Introduction:

In Rahul M.R. v. State of Kerala & Anr. [CRL.A No.1685/2025 and connected case, 2025 LiveLaw (Ker) 582], the Kerala High Court delivered a significant ruling on the applicability of anticipatory bail in cases involving Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (SC/ST Act). A bench led by Justice Gopinath P. clarified that the statutory bar under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act on the grant of anticipatory bail will not apply where the court prima facie finds that the substantive offence carrying a punishment of ten years or more has not been established. The Court was adjudicating two connected criminal appeals filed under Section 14A of the SC/ST Act by accused individuals who had been denied anticipatory bail by the Special Judge. The allegations concerned offences under Sections 376(2)(n) [rape], 506 IPC [criminal intimidation], and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act.

Arguments of the Appellants:

The appellants contended that the allegations did not disclose a prima facie case under the serious offences invoked. For the first accused, the charge of rape under Section 376(2)(n) IPC was based on the complainant’s claim that he induced her into a sexual relationship on the false promise of marriage. The defense argued that the relationship between the accused and the complainant spanned nearly two years, from 2023 to July 2025, and amounted to a consensual live-in relationship. They further highlighted that the complainant was already a married woman, making the allegation of rape on false promise of marriage untenable in law. Relying on precedents such as Hiran Das Murali v. State of Kerala, Anil Kumar v. State of Kerala, and Mahesh Damu Khare v. State of Maharashtra, the appellants argued that consensual relationships cannot later be converted into allegations of rape merely because the promise of marriage was not fulfilled.

As for the second accused, it was alleged that he threatened the complainant over her relationship with the first accused. However, the defense pointed out that the phone call records showed unusually long conversations between the complainant and the second accused, often at times when she was cohabiting with the first accused. This suggested that the first accused himself might have been using her phone to speak to the second accused, casting doubt on whether any criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC was ever committed. The appellants maintained that neither offence under Section 376(2)(n) nor Section 506 IPC could stand scrutiny, and therefore, the consequential invocation of Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act was without foundation. They also stressed that Section 3(2)(v) is not a substantive offence but a sentencing enhancement provision that applies only when a qualifying substantive offence is proved, which was not the case here. Hence, the statutory bar against anticipatory bail under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act was inapplicable.

Arguments of the Respondents:

The State and the complainant’s counsel opposed the grant of anticipatory bail, arguing that the allegations disclosed serious offences. They contended that the complainant’s statements clearly established that she was coerced into a sexual relationship by the first accused under false assurances of marriage, which he later reneged on. According to the prosecution, this amounted to rape within the meaning of Section 376(2)(n) IPC, regardless of the relationship’s duration. They further maintained that the second accused’s actions in threatening the complainant should be taken seriously, as intimidation undermines the complainant’s dignity and independence. The respondents argued that Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act was attracted since the offences were committed against a woman belonging to a Scheduled Caste. They asserted that once this section is invoked, Section 18 of the SC/ST Act automatically bars anticipatory bail, and the High Court ought not to interfere with the Special Judge’s rejection of bail. They urged that granting bail would embolden perpetrators and defeat the protective purpose of the SC/ST Act, enacted to safeguard vulnerable communities.

Court’s Analysis and Judgment:

Justice Gopinath P. undertook a careful analysis of the legal framework and precedents. The Court first emphasized that Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act is not a standalone offence but an aggravating provision that prescribes enhanced punishment when an offence punishable with ten years or more is committed against a member of a Scheduled Caste or Tribe on account of such identity. The Court cited Rajachandrasekharan @ Babu v. State of Kerala to underscore this principle. Therefore, unless the underlying substantive offence is made out, Section 3(2)(v) cannot be invoked.

On the charge of rape under Section 376(2)(n) IPC, the Court observed that the complainant herself admitted to a long-term consensual relationship with the first accused from 2023 until July 2025. Relying on Hiran Das Murali, Anil Kumar, and Mahesh Damu Khare, the Court reiterated that when a relationship is consensual and continues for a substantial period, allegations of rape on the ground of a subsequently withdrawn promise of marriage do not prima facie constitute an offence under Section 376 IPC. The complainant’s status as a married woman further weakened the foundation of the allegation. Thus, the Court concluded that the charge under Section 376(2)(n) could not prima facie stand.

Regarding the allegation under Section 506 IPC, the Court noted the long duration of phone calls between the complainant and the second accused. Given that many of these calls took place while the complainant was cohabiting with the first accused, the Court found it plausible that the first accused himself might have been conversing with the second accused. This created serious doubt over whether the second accused ever threatened the complainant. The Court thus held that prima facie, no offence under Section 506 IPC was established.

Since the maximum punishment for Section 506 IPC is seven years, it fell below the threshold required to invoke Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act. The Court further observed that while Section 506 IPC is a scheduled offence for the purposes of Section 3(2)(va) of the SC/ST Act, that provision had not been invoked in the present case. Thus, even on this count, the applicability of the SC/ST Act was doubtful.

Having held that neither Section 376(2)(n) IPC nor Section 506 IPC was prima facie made out, the Court concluded that Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act could not be invoked. Consequently, the statutory bar under Section 18 of the SC/ST Act did not apply, and the appellants were entitled to seek anticipatory bail. Justice Gopinath P. underscored that anticipatory bail should not be mechanically denied merely because the SC/ST Act has been invoked; rather, courts must examine whether the substantive offence supporting the enhanced provision is prima facie established.

With these findings, the Court allowed the appeals, set aside the Special Judge’s orders, and granted anticipatory bail to both appellants subject to conditions.