the life imprisonment became illegal. Referring to the jail remarks placed on record, the Court noted that the petitioner had already completed all sentences imposed upon him. In these circumstances, his continued custody was without authority of law. The Court therefore allowed the petition, quashed the impugned orders directing consecutive running of sentences, and ordered that the petitioner be released forthwith. The ruling reinforces the mandatory nature of Section 427(2) CrPC and underscores that statutory commands cannot be diluted by judicial discretion. It also affirms that once a life convict has undergone the sentence including remission, any subsequent term sentence imposed during the life imprisonment must be treated as having run concurrently, and continued detention beyond that point violates constitutional protections of personal liberty.