Introduction:

The Kerala High Court has reiterated an important principle governing the functioning of constitutional courts: all Judges of a High Court enjoy equal judicial status and authority, and no Bench can claim supervisory power over another merely because it has a greater number of Judges. The Court emphasised that while a Division Bench exercising intra-court appellate jurisdiction may examine, modify or set aside a judgment delivered by a Single Judge, such appellate authority does not permit it to advise, counsel or criticise the Judge whose decision is under scrutiny. Judicial discipline, the Court explained, rests on mutual respect and institutional propriety rather than a rigid hierarchy among Benches.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Devan Ramachandran and Justice Basant Balaji made these observations while deciding an appeal in I. Bindhu v. M/s Thiruvananthapuram Service Co-operative Bank and Another, reported as 2026 LiveLaw (Ker) 601. The dispute arose from an order of the Labour Court, Kollam, extending the time granted to the Thiruvananthapuram Service Co-operative Bank to complete fresh disciplinary proceedings against the appellant, Bindhu.

Although the case originated in an employment-related dispute concerning disciplinary proceedings, the appeal raised a broader question concerning the institutional relationship between Single Benches and Division Benches of a High Court. In particular, the Court had to examine whether a Division Bench could remit a matter to a Single Judge for consideration of an issue that had allegedly been overlooked and whether such a request could be characterised as an impermissible direction by a superior judicial authority.

The dispute also required the High Court to consider the Labour Court’s authority to extend the period fixed in its earlier award and the circumstances in which that discretion could properly be exercised. The Court ultimately held that the Labour Court possessed the power to extend the time limit but had failed to adequately assess the Bank’s explanation for the delay and the objections raised by the appellant. Consequently, it set aside the orders under challenge and directed the Labour Court to reconsider the Bank’s application on its merits.

The judgment is significant because it addresses two distinct but interconnected aspects of judicial administration. First, it clarifies that intra-court appeals are a mechanism for correcting judicial errors and ensuring proper adjudication, not a means of establishing personal or institutional superiority among Judges. Second, it underscores that judicial discretion, including the power to extend a time limit fixed in an award, must be exercised through a reasoned assessment of the relevant circumstances and the interests of the parties.

Arguments of the Parties:

The appellant, I. Bindhu, challenged the Labour Court’s decision to extend the time available to the Thiruvananthapuram Service Co-operative Bank for completing fresh disciplinary proceedings. Her challenge arose after the Labour Court had set aside the original disciplinary enquiry and the punishment imposed upon her, while granting the Bank liberty to initiate fresh proceedings subject to a specific time limit.

In its award dated September 29, 2023, the Labour Court, Kollam, had directed that the fresh proceedings be completed within three months. The time limit was material to the exercise of the liberty granted to the Bank, as it sought to ensure that the disciplinary dispute would be reconsidered without undue delay. The Bank subsequently approached the Labour Court seeking an extension of the prescribed period.

The appellant questioned the decision to grant that extension and approached the High Court by filing a writ petition. Her challenge was initially dismissed by a Single Judge. She thereafter pursued an intra-court appeal, contending that a substantive ground raised against the Labour Court’s order had not been properly considered in the earlier proceedings.

The Division Bench hearing that appeal found that the relevant ground had not received the necessary consideration. It therefore requested the Single Judge to reconsider the issue. When the matter returned to the Single Judge, the writ petition was again dismissed. In doing so, the Single Judge observed that a Division Bench could not ordinarily remand a matter to a Single Bench.

Aggrieved by the subsequent decision, the appellant filed the present writ appeal. The procedural history brought the question of the relationship between the two Benches directly before the High Court. The matter was no longer confined to the validity of the Labour Court’s extension order; it also concerned the scope of an appellate Bench’s authority to seek consideration of a question that had not been addressed in the judgment under challenge.

The appellant’s position, as reflected in the procedural history, was that the legality of the Labour Court’s order required meaningful judicial scrutiny and that the substantive grounds raised against the extension could not be left unresolved. Her challenge also required the Court to examine whether the Labour Court had adequately considered the Bank’s explanation for seeking additional time and the objections raised against the extension.

The principal institutional issue was whether a Division Bench could request a Single Judge to address a material aspect that had been omitted from the original judgment. The Court had to distinguish between an appellate Bench seeking proper consideration of an undecided issue and an appellate Bench attempting to direct a Single Judge to alter a conclusion already reached on its merits.

The respondent Bank, represented by its counsel, had sought additional time to complete the fresh disciplinary proceedings permitted under the Labour Court’s award. Its application necessarily required the Labour Court to consider the circumstances that had prevented completion within the original three-month period. The Bank’s request was based on the need for an extension of the time fixed by the award, although the High Court subsequently found that the reasons advanced for the delay had not been adequately scrutinised.

The material provided in the case summary does not set out the Bank’s detailed explanation for the delay or reproduce the complete submissions made by its counsel. It would therefore be inappropriate to attribute specific factual justifications to the Bank beyond its request for an extension of time. Nevertheless, its position in the proceedings was that the extension granted by the Labour Court should withstand judicial review.

The respondents’ position also required consideration of the Labour Court’s legal authority to extend the period specified in its earlier award. The mere fact that an award had become enforceable did not necessarily mean that the Labour Court had exhausted every power connected with the implementation of that award. The question was whether the Labour Court could extend the period to secure the ends of justice and, if so, whether the discretion had been exercised on a legally sustainable basis.

The dispute thus involved two separate legal inquiries. One concerned the institutional limits of intra-court appellate jurisdiction, particularly the distinction between requesting reconsideration of an overlooked issue and directing a Judge to revisit a concluded decision. The other concerned the validity of the Labour Court’s exercise of discretion in granting the Bank additional time.

The High Court was required to resolve both questions without confusing the existence of judicial power with the proper exercise of that power. Even if the Labour Court possessed jurisdiction to extend the deadline, its decision could still be set aside if the relevant circumstances had not been properly evaluated. Similarly, even if a Division Bench could correct errors in a Single Judge’s judgment, that authority did not permit it to assume a supervisory relationship over another Bench.

Court’s Judgment:

The Kerala High Court allowed the writ appeal and delivered an important ruling on judicial equality, intra-court appellate jurisdiction and the proper exercise of judicial discretion. The Bench clarified that all Judges of a High Court possess equal status and judicial power, with the Chief Justice occupying the position of primus inter pares, meaning first among equals. The existence of Benches comprising different numbers of Judges does not create a relationship of personal superiority or subordination among their members.

The Court explained that the Chief Justice’s position within the High Court does not alter the fundamental principle that Judges are judicial peers. Likewise, a Division Bench does not become institutionally superior to a Single Bench in a manner that permits its members to supervise the conduct of the Judge hearing a matter. The distinction in the strength of a Bench determines the applicable judicial procedure and the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, but it does not confer a general authority to instruct or mentor another Bench.

The Court observed that all Benches are constituent parts of the same High Court and function under a unified judicial authority. Accordingly, no Bench can assume a supervisory role over another merely because it comprises more Judges. The relationship between Benches must be governed by judicial discipline, mutual respect and established principles of judicial propriety.

This principle was central to the Court’s examination of the earlier proceedings. The Division Bench had identified a substantive aspect of the appellant’s challenge that had not been addressed by the Single Judge. It had therefore requested reconsideration of that issue. The subsequent observation that a Division Bench could not ordinarily remand a matter to a Single Bench required the Court to clarify the nature and limits of such a request.

The Bench held that the power of a Division Bench to remit a matter to a Single Bench, or to request consideration of an issue that has not been addressed, is inherent in the proper exercise of intra-court appellate jurisdiction. Where a material legal or factual aspect has been overlooked, the appellate Bench may consider it necessary for the matter to return to the original Bench so that the omitted issue can receive proper consideration.

However, the Court carefully distinguished this procedural power from an assertion of hierarchical authority. A request to consider an undecided issue does not mean that the Single Judge is subordinate to the Division Bench. Nor does it imply that the appellate Bench can dictate the reasoning that must be adopted or the conclusion that must ultimately be reached.

The Court noted that a Single Bench and a Division Bench exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. An intra-court appeal provides an additional level of scrutiny within the High Court, allowing an aggrieved litigant to challenge a decision before another Bench in accordance with the applicable procedure. The existence of that additional level of scrutiny is intended to improve the quality and correctness of adjudication; it does not change the constitutional status of the Judge whose decision is under appeal.

In support of this principle, the Bench relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Roma Sonker v. M.P. State PSC, reported in (2018) 17 SCC 106. The ruling was cited for the proposition that the availability of a further tier of judicial scrutiny does not render a Single Judge subordinate to a Division Bench. The appellate structure must therefore be understood as a procedural mechanism for examining judicial decisions, rather than a relationship of personal or institutional domination.

The High Court also referred to the Supreme Court’s decision in Baddula Lakshmaiah v. Sri Anjaneya Swamy Temple, reported in (1996) 3 SCC 52. That decision explained the nature of an intra-court appeal as a process through which the High Court, sitting as a Court of Correction, reviews its own orders while exercising the same jurisdiction.

The significance of this principle lies in the distinction between correcting a judgment and controlling the Judge who delivered it. An appellate Bench may conclude that a judgment contains an error of law, fails to consider a material issue or requires modification. It may then exercise the powers available to it under the law. What it cannot do is use that appellate authority as a basis for advising, counselling or criticising another Judge in the manner in which judicial decisions should be made or recorded.

The Bench emphasised that the judicial authority of a High Court is strengthened by institutional discipline and mutual respect. It observed that no Bench can claim superiority over another by commenting on how its members should act, behave or express their judicial views. Such conduct, according to the Court, undermines the essential requirements of judicial propriety.

The Court expressed this principle by observing that judicial strength derives from discipline rather than dominion. The distinction is important: discipline ensures that Judges operate within the constitutional framework, respect binding precedents and follow established judicial procedures. Dominion, by contrast, would imply a power to control judicial peers merely because one Bench has a greater numerical strength.

The judgment further emphasised the principle of peer restraint, which rests on the horizontal relationship between Benches rather than an exclusively hierarchical model. Under this approach, judicial independence and institutional harmony are maintained by recognising that different Benches exercise judicial authority within the same constitutional institution.

Peer restraint does not prevent a Division Bench from disagreeing with a Single Judge. Nor does it insulate a Single Judge’s decision from appellate scrutiny. Instead, it requires that disagreement be expressed through legally recognised judicial processes, supported by reasons and exercised within the limits of the appellate jurisdiction.

The Bench relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Rohan Vijay Nahar and Others v. State of Maharashtra and Others, cited in the supplied case summary as a 2026 decision, in discussing the relationship between judicial discipline and institutional authority. The Court underscored that comity among Benches, predictability in judicial outcomes and mutual respect are essential to the effective functioning of the judicial system.

The doctrine, as explained by the High Court, is not based solely on the principle of stare decisis, under which courts generally follow binding precedents. It also rests on the need for judicial comity: the recognition that different Benches form part of a single institution and must exercise their respective powers without undermining one another’s judicial independence.

The Court then clarified the circumstances in which a matter may be remitted to a Single Bench. Where an issue has not been considered or answered in the judgment under challenge, the appellate Bench may request the Single Judge to address it. In such circumstances, the use of the expressions “remand” or “remit” does not signify a command issued by a superior judicial authority. It is a procedural request made to ensure that the omitted question receives appropriate judicial consideration.

Ordinarily, such a request should be acceded to because it serves the proper administration of justice. The purpose is not to compel the Single Judge to reach a particular conclusion but to ensure that a relevant aspect of the dispute is judicially determined.

The Court nevertheless recognised an important limitation. If the Single Judge has already considered an issue and decided it on its merits, a Division Bench cannot remit the matter merely because it disagrees with that conclusion or wants the Judge to reconsider the reasoning or modify the relief granted. In such a situation, the disagreement must be resolved through the ordinary exercise of appellate powers, including setting aside or modifying the impugned judgment where legally justified.

The Bench referred to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Rajasthan Public Service Commission v. Yati Jain, cited in the supplied summary as 2026 KHC Online 6051 (SC), and Bihar Industrial Area Development Authority v. M/s Scope Sales Pvt. Ltd., cited as 2026 KHC Online 6072 (SC). These decisions were invoked in reiterating that intra-court appellate jurisdiction should ordinarily be exercised where the challenged judgment is demonstrably erroneous or suffers from perversity.

The principle reinforces the need for restraint in appellate intervention. An appeal is not an invitation to reopen every conclusion merely because another Bench might have reached a different view. Intervention must be justified by a recognised legal basis, such as a material error, a failure to consider a relevant issue or a conclusion that cannot reasonably be sustained on the applicable law and facts.

Having clarified the relationship between the Benches, the Court turned to the Labour Court’s authority to extend the deadline fixed in its earlier award. It relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Haryana Suraj Malting Limited v. Phool Chand, reported in (2018) 16 SCC 567, to explain that a Labour Court does not necessarily become functus officio merely because its award has become enforceable.

The expression functus officio refers to a situation in which an authority has completed its legally assigned function and no longer possesses the power to act further on the matter, except where the law permits. The High Court clarified that the enforceability of an award does not automatically eliminate every power that may be necessary to give effect to its directions or secure the ends of justice.

In the present case, the Labour Court’s original award had set aside the disciplinary enquiry and punishment imposed on the appellant while granting the Bank liberty to initiate fresh proceedings within three months. The subsequent application sought an extension of that period. The legal question was whether the Labour Court could entertain such a request after fixing the original deadline.

The High Court answered that question in the affirmative. It held that the Labour Court possessed the power to extend the time fixed under its earlier award. However, the existence of that power did not mean that the extension could be granted automatically or without examining the circumstances that led to the delay.

The Court found that the Labour Court had allowed the Bank’s application without adequately evaluating the explanation offered for failing to complete the proceedings within the prescribed period. It had also failed to properly consider the objections raised by the appellant. This omission was material because an extension of time could affect the competing interests of both parties.

The Bench emphasised that judicial discretion must be exercised after a meaningful assessment of the relevant facts, the explanation advanced by the applicant and the objections raised by the opposing party. A Labour Court cannot simply accept an employer’s request for additional time without examining whether the reasons justify the extension. Equally, the power cannot be exercised for an arbitrary purpose or in a manner that disregards the interests of the affected employee.

The appropriate course was therefore not to hold that the Labour Court lacked jurisdiction to extend the deadline, but to require it to exercise that jurisdiction properly. The distinction between jurisdiction and the lawful exercise of discretion was decisive. An authority may possess the power to grant relief, yet its decision may still beinvalid if it fails to consider relevant circums