Introduction:

The Kerala High Court, in Ahamed Junaid P.S. v. Union of India and Anr., 2026 LiveLaw (Ker) 460, has upheld the requirement that a second girl child must receive the prescribed vaccinations within the stipulated period for the lactating mother to claim the monetary benefit of ₹6,000 under the Pradhan Mantri Matru Vandana Yojana (PMMVY). Justice Bechu Kurian Thomas held that the benefit under the scheme is conditional and does not constitute an unconditional or fundamental right available to every lactating mother. The Court consequently dismissed the challenge to the vaccination requirement and rejected the contention that the condition was arbitrary or unconstitutional.

The case arose from a writ petition filed by Ahamed Junaid P.S., who approached the High Court seeking a declaration that insisting upon production of a vaccination certificate in respect of his second girl child, as a condition for his wife to receive the benefit under the PMMVY Scheme, was unconstitutional. The petitioner contended that the requirement interfered with personal liberty and indirectly compelled parents to vaccinate their child against their wishes.

The PMMVY Scheme is a maternity benefit scheme of the Central Government designed to provide financial assistance to eligible beneficiaries. The scheme operates within the framework of Section 4 of the National Food Security Act, 2013, which provides for maternity benefits subject to the conditions and scheme prescribed by the Central Government. In the case of a second girl child, the scheme provides a benefit of ₹6,000 subject to specified eligibility requirements, including fulfilment of vaccination-related conditions.

The controversy before the High Court centred on Rule 7(2)(ii) of the PMVVY Rules. The provision makes the monetary benefit in respect of a second girl child conditional upon the child having received all due vaccinations up to fourteen weeks from the date of birth, as admissible under the Universal Immunization Programme of the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare.

The petitioner questioned the constitutional validity of this condition. His argument was not merely that vaccination was a condition for receiving a particular government benefit, but that making vaccination a prerequisite indirectly coerced parents into subjecting their children to immunisation. According to him, such indirect coercion affected the autonomy and personal liberty protected under Article 21 of the Constitution. He also contended that the vaccination requirement was arbitrary and therefore offended Article 14.

The petitioner further sought to invoke Article 47 of the Constitution. His contention was that the State has a constitutional duty to improve public health and to endeavour to prohibit the consumption of drugs and substances injurious to health. According to him, if vaccination could produce adverse effects, the State could not constitutionally impose a vaccination-linked condition while granting a welfare benefit.

The respondents, however, defended the scheme on the basis that the monetary assistance was not an unconditional entitlement. The Union Government maintained that Parliament, through Section 4 of the National Food Security Act, had contemplated a conditional maternity benefit and had left it to the Central Government to formulate an appropriate scheme governing eligibility and payment.

The Union further explained that early immunisation was incorporated into the scheme because vaccination is an important public-health measure capable of reducing infant mortality and protecting children against preventable diseases. The cash incentive under the PMMVY Scheme was also intended to support mothers around pregnancy and childbirth and, in the case of the second girl child, to encourage a positive attitude towards the birth of girls.

Before considering the constitutional challenge in detail, the High Court first examined whether the writ petition itself was maintainable. The Union argued that the petitioner was not the intended beneficiary under the scheme. The benefit was intended for the lactating mother and was to be transferred directly to her bank account. Since the mother was not before the Court and the petitioner was seeking to challenge the eligibility condition merely on the basis that he was the father of the child, the respondents contended that he had no legally enforceable right to claim the benefit.

The High Court accepted this preliminary objection. It nevertheless proceeded to examine the substantive constitutional arguments raised by the petitioner and rejected them on merits as well.

The judgment is significant because it addresses the intersection of welfare schemes, vaccination policy, parental autonomy and constitutional rights. Rather than treating the vaccination condition as a standalone compulsory vaccination mandate, the Court examined the nature of the PMMVY benefit and concluded that the Government was entitled to prescribe reasonable eligibility conditions for persons who voluntarily sought to claim the benefit under the scheme.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioner challenged the vaccination condition principally on constitutional grounds. His case was that requiring proof that his second girl child had received the prescribed vaccinations placed parents in a position where they would have to vaccinate their child if they wished to receive the monetary benefit available under the PMMVY Scheme. According to him, although the Government might not expressly compel vaccination through a criminal prohibition or direct coercive order, linking vaccination to a financial benefit created an indirect form of coercion.

The petitioner argued that such indirect compulsion affected the constitutionally protected sphere of personal liberty under Article 21. He maintained that decisions concerning medical treatment and vaccination involve individual autonomy and bodily integrity. In his view, the State could not effectively compel a parent to make a medical decision concerning a child by withholding a welfare benefit.

The petitioner also invoked Article 14 and contended that the vaccination condition was arbitrary. According to him, the State had not demonstrated a sufficient constitutional basis for denying a maternity benefit merely because a child had not received vaccinations within a prescribed period. He questioned whether a welfare benefit intended to support mothers could legitimately be made dependent upon compliance with an unrelated medical requirement.

The petitioner further relied on Article 47 of the Constitution. His submission was that the State has a constitutional responsibility to improve public health and to prohibit measures injurious to health. He argued that where vaccination may allegedly have adverse effects, the State could not rely upon public-health objectives to impose vaccination as a condition for receiving financial assistance.

Considerable reliance was placed on the Supreme Court’s decision in Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India. The petitioner sought to draw support from that judgment for the proposition that vaccination policies could implicate individual autonomy and personal liberty. He contended that the principles recognised in that decision demonstrated that vaccination could not simply be imposed through indirect governmental pressure.

The petitioner therefore sought a declaration that the vaccination requirement under the PMMVY Scheme was unconstitutional, arbitrary and violative of Articles 14 and 21. He argued that the State should not use a welfare benefit as a means of compelling parents to adopt a particular medical choice.

The Union Government opposed the petition at both the preliminary and substantive stages. As a threshold matter, the Union argued that the petitioner was not the beneficiary contemplated by the PMMVY Scheme. The benefit was payable to the lactating mother and was intended to be directly credited into her bank account. Therefore, according to the Union, the father could not claim a legally enforceable entitlement to the benefit or challenge the conditions attached to it merely by asserting his status as the father of the child.

The Union further contended that the PMMVY Scheme was not an unconditional statutory entitlement. Section 4 of the National Food Security Act contemplated maternity benefits subject to a scheme formulated by the Central Government. The Government therefore had the authority to prescribe eligibility requirements governing the release of the benefit.

According to the Union, the vaccination condition was incorporated as a legitimate public-health measure. Early immunisation is intended to protect children against vaccine-preventable diseases and contributes to the reduction of infant mortality. Linking the benefit to timely vaccination was therefore connected with the broader objective of promoting maternal and child health.

The Union also emphasised the social objectives underlying the PMMVY Scheme. The financial assistance is intended to provide support to mothers during pregnancy and after childbirth and, in relation to the second girl child, to encourage a positive attitude towards the birth of girl children. The vaccination requirement was therefore not an arbitrary condition unrelated to the objectives of the scheme.

The State Government supported the Union’s position. It maintained that the vaccination condition was neither arbitrary nor unconstitutional and that the Government was entitled to formulate conditions for the disbursement of a conditional welfare benefit.

The respondents also disputed the petitioner’s reliance on Jacob Puliyel. They contended that the Supreme Court’s observations in that case could not be treated as a universal declaration invalidating vaccination requirements in every governmental context. The circumstances and legal issue involved in that decision were distinguishable from the question before the Kerala High Court.

The respondents accordingly urged the Court to reject the writ petition both because it was not maintainable at the instance of the petitioner and because the vaccination requirement did not infringe Articles 14 or 21.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice Bechu Kurian Thomas delivered the judgment of the Kerala High Court and dismissed the writ petition. The Court first accepted the respondents’ objection regarding maintainability. It noted that the PMMVY Scheme is a conditional scheme under which the benefit is intended for a lactating mother. The mother of the child, who was the intended beneficiary, was not before the Court.

The Court observed that the scheme contemplated direct transfer of the financial assistance into the mother’s bank account. Consequently, the petitioner, merely by claiming to be the father of the child, did not acquire a legally enforceable right to receive the benefit or to insist that the conditions applicable to the beneficiary be removed.

The Court therefore held that the writ petition itself was not maintainable. Nevertheless, recognising the constitutional questions raised by the petitioner, the Court proceeded to examine the challenge on its merits.

The central issue was whether vaccination could constitutionally be prescribed as an eligibility condition for obtaining the ₹6,000 benefit under the PMMVY Scheme. The Court examined Rule 7(2)(ii) of the PMVVY Rules and found that the provision expressly contemplated vaccination as one of the conditions governing the benefit for a second girl child.

The Court emphasised the distinction between a fundamental right and a conditional governmental benefit. According to the Court, the PMMVY Scheme does not confer an absolute right upon every lactating mother to receive ₹6,000 irrespective of the conditions prescribed by the scheme. The benefit becomes available only when the eligibility requirements are satisfied.

This distinction formed the foundation of the Court’s reasoning. The Court held that a person who voluntarily seeks to claim a benefit under a government scheme cannot ordinarily challenge the conditions attached to that benefit merely on the ground that compliance with those conditions requires a particular course of conduct.

The Court made it clear that the scheme itself does not impose an absolute command that every child must be vaccinated. Rather, it provides that the financial benefit will be available subject to fulfilment of the prescribed vaccination condition. In the Court’s view, this did not amount to an unconstitutional deprivation of a fundamental right.

The Court relied upon the principle recognised by the Supreme Court in Union of India v. Charak Pharmaceuticals (India) Ltd., reported in (2003) 11 SCC 689, concerning the distinction between a legal entitlement and a benefit made available subject to conditions prescribed by the Government. Applying that principle, the High Court concluded that the Government was entitled to determine the terms on which the particular benefit would be conferred.

The Court consequently rejected the argument that there was a fundamental right to receive the PMMVY benefit. Since the benefit was conditional, prescribing eligibility criteria could not, in itself, be regarded as constitutionally invalid.

The Court then considered the petitioner’s challenge under Articles 14 and 21. It found no arbitrariness in linking the benefit with vaccination. The vaccination requirement was connected to a legitimate public-health objective and was not an irrational or unrelated condition.

The Court specifically considered the petitioner’s argument that immunisation could have side effects. Even assuming that vaccinations may produce some adverse effects in certain circumstances, the Court held that the overall health benefits of immunisation substantially outweigh such side effects. Therefore, governmental measures designed to promote and encourage vaccination could not, merely on that basis, be characterised as unconstitutional or arbitrary.

The Court’s reasoning reflects judicial deference to public-health policy, particularly where such policy is based upon accepted medical and scientific considerations. Courts are not ordinarily equipped to substitute their own assessment for that of specialised public-health authorities when the Government has adopted a policy based on expert consensus.

This principle was reinforced by the Court’s discussion of Jacob Puliyel v. Union of India. The petitioner had relied upon that decision to contend that vaccination requirements could violate personal liberty. The High Court, however, held that the decision could not be treated as a precedent applicable to all vaccination-related questions without regard to the factual and legal context in which it was decided.

The Court referred to the Supreme Court’s observations in Jacob Puliyel concerning paediatric vaccination and noted that the Supreme Court had recognised that India’s decision to vaccinate children was consistent with the global scientific consensus and the views of expert institutions such as the World Health Organization, UNICEF and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention.

The Supreme Court had also indicated that courts should not second-guess expert scientific opinion forming the basis of government policy. Relying on this principle, the Kerala High Court concluded that the efficacy and public-health benefits of paediatric vaccination were not matters open to routine judicial scrutiny in the manner suggested by the petitioner.

The Court therefore declined to undertake an independent judicial evaluation of the scientific effectiveness of childhood vaccination. Instead, it accepted the Government’s stated public-health objective as a legitimate basis for prescribing vaccination as an eligibility condition under the welfare scheme.

The Court also rejected the petitioner’s reliance on Article 47. Article 47 forms part of the Directive Principles of State Policy and directs the State to regard the improvement of public health as among its primary duties. The Court found nothing inconsistent between this constitutional objective and the Government’s effort to encourage childhood immunisation.

Indeed, from the Court’s perspective, measures encouraging vaccination were consistent with the broader constitutional objective of improving public health. The petitioner’s argument that Article 47 itself rendered the vaccination condition unconstitutional was therefore found to be unsustainable.

An important aspect of the decision is the Court’s treatment of indirect coercion. The petitioner argued that although vaccination may not be expressly compulsory, making it a condition for a financial benefit effectively pressures parents to vaccinate their children. The Court did not accept that such a condition transformed the scheme into an unconstitutional vaccination mandate.

The Court’s approach was based on the voluntary nature of participation in the benefit scheme. The financial assistance was not an unconditional entitlement that the State was constitutionally bound to provide irrespective of eligibility requirements. The individual remained free not to claim the benefit, although choosing not to satisfy the conditions would mean that the benefit would not be available.

This distinction between compulsion and conditional entitlement is central to the judgment. A government may, subject to constitutional limitations, determine the terms upon which a particular welfare benefit is granted. The existence of a condition may influence an individual’s decision whether to claim the benefit, but that does not necessarily amount to a direct violation of personal liberty.

The Court also placed importance on the specific public-health objective behind the vaccination requirement. The condition was not introduced as a random or unrelated restriction. It was connected to the Government’s objective of encouraging timely immunisation of infants, which the respondents submitted would contribute to reducing infant mortality.

The Court therefore found a rational connection between the condition and the purpose of the scheme. This was sufficient to withstand the petitioner’s challenge under Article 14.

The decision also reflects a broader judicial principle concerning welfare schemes. Courts generally distinguish between benefits which are legally enforceable rights and benefits which are created through executive schemes subject to specified eligibility conditions. Where a scheme expressly defines the circumstances in which a benefit will be released, courts cannot ordinarily rewrite those conditions merely because an individual finds them inconvenient or disagrees with the underlying policy.

At the same time, the judgment should not be understood as declaring that every vaccination condition attached to every government benefit will automatically be constitutionally valid. The Court’s conclusion was rooted in the specific structure and objectives of the PMMVY Scheme, the statutory framework under which it was formulated, the nature of the benefit, and the public-health rationale behind the vaccination requirement.

The Court ultimately held that the PMMVY Scheme does not confer an absolute right to ₹6,000 upon every lactating mother. The benefit is conditional and becomes payable only when the requirements specified under the scheme are satisfied. The vaccination condition was therefore not found to violate Articles 14 or 21.

The Court’s conclusion also underscores the limited role of judicial review in matters involving technical public-health policy. Where a policy is supported by expert opinion and pursues a legitimate public-health objective, courts are generally reluctant to substitute their own assessment of medical efficacy for that of specialised authorities.

In the present case, the Cout found that encouraging paediatric vaccination served