Introduction:

The Kerala High Court on September 24, 2026 reserved its verdict on the plea filed by former Director General of Police Tomin J. Thachankary seeking suspension of his four-year sentence in a disproportionate assets case under the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. Justice A. Badharudeen heard detailed submissions from Senior Advocate B. Raman Pillai for Thachankary and the Public Prosecutor appearing for the State of Kerala, before reserving orders on the request for suspension of sentence.

The proceedings arise from Criminal Appeal No. 1239 of 2026, titled Tomin J. Thachankary v. State of Kerala. Thachankary has challenged the judgment of the Enquiry Commissioner and Special Judge (Vigilance), Kottayam, who convicted him under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and sentenced him to four years’ imprisonment along with a fine of ₹30.84 lakh. The trial court had concluded that, even after giving the accused the benefit of discrepancies established through the evidence, the assets remaining unexplained constituted 52.33 per cent of his known income. (Live Law)

The underlying case concerns allegations relating to assets acquired by Thachankary during the period from January 1, 2003 to July 4, 2007. The vigilance investigation had alleged that assets worth approximately ₹64.70 lakh were disproportionate to his known sources of income. Earlier reports on the case stated that the investigation had initially calculated the disproportion at a substantially higher level, while the trial court ultimately arrived at the lower figure after accounting for discrepancies and other adjustments in favour of the accused. (Live Law)

The sentence-suspension proceedings before the High Court are distinct from the final determination of the criminal appeal. Thachankary has challenged the conviction itself, contending that the trial court wrongly appreciated the evidence and incorrectly calculated his income and assets. His immediate request, however, is that the four-year sentence be suspended during the pendency of the appeal.

The question before Justice Badharudeen was therefore not, at this stage, whether the conviction should ultimately stand. The immediate issue was whether the sentence imposed by the vigilance court should be suspended pending the High Court’s adjudication of the appeal.

During the hearing, Senior Advocate B. Raman Pillai submitted that in Prevention of Corruption Act cases where the sentence imposed is below ten years, suspension of sentence and release on bail ordinarily follow. The State, however, opposed the request and contended that suspension of sentence is not automatic merely because the term imposed is below ten years. According to the prosecution, the appellate court retains discretion to consider the facts and circumstances of each individual case.

The argument brought Section 389 of the Code of Criminal Procedure into focus. The provision empowers an appellate court to suspend the execution of a sentence and, where the convicted person is in confinement, release him on bail. The controversy in the present proceedings concerns how that discretion should operate after conviction in a corruption case, particularly where the sentence is below ten years.

The Court’s oral observations during the hearing reflected concern over the larger consequences of routinely suspending sentences after convictions in corruption cases. Justice Badharudeen noted that obtaining a conviction after a full-fledged trial in such cases is itself difficult and that appellate proceedings can sometimes continue for several years. If a convicted person is released soon after conviction and the appeal remains pending for a prolonged period, the practical consequences of the conviction may be substantially delayed.

The Court also expressed concern about the larger institutional implications of prolonged appellate pendency. It referred to data concerning the High Court and questioned whether the justice system is adequately serving its purpose when appeals remain unheard for years, including situations in which accused persons may die before the appellate court finally considers their cases.

These observations were made in the context of the sentence-suspension plea and should not be treated as a final finding on Thachankary’s appeal. The Court has not yet delivered its decision on whether the sentence should be suspended.

The proceedings also brought into focus the evidentiary issues raised by the appellant. The defence contended that the trial court had incorrectly treated certain amounts as unexplained assets. Among the disputed items was an amount of approximately ₹45 lakh which, according to Thachankary, had in fact been accounted for. The defence therefore argued that the finding of disproportionate assets was materially affected by errors in appreciating the evidence.

The Court, however, questioned whether some of the explanations relied upon by the defence were supported by documentary accounting evidence. In particular, Justice Badharudeen observed that certain claims concerning money allegedly received from the appellant’s mother appeared to rest upon oral evidence. The Court questioned how such explanations could be accepted in a disproportionate assets case without corresponding accounting or documentary material.

The proceedings therefore involve both a procedural question concerning suspension of sentence and substantive issues arising from the challenge to the conviction. The High Court will have to consider the sentence-suspension request separately from the final merits of the appeal.

Arguments of the Parties:

Senior Advocate B. Raman Pillai, appearing for Tomin J. Thachankary, principally argued that the four-year sentence imposed by the vigilance court should be suspended while the criminal appeal is pending. The defence emphasised the fact that the sentence imposed was below ten years and submitted that suspension of sentence in such circumstances is ordinarily granted in corruption cases.

The submission was directed towards the practical consequences of keeping a convicted person in custody throughout a potentially lengthy appellate process. Since the appeal challenges both the conviction and sentence, the defence sought interim relief until the High Court finally determines the appeal.

The defence also challenged the correctness of the trial court’s findings. According to Thachankary, the vigilance court had wrongly appreciated and calculated various components of his income and assets. The appeal contends that the conviction was based on an erroneous assessment of the financial material placed before the trial court. Contemporary reports on the appeal record that Thachankary has disputed the trial court’s calculations and argued that income from properties, rental and sale proceeds, as well as his wife’s income from business and agricultural properties, had not been properly considered. (The Times of India)

One of the central defence submissions concerned an amount of around ₹45 lakh. Thachankary’s case was that this amount had been accounted for and therefore ought not to have formed part of the unexplained disproportionate assets. If the amount were properly recognised, the defence argued, the calculation underlying the conviction would be materially affected.

The defence also questioned the manner in which the trial court dealt with various sources of income. The appellant’s broader contention was that the vigilance court had relied upon calculations that did not properly account for all legitimate sources of funds and had thereby arrived at an incorrect figure of disproportionate assets.

The defence therefore maintained that the conviction itself was open to serious challenge. The sentence-suspension plea was advanced against that background, with the appellant seeking release during the pendency of the appeal rather than waiting in custody until the appellate proceedings concluded.

The State opposed the plea and argued that the suspension of sentence cannot be treated as an automatic consequence of a sentence being below ten years. According to the prosecution, the appellate court has discretion under the applicable law and must exercise that discretion after considering the nature of the offence, the circumstances of the conviction and the broader interests involved.

The prosecution also characterised the case as an exceptional one, particularly in view of Thachankary’s former position as a senior police officer and Director General of Police. Earlier during the proceedings, the State had sought two days’ time to file a written objection, submitting that the case warranted a detailed response because of the circumstances in which the conviction had been recorded. The Court had granted the requested time and subsequently heard the State’s submissions. (Live Law)

The State’s opposition was also connected with the nature of the offence. A disproportionate assets prosecution under the Prevention of Corruption Act concerns allegations relating to possession of assets beyond known sources of income by a public servant. The prosecution contended that such cases involve a public dimension because corruption-related offences can affect confidence in public administration.

The prosecution therefore disputed the suggestion that the appellant should receive suspension of sentence merely because the term imposed was four years. Its position was that Section 389 confers discretion upon the appellate court and does not create an automatic entitlement to suspension whenever the sentence falls below ten years.

The State’s position was also informed by the trial court’s findings. The Special Judge had concluded that even after giving the accused the benefit of material discrepancies demonstrated through the evidence, 52.33 per cent of his known income remained disproportionate. The prosecution relied upon that finding in resisting the suggestion that the conviction was based merely on a marginal or insignificant financial discrepancy. (Live Law)

The State also relied on the principle that a person convicted after a full trial stands on a different footing from an accused awaiting trial. Once a conviction has been recorded, the appellate court considering suspension of sentence must exercise its discretion judicially, rather than treating bail after conviction as a continuation of the presumption applicable during the trial.

The Court’s oral observations during the hearing reflected this aspect of the State’s opposition. Justice Badharudeen stated that sentence suspension is itself discretionary and must be considered on a case-to-case basis. The Court questioned the practical consequences of a system in which a conviction in a corruption case is followed by relatively easy release on suspension of sentence, while the appeal remains pending for years.

The prosecution’s submissions therefore placed emphasis upon the seriousness of corruption offences, the fact of conviction by a competent vigilance court and the need to consider the consequences of appellate delay while deciding whether interim relief should be granted.

The defence, on the other hand, continued to maintain that the conviction itself was vulnerable and that the appellant should not be required to undergo the sentence while his challenge to that conviction remains pending.

The arguments thus presented the High Court with two competing considerations. The first concerned the appellant’s right to seek suspension of sentence pending an appeal and the practical reality that appellate proceedings can take considerable time. The second concerned the discretionary nature of that relief and the public interest considerations that may arise in cases involving corruption convictions.

Court’s Judgment:

The Kerala High Court has reserved its verdict on the sentence-suspension plea and has therefore not yet finally determined whether Tomin J. Thachankary will be released pending the criminal appeal. Justice A. Badharudeen heard the submissions from both sides before reserving the matter.

The most significant feature of the hearing was the Court’s observation that suspension of sentence is not automatic. Justice Badharudeen indicated that even where the sentence imposed is below ten years, the appellate court retains discretion to determine whether suspension is appropriate in the circumstances of the particular case.

This observation arose in response to the defence submission that sentences below ten years in Prevention of Corruption Act cases ordinarily result in suspension and bail. The Court made it clear that the fact that a sentence falls below a particular numerical threshold does not, by itself, determine the outcome of a suspension application.

The Court’s remarks also focused on the wider problem of delay in criminal appeals. Justice Badharudeen expressed concern that securing a conviction after trial can itself be difficult, while appeals may subsequently remain pending for years. If sentence suspension is routinely granted and the appeal is not heard for a prolonged period, the practical effect of the conviction may become considerably delayed.

The Court referred to the High Court’s own data while expressing concern over such delays. It noted the possibility that accused persons may remain out of custody for years after conviction while awaiting adjudication of their appeals, and in some cases may die before their appeals are finally considered.

The observation was not a finding against Thachankary personally. Rather, it reflected a systemic concern regarding the relationship between appellate delay and suspension of sentences after conviction, particularly in corruption cases.

Justice Badharudeen also expressed concern about the effectiveness of the Prevention of Corruption Act if persons convicted under the statute are able to obtain release and remain outside custody for extended periods while their appeals remain pending. The Court stressed the importance of maintaining public confidence in the enforcement of anti-corruption legislation.

The Court observed that provisions of the Prevention of Corruption Act must be construed strictly in accordance with law so that persons found guilty of corruption offences do not escape the consequences of conviction merely because of prolonged procedural delays. The Court also referred to the possibility that persons convicted of corruption offences could, depending on their circumstances, return to public service if appropriate action is not taken.

These observations must, however, be understood as part of the Court’s consideration of the sentence-suspension issue and not as a final determination of the appellant’s guilt beyond the conviction already recorded by the trial court. The appeal against the conviction remains pending.

The Court also engaged with the substantive challenge raised by Thachankary concerning the calculation of disproportionate assets. The defence argued that an amount of approximately ₹45 lakh had been properly accounted for and that the trial court had therefore committed an error in treating it as unexplained.

Justice Badharudeen questioned the evidentiary basis of some of these explanations. In particular, the Court noted that certain claims regarding amounts allegedly received from the appellant’s mother appeared to be based primarily on oral evidence.

The Court questioned whether such oral assertions could, by themselves, establish the source of funds in a disproportionate assets prosecution where financial accounting and documentary material are particularly relevant. The Court observed that where an amount is claimed to have been received from another person, the absence of corresponding accounting or supporting evidence may affect the weight that can be given to that explanation.

The Court’s observations indicate that the High Court will closely examine the evidentiary foundation of the appellant’s explanations when considering the broader criminal appeal. At the present stage, however, the Court was not finally deciding whether the trial court’s calculation was correct.

The trial court had found that after extending the benefit of every material discrepancy established through the evidence, the unexplained disproportion remained at 52.33 per cent of the known income. That finding formed an important part of the prosecution’s opposition to suspension of sentence.

The conviction itself arose under Section 13(2) read with Section 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. The latter provision, as it existed during the relevant period, dealt with possession of pecuniary resources or property disproportionate to known sources of income by a public servant. Section 13(2) prescribed punishment for criminal misconduct falling within the relevant provision.

The proceedings therefore concern a specific statutory offence involving a financial comparison between the public servant’s known sources of income and the assets and expenditure attributed to the public servant during the check period.

The Court’s consideration of the defence explanation concerning the ₹45 lakh amount is consequently significant because the determination of disproportionate assets depends upon the proper identification and valuation of both sides of that financial equation.

At the same time, the High Court has not yet accepted or rejected the defence’s substantive challenges. The present proceedings concern the interim request for suspension of the sentence, while the appeal against conviction will require a fuller examination of the trial record.

The Court’s discussion also highlights the distinction between suspension of sentence and reversal of conviction. Suspension of sentence does not amount to acquittal or setting aside of the conviction. It is an interim measure that may be granted during the pendency of an appeal subject to the statutory framework and judicial discretion.

Conversely, refusal to suspend a sentence does not by itself finally determine the correctness of the conviction. The ultimate merits of the criminal appeal remain to be decided independently.

The Court’s remarks regarding corruption cases also underline the importance it attaches to the institutional purpose of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The Bench expressed concern that prolonged appellate proceedings, combined with routine suspension of sentences, could weaken the practical effect of convictions and undermine public confidence in anti-corruption enforcement.

The Court nevertheless has to balance that concern with the rights of a convicted person who has exercised the statutory right of appeal. The sentence-suspension application must therefore be decided according to the applicable legal principles and the facts of the individual case.

The proceedings also follow a lengthy history of litigation in the underlying disproportionate assets matter. The case was registered in 2007 in relation to alleged accumulation of disproportionate assets during the period from 2003 to 2007, and the charge sheet was filed in 2013. The vigilance trial ultimately culminated in the September 2026 conviction and four-year sentence. (The New Indian Express)

The High Court had previously directed that the trial be completed within a stipulated period, reflecting the concern over the considerable time taken by the proceedings. Contemporary reporting records that the High Court had directed the vigilance court to conclude the trial within a fixed timeframe. (The Times of India)

Against that background, Justice Badharudeen’s concern about further appellate delay assumes particular significance. The Court is effectively examining not only the individual request for interim relie but also the practical consequences that may follow if c