Introduction:
In a significant judgment concerning educational policy and the scope of judicial review in academic matters, the Kerala High Court declined to interfere with the State Government’s revised standardisation formula introduced through the 2026 Prospectus for Admission to Professional Degree Courses. The decision came in Jomon Jaison and Others v. State of Kerala and Another and connected matters, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (Ker) 317, where a group of students challenged the method adopted by the State for preparing the rank list for engineering admissions.
The case was heard by Justice Bechu Kurian Thomas, who was called upon to examine whether the revised normalisation process introduced by the Government unfairly disadvantaged students belonging to the Central Board of Secondary Education (CBSE) and whether the new system had been implemented without adequate expert evaluation. The petitioners, who intended to participate in the engineering admission process, contended that the revised formula was arbitrary, unscientific, and likely to cause serious prejudice to students from certain educational boards.
The dispute arose against the backdrop of Kerala’s long-standing practice of standardising marks obtained by students from different educational boards for the purpose of preparing a common rank list for professional admissions. Since students appear for qualifying examinations conducted by different boards that follow distinct curricula, evaluation methods, and marking patterns, the State has historically adopted mechanisms to equalise scores and ensure a level playing field during admissions.
The challenge in the present case related to a new normalisation system introduced through the 2026 Prospectus after the Government constituted an Internal Committee to review the existing methodology. The committee examined alternative models and recommended a formula similar to the one followed in Tamil Nadu, where the highest marks obtained in each respective board are treated as the benchmark for standardisation.
The petitioners argued that the new formula lacked scientific justification and had the potential to adversely affect CBSE students. The State, however, maintained that the revised methodology was introduced precisely to remove disparities that existed under earlier systems and was based on a reasoned policy decision following expert consideration.
The case therefore raised important questions regarding educational equality, policy-making in academic administration, and the extent to which courts can scrutinize governmental decisions relating to admission procedures. Ultimately, the High Court was required to balance the concerns of students against the well-established principle that courts ordinarily refrain from substituting their views for those of educational authorities and policy-makers.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioners, consisting primarily of students aspiring to secure admission to engineering courses through the State’s entrance examination process, challenged the validity of the standardisation formula incorporated in the 2026 Prospectus. Their principal grievance was that the revised normalisation method operated unfairly against students studying under the CBSE curriculum and failed to achieve true parity among candidates from different educational boards.
According to the petitioners, the State Government had introduced a fundamentally altered method of standardisation without conducting any comprehensive scientific study or obtaining the opinion of independent experts possessing specialised knowledge in educational measurement and statistical evaluation. They argued that a change affecting thousands of students competing for limited seats in professional courses required a rigorous empirical foundation rather than administrative experimentation.
The petitioners submitted that the revised formula was arbitrary because it treated the highest marks obtained in each board as the benchmark for standardisation without adequately considering variations in syllabus content, examination difficulty, marking standards, and student performance patterns across different boards. They contended that such an approach could distort merit and create an artificial equalisation that did not reflect actual academic achievement.
A further argument advanced by the petitioners was that the Internal Committee constituted by the Government lacked the necessary expertise to undertake a comprehensive review of the standardisation process. It was argued that educational standardisation involves complex statistical and psychometric considerations and therefore requires the involvement of specialised experts rather than administrative officials.
The petitioners also emphasized that students had structured their academic preparation based on expectations generated by earlier admission practices. Any abrupt alteration in the method of standardisation, according to them, had the potential to affect admission prospects and create uncertainty among candidates.
In response, the State Government and the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations strongly defended the revised normalisation system. The respondents argued that educational policy and admission procedures fall primarily within the domain of the executive and expert authorities. Consequently, unless a policy decision is shown to be arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide, or manifestly unreasonable, courts should not interfere.
The State submitted that the revised formula was not introduced arbitrarily but emerged from a detailed review conducted by an Internal Committee consisting of the Commissioner for Entrance Examinations, the Director of Technical Education, and the Director of the State Council for Educational Research and Training (SCERT). According to the respondents, these officials possessed substantial experience and expertise in matters relating to education, entrance examinations, and academic evaluation.
The respondents further argued that the purpose of the revised methodology was to address disparities that had existed under previous standardisation systems. By treating the highest marks obtained in each board as representing 100 percent achievement within that board, the new formula sought to eliminate undue advantages or disadvantages arising from differences in examination patterns and marking practices.
The State also relied upon the experience of Tamil Nadu, where a similar normalisation model had reportedly been followed for several years without generating substantial complaints or legal challenges. This, according to the respondents, demonstrated the practical viability and fairness of the adopted methodology.
Another important submission made on behalf of the State was that no student had demonstrated actual prejudice resulting from the revised formula. The respondents contended that mere apprehension or speculative disadvantage cannot constitute a valid ground for invalidating a policy decision affecting educational administration. In the absence of concrete evidence showing discrimination or arbitrariness, judicial intervention would be unwarranted.
The respondents therefore urged the Court to respect the autonomy of educational authorities and uphold the prospectus provisions as a legitimate exercise of governmental policy-making power.
Court’s Judgment:
Justice Bechu Kurian Thomas dismissed the writ petitions and upheld the validity of the standardisation formula contained in the 2026 Prospectus. In doing so, the Court delivered an important exposition on the limits of judicial review in matters involving educational policy and academic administration.
At the outset, the Court emphasized that the formulation of admission policies and standardisation mechanisms falls primarily within the competence of the Government and educational authorities. Courts, the Judge observed, are not experts in academic matters and therefore must exercise considerable restraint before interfering with such decisions.
The Court reiterated the well-established principle that judicial review is concerned with the legality of a decision-making process rather than the wisdom or desirability of the policy itself. Consequently, unless a policy is shown to be arbitrary, discriminatory, mala fide, or demonstrably prejudicial, courts should refrain from substituting their own views for those of the competent authorities.
Examining the history of standardisation in Kerala, the Court noted that various methods had been adopted over the years to address disparities arising from the existence of multiple educational boards. The present revision was not an ad hoc measure but formed part of a continuing effort to refine and improve the admission process.
The Court also referred to an earlier decision of a Division Bench that had invalidated a revised standardisation formula introduced after the issuance of a prospectus. In contrast, the present methodology had been incorporated directly into the 2026 Prospectus following deliberations by the Internal Committee constituted on December 6, 2025. This distinction, according to the Court, demonstrated procedural propriety in the adoption of the revised formula.
A significant aspect of the judgment was the Court’s evaluation of the Internal Committee. Rejecting the petitioners’ criticism regarding the absence of experts, Justice Thomas observed that the committee consisted of senior officials occupying key positions in the educational framework of the State. The Commissioner for Entrance Examinations, the Director of Technical Education, and the Director of SCERT were all individuals possessing extensive experience in the field of education and entrance examinations.
The Court held that it would be inappropriate to characterize such officials as lacking competence merely because they were not academic statisticians or external consultants. Their institutional experience and professional responsibilities qualified them to review and recommend modifications to the standardisation process.
The Court then examined the substance of the revised formula. It noted that the adopted methodology was not entirely novel. A similar system had been implemented in Tamil Nadu for several years without attracting significant criticism. While the existence of a comparable system elsewhere did not automatically validate the Kerala model, it did indicate that the methodology was neither irrational nor inherently unworkable.
Importantly, the Court found that the revised formula did not reduce the marks of any student from any educational board. Instead, the system sought to create parity by treating the highest marks secured in each board as the benchmark for normalisation. The objective was to prevent any particular board from enjoying an unintended advantage due to differences in examination standards or evaluation practices.
Justice Thomas observed that the petitioners had failed to establish any explicit arbitrariness in the formula. Equally significant was the absence of evidence demonstrating actual prejudice suffered by any student. The Court stressed that constitutional challenges to educational policies cannot succeed merely on the basis of apprehensions or theoretical possibilities. A petitioner must show a real and substantial adverse impact arising from the impugned measure.
Addressing the broader concern regarding imperfections in newly introduced systems, the Court adopted a pragmatic approach. The Judge acknowledged that minor errors may emerge whenever a new policy is implemented. Certain shortcomings may become visible only after the system is tested in practice. However, the possibility of minor imperfections cannot by itself justify judicial invalidation of a policy.
The Court observed that educational administration involves complex choices and competing considerations. Absolute equality, though an ideal objective, is often difficult to achieve in a system where different boards follow different curricula, teaching methodologies, and evaluation patterns. The law does not require perfection; it requires fairness, rationality, and absence of arbitrariness.
In one of the most significant observations of the judgment, Justice Thomas cautioned against courts sitting in judgment over the wisdom of educational policies. The Court noted that judges are not equipped to determine whether one standardisation formula is academically superior to another. Such assessments fall within the expertise of educational authorities and policy-makers.
The judgment reflects the doctrine of institutional competence, which recognizes that certain decisions are best left to bodies possessing specialised knowledge and administrative experience. Courts intervene only when there is a clear violation of constitutional or legal principles.
The Court also found it relevant that the revised normalisation method had been adopted after a structured review process rather than being introduced abruptly or arbitrarily. The constitution of the Internal Committee and its consideration of alternative models demonstrated that the Government had undertaken a reasoned exercise before arriving at its decision.
Ultimately, the Court concluded that the petitioners had not established any of the grounds necessary for judicial intervention. There was no evidence of mala fides, discrimination, manifest arbitrariness, or substantial prejudice. The challenge was essentially directed against the policy wisdom underlying the revised formula, a domain in which judicial review remains limited.
Accordingly, the writ petitions were dismissed, and the standardisation formula contained in the 2026 Prospectus was upheld.
The judgment carries significance beyond the immediate dispute. It reaffirms the principle that courts must exercise restraint in educational matters and recognize the expertise of specialised authorities. It also underscores that policy decisions aimed at achieving fairness among students from diverse educational backgrounds cannot be invalidated merely because alternative methods may also be possible.
By upholding the revised normalisation process, the Kerala High Court has reinforced the autonomy of educational administrators while simultaneously clarifying the narrow grounds upon which courts may interfere with academic policy decisions. The ruling therefore serves as an important precedent on judicial deference, educational governance, and the constitutional limits of judicial review in matters of academic administration.