Introduction:
The Kerala High Court has reaffirmed the limited scope of interference in second appeals by refusing to disturb concurrent findings of fact recorded by the courts below in a long-pending compensation dispute arising from alleged police brutality. In Sukumaran P.N. v. Vimal K. Charles and Others (RSA Nos. 254 and 256 of 2026) [2026 LiveLaw (Ker) 379], Justice Easwaran S. dismissed two Regular Second Appeals filed by a police officer who challenged decrees directing him to pay compensation to an advocate for an assault that allegedly took place in 2010.
The Court held that the appeals did not raise any substantial question of law as required under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. Observing that the litigation had continued for nearly sixteen years, the Court remarked that the appellant had successfully delayed the payment of compensation awarded by the subordinate courts for all these years. Besides dismissing the appeals, the High Court imposed costs of ₹15,000 in favour of the respondent-lawyer.
The dispute originated in 2010 when advocate Vimal K. Charles instituted two civil suits seeking compensation against the State of Kerala and certain police officials, including the appellant police officer. According to the plaintiff, he was unlawfully taken into police custody, physically assaulted and sustained injuries because of the conduct of the police officers.
The plaintiff further alleged that the Sub-Inspector of Kadavanthra Police Station falsely implicated him by registering a case under Section 160 of the Indian Penal Code. He also claimed that false entries were made in the medical records of the General Hospital suggesting that traces of alcohol had been found during his medical examination. According to him, after his release from the General Hospital, he was shifted to a private hospital where he remained admitted as an inpatient. Medical records and treatment certificates were produced in support of his claim.
The trial court accepted the plaintiff’s case and awarded compensation against the police officers. Although one of the decrees was slightly modified by the first appellate court with respect to the quantum of compensation, the finding regarding liability was substantially affirmed. Dissatisfied with these concurrent findings, the appellant approached the High Court by filing the present Regular Second Appeals.
Arguments of the Parties:
The appellant police officer contended that the courts below had erred in holding him liable without adequate evidence. It was argued that a claim for damages arising from an alleged wrongful act must be established through clear and convincing evidence and that the plaintiff had failed to prove that the appellant was responsible for causing the alleged injuries.
The appellant submitted that there were inconsistencies in the plaintiff’s version regarding the manner in which the incident occurred. He argued that while the plaintiff claimed he had been taken in a police jeep and assaulted, the appellant had actually reached the place of occurrence on a scooter. According to the appellant, these inconsistencies created serious doubts about the correctness of the plaintiff’s case.
The appellant also challenged the assessment of damages awarded by the courts below. It was contended that there was no conclusive evidence establishing the exact nature or extent of the injuries allegedly suffered by the plaintiff. The appellant further claimed that he had been exonerated in departmental proceedings and therefore could not be held liable in the civil proceedings.
On the other hand, the respondent-lawyer supported the judgments of the trial court and the first appellate court. It was argued that the findings were based on oral and documentary evidence produced during the trial, including medical records demonstrating that the plaintiff had sustained injuries and required hospitalisation.
The respondent also highlighted that despite disputing the allegations, the appellant had failed to produce any oral or documentary evidence before the trial court. He neither entered the witness box nor examined any witness in support of his defence. More significantly, the appellant did not effectively cross-examine the witnesses examined by the plaintiff. Having failed to contest the evidence at the appropriate stage, the appellant could not seek to reopen factual findings in a second appeal.
It was further submitted that the first appellate court had independently examined the entire evidence and had noticed inconsistencies in the defence taken by the appellant in the written statement and the memorandum of appeal. Consequently, the concurrent findings recorded by both courts below did not warrant interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Court’s Judgment:
The Kerala High Court dismissed both Regular Second Appeals, holding that they were devoid of merit and failed to raise any substantial question of law warranting interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
Justice Easwaran S. observed that the jurisdiction of the High Court in a second appeal is confined to examining substantial questions of law and does not extend to reappreciating evidence or reassessing concurrent findings of fact merely because another view may be possible.
The Court noted that the appellant had completely failed to discharge his burden before the trial court. Despite serious allegations being levelled against him, he did not adduce any oral or documentary evidence to rebut the plaintiff’s case. He also chose not to effectively cross-examine the witnesses produced by the plaintiff. In the absence of any defence evidence, the trial court was justified in relying upon the evidence produced by the plaintiff while determining liability.
The High Court further observed that although the appellant claimed before it that he had been exonerated in departmental proceedings, no material whatsoever had been produced before the courts below to substantiate this assertion. Mere submissions made during arguments could not substitute legally admissible evidence.
The Court also found no satisfactory explanation for the appellant’s failure to produce evidence at the trial stage. It held that a party who neglects to place relevant evidence before the trial court cannot ordinarily seek a fresh evaluation of disputed facts at the stage of a second appeal.
Another significant factor noticed by the Court was the finding recorded by the first appellate court regarding inconsistencies in the appellant’s stand. The High Court observed that contradictory positions taken by the appellant at different stages of the proceedings further weakened his defence and reinforced the conclusions reached by the subordinate courts.
Refusing to interfere with the concurrent findings, the Court emphasised that the second appellate jurisdiction is not intended to provide another opportunity to contest questions of fact that have already been conclusively determined after appreciation of evidence by two competent courts.
The High Court also expressed concern over the prolonged nature of the litigation. Noting that the dispute had originated in 2010, the Court observed that for nearly sixteen years the appellant had successfully delayed the payment of compensation awarded to the respondent-lawyer. Such prolonged litigation, according to the Court, defeated the very object of granting civil compensation to a person who had established his claim before the competent courts.
Accordingly, both Regular Second Appeals were dismissed. The Court affirmed the findings of the trial court and the first appellate court holding the appellant liable to compensate the respondent. In addition, costs of ₹15,000 were awarded to the respondent-lawyer.
The judgment reiterates two important principles of civil jurisprudence. First, a second appeal under Section 100 CPC cannot be converted into a third round of factual adjudication in the absence of a substantial question of law. Secondly, a litigant who fails to produce evidence at the appropriate stage cannot ordinarily seek to challenge well-reasoned concurrent findings based on the evidence available on record. The decision also reflects the Court’s concern against unnecessary prolongation of litigation, particularly where compensation awarded to an aggrieved party has remained unrealised for several years due to repeated legal challenges.