Introduction:
The Kerala High Court recently delivered an important judgment reaffirming the principle that statutory remedies must ordinarily be exhausted before invoking the extraordinary writ jurisdiction of constitutional courts. In the case titled Eriyad Palli @ Eriyad Mahallu Jama-Ath and Others v. Aboobacker K.M. and Others, the High Court clarified that once a Waqf Tribunal has been constituted by the State Government under Section 83 of the Waqf Act, 1995, parties aggrieved by orders passed under the Act must approach the Tribunal instead of directly filing writ petitions before the High Court.
The judgment was delivered by a Division Bench comprising Justice Anil K. Narendran and Justice Muralee Krishna S.. The Bench held that the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution can be invoked only in exceptional situations where no Tribunal has been constituted or where the Tribunal is not functioning.
The case arose from disputes concerning the administration and management of a waqf institution known as Eriyad Mosque and Eriyad Mahallu Jama-ath. Certain party respondents approached the Kerala State Waqf Board alleging serious irregularities in the management of the waqf. They contended that the affairs of the Jama-ath were not being properly administered by the existing office-bearers and that proper accounts were not regularly submitted before the Board as required under law.
Acting upon these allegations, the Waqf Board passed multiple interim orders in interlocutory applications pending before it. One such order directed the Division Waqf Officer to conduct an inquiry into the affairs of the Jama-ath and submit a detailed report before the Board. Another order restrained the respondents before the Board from conducting elections to the Jama-ath committee without obtaining prior permission from the Board.
In a separate direction, the Board ordered a detailed audit of the Jama-ath accounts for the period between 2019 and 2025 through an empanelled auditor. The Division Waqf Officer was also instructed to seek explanations regarding defects identified during the audit and issue appropriate corrective directions. Any recoveries identified through the audit process were required to be placed before the Board on the administrative side.
Aggrieved by these interim directions, the petitioners approached the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution contending that the orders seriously interfered with the day-to-day management of the waqf and exceeded the authority of the Board. The petition therefore raised an important legal question regarding maintainability of writ petitions challenging orders passed under the Waqf Act when a statutory Waqf Tribunal is already functioning.
The judgment assumes considerable significance because it interprets the amended framework under Section 83 of the Waqf Act following the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, and clarifies the relationship between statutory tribunals and constitutional writ jurisdiction.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioners argued before the High Court that the interim orders passed by the Waqf Board had substantially disrupted the administration and functioning of the Jama-ath. According to them, the directions issued by the Board interfered with the internal management of the waqf institution and imposed unnecessary restrictions upon the elected committee managing the affairs of the mosque and Jama-ath.
The petitioners specifically challenged the Board’s direction restraining the conduct of elections without prior permission. It was argued that elections to the Managing Committee had always been conducted in accordance with the bye-laws governing the waqf and there was no justification for the Board to interfere with the democratic functioning of the institution.
The petitioners further contended that they had not been provided adequate opportunity to submit audited accounts and clarify any alleged discrepancies before the Board directed a fresh audit through an empanelled auditor. According to them, if reasonable opportunity had been granted, they could have satisfied the Board regarding the financial administration of the Jama-ath and demonstrated that no further inquiry or audit was necessary.
The petitioners also objected to the direction authorising the Division Waqf Officer to conduct inquiries and seek explanations regarding financial irregularities. They argued that such measures created an atmosphere of administrative overreach and adversely affected the autonomy of the waqf institution in managing its affairs.
In essence, the petitioners sought judicial intervention against what they described as excessive interference by the Waqf Board in matters relating to routine administration and governance of the Jama-ath. They therefore invoked the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking quashing of the impugned interim orders.
On the other hand, the respondents and the Waqf Board questioned the maintainability of the writ petition itself. The respondents argued that the Waqf Act provides a complete statutory mechanism for redressal of grievances through the Waqf Tribunal constituted under Section 83 of the Act.
It was submitted that once the State Government had established a functioning Waqf Tribunal, any person aggrieved by an order passed under the Waqf Act must necessarily approach the Tribunal rather than directly invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court.
The respondents relied upon the statutory framework of the Waqf Act, particularly Section 83, which establishes specialised Tribunals for adjudication of disputes, questions, and matters relating to waqf properties and administration. According to them, the legislative intention behind constituting such Tribunals was to ensure specialised and efficient adjudication of waqf disputes without burdening constitutional courts with matters capable of resolution through statutory remedies.
The Waqf Board further argued that the interim orders had been passed within its statutory authority after receiving complaints regarding alleged irregularities in management and financial administration of the Jama-ath. It was contended that ensuring proper management, accountability, and auditing of waqf institutions falls squarely within the supervisory powers conferred upon the Board under the Waqf Act.
The respondents also referred to the amended proviso inserted under Section 83(2) by the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025. According to them, the amendment clearly restricts direct recourse to the High Court by providing that challenges to orders under the Act may be entertained by the High Court only when no Tribunal exists or where the Tribunal is not functioning.
It was therefore argued that the writ petition deserved dismissal solely on the ground of availability of an effective statutory remedy before the Waqf Tribunal.
Court’s Judgment:
The Kerala High Court dismissed the writ petition as not maintainable and categorically held that parties aggrieved by orders passed under the Waqf Act must ordinarily approach the Waqf Tribunal instead of directly invoking writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
At the outset, the Division Bench examined the statutory framework governing waqf administration under the Waqf Act, 1995. The Court referred extensively to Sections 32, 47, 63, 69, 70, and 83 of the Act in order to understand the scope of powers exercised by the Waqf Board and the jurisdiction vested in Waqf Tribunals.
The Bench observed that Section 83 creates a specialised adjudicatory mechanism for disputes and grievances arising under the Act. The Court noted that the legislative objective behind establishing Waqf Tribunals was to provide an effective alternative forum possessing expertise in matters concerning waqf administration, governance, and disputes.
A crucial aspect of the judgment was the Court’s interpretation of the proviso inserted to Section 83(2) by the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025. The amended provision states that challenges against orders made under the Act or rules framed thereunder can be entertained by the High Court only where no Tribunal has been constituted or where the Tribunal is not functioning.
The Court held that the amendment makes the legislative intent abundantly clear. Once a functioning Tribunal exists, aggrieved parties are expected to avail the statutory remedy provided under the Act rather than bypassing the Tribunal and directly approaching constitutional courts.
The Division Bench observed:
“In view of the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 83 of the 1995 Act, inserted by the Waqf (Amendment) Act, 2025, a challenge against an order made under the Act, or rules made thereunder, can be entertained by the High Court if there is no Tribunal constituted under sub-section (1) of Section 83 or the Tribunal is not functioning.”
The Court emphasised that writ jurisdiction under Article 226 is extraordinary and discretionary in nature. Although constitutional courts possess wide powers of judicial review, such powers are ordinarily not exercised where an effective alternative statutory remedy exists.
In support of this principle, the Court relied upon the judgment of the Supreme Court of India in West Bengal Wakf Board v. Anis Fatma Begum. In that decision, the Supreme Court had highlighted the broad jurisdiction of Waqf Tribunals and the necessity of channeling waqf disputes through the statutory mechanism established under the Act.
The Kerala High Court observed that entertaining writ petitions despite the availability of a functioning Tribunal would undermine the legislative scheme and defeat the purpose behind constituting specialised adjudicatory bodies.
Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, the Court found that the petitioners had directly challenged interim orders passed by the Waqf Board without first approaching the Waqf Tribunal. Since the Tribunal was admittedly constituted and functioning in the State, the petitioners were legally bound to invoke the statutory remedy available under Section 83.
The Court therefore declined to examine the merits of the allegations concerning audit directions, election restrictions, and administrative interference by the Board. Instead, the Bench confined itself to the issue of maintainability and held that the writ petition itself was not maintainable in law.
Importantly, the judgment clarifies that the High Court’s writ jurisdiction is not completely barred in waqf matters. The Court recognised that constitutional remedies may still be invoked in exceptional situations where no Tribunal exists or where the Tribunal has ceased functioning. However, such jurisdiction remains limited and cannot be routinely invoked merely because a party prefers approaching the High Court directly.
The ruling reinforces the broader judicial principle that specialised tribunals created by statute must ordinarily be allowed to function as the primary adjudicatory forums within their designated domain. High Courts should exercise restraint and avoid bypassing legislative mechanisms unless exceptional circumstances justify constitutional intervention.
The judgment is likely to have substantial implications for future waqf litigation across Kerala and potentially other jurisdictions. Parties aggrieved by decisions of Waqf Boards will now be required to first exhaust remedies before the Waqf Tribunal before seeking intervention from constitutional courts.
Ultimately, the Kerala High Court concluded that since the State had constituted a functioning Waqf Tribunal under Section 83 of the Waqf Act, the petitioners were bound to pursue the statutory remedy available before the Tribunal. Consequently, the writ petition was dismissed as not maintainable.