Introduction:
In a significant judgment reaffirming the principle that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof, the Kerala High Court, in Parimal Sahu v. State of Kerala, Criminal Appeal No. 974 of 2022 and connected case, delivered on October 31, 2025, acquitted Parimal Sahu, a migrant labourer from Assam, who had been accused and convicted of the brutal rape and murder of a 60-year-old widow residing in the Puthanvelikkara Grama Panchayat, Ernakulam district, in 2018. The Division Bench comprising Dr. Justice Jayasankaran Nambiar and Justice Jobin Sebastian overturned the conviction and death sentence awarded by the Additional Sessions Court, North Paravur. The High Court found severe procedural and evidentiary lapses in the trial, holding that the conviction was based on unreliable testimony, uncorroborated scientific evidence, and improperly admitted confessions. The Court underscored that a conviction in a case of such gravity must rest upon unimpeachable evidence, not conjecture, or flawed investigation.
Arguments on Behalf of the Prosecution:
The prosecution’s case was constructed on a sequence of alleged facts and circumstances pointing toward the guilt of the accused. It was alleged that on the night of the incident, around 11 PM, the accused, who lived adjacent to the house of the deceased, entered her residence with the intent to commit rape. The prosecution claimed that after sexually assaulting the woman, he struck her with a granite stone lying in the courtyard, causing fatal head injuries. Subsequently, he allegedly dragged her lifeless body into the bedroom and tightened a cloth around her neck to ensure her death. To mislead the investigation, the accused purportedly smeared blood on the t-shirt of the deceased’s intellectually disabled son, intending to create a false narrative implicating him, and concealed the stone within the premises of the house.
The prosecution charged the accused under Sections 449 (House-trespass to commit offence punishable with death), 376A (Rape resulting in death), 302 (Murder), and 201 (Causing disappearance of evidence) of the Indian Penal Code. At trial, the Additional Sessions Court, North Paravur, accepted the prosecution’s version, finding the accused guilty on all counts. The trial court imposed the death penalty under Section 376A, along with life imprisonment under Section 302, pending confirmation by the High Court.
In the appellate proceedings, the prosecution, represented by Special Public Prosecutor Ambika Devi S., defended the trial court’s findings. The prosecution contended that the chain of circumstantial evidence was complete and pointed unerringly to the guilt of the accused. It argued that the presence of bloodstains and the recovery of the granite stone at the accused’s instance corroborated his involvement.
The prosecution further relied upon the testimony of PW4, the deceased’s intellectually disabled son, claiming that his evidence, although limited, provided crucial corroboration. They argued that the absence of a voir dire examination (a preliminary test to assess witness competency) did not invalidate his testimony, since the trial court was satisfied with his mental condition during deposition. The prosecution maintained that the Court could rely on PW4’s statements given his proximity to the incident and his relationship with the deceased.
Moreover, the prosecution emphasized the alleged extra-judicial confession made by the accused to doctors at the Government Medical College, where he was taken for medical examination following his arrest. It was contended that this confession was voluntary and reliable, offering direct admission of guilt. Additionally, the recovery of the weapon of offence (granite stone) from the scene, coupled with the alleged attempt by the accused to fabricate evidence by smearing blood on the son’s clothing, were portrayed as strong incriminating circumstances.
The prosecution also attempted to justify minor inconsistencies and procedural lapses, asserting that they did not affect the overall integrity of the investigation. They urged the Court not to adopt an overly technical approach, particularly given the heinous nature of the crime, which demanded stern punishment. According to the prosecution, the totality of evidence, including medical and scientific reports, sufficiently established the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Arguments on Behalf of the Defence:
The defence, represented by advocates Mitha Sudhindran, Shreya Rastogi, Nadia Shalin, Moulika Diwakar, Riji Rajendran, and Bhairavi S.N., assisted by the Square Circle Clinic, NALSAR, provided legal aid to the appellant. The defence presented a meticulous and systematic rebuttal to the prosecution’s case, asserting that the conviction was entirely based on conjecture, defective investigation, and inadmissible evidence.
Firstly, the defence argued that the alleged eyewitness testimony of PW4, the deceased’s intellectually disabled son, was fundamentally unreliable. It was submitted that no voir dire test was conducted to assess his mental competence as required under Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act. Citing precedents such as Agniraj & Ors. v. State and State of Madhya Pradesh v. Balveer Singh, counsel stressed that the trial judge had a duty to determine whether a person with intellectual disability could understand and respond rationally to questions before recording his testimony.
The defence further highlighted that PW4’s IQ was assessed as being within the range of moderate mental retardation, equating to a mental age of 7½ years. His testimony, while coherent during the examination-in-chief, became inconsistent, incoherent, and unintelligible during cross-examination. This, according to the defence, was a clear indication of tutoring or external influence, rendering his evidence unreliable. The failure of the trial judge to assess his competency was, therefore, a fatal irregularity that vitiated the trial.
Secondly, the defence challenged the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession allegedly made to the doctors, arguing that it was obtained while the accused was in police custody, thus violating Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act. Citing modern judicial interpretations, the defence argued that “custody” encompasses situations where an individual’s freedom of movement is under police restraint, even without formal arrest. Since the accused was escorted by police officers to the hospital, any confession made at that time was inadmissible.
Thirdly, the defence questioned the recovery of the granite stone (MO4), contending that it was retrieved from an open, publicly accessible space within the compound where the incident occurred. The investigating officer himself admitted that the area was not concealed and was already occupied by local people and police officers at the time of seizure. Therefore, it could not be said that the discovery was made “based on information received from the accused,” as required under Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The recovery, according to the defence, was stage-managed to strengthen a weak case.
The defence also cast doubt on the alleged bite marks on the accused’s hand, which the prosecution claimed were inflicted by the deceased while resisting the assault. It was submitted that the examination was conducted by a dentist rather than a registered medical practitioner, and that bite mark comparison is an inexact and unreliable forensic method. The defence even argued that these marks might have been inflicted by police officers during third-degree interrogation.
Regarding the presence of nail clippings and blood samples, the defence pointed out that forensic analysis revealed no epithelial cells of the accused on the deceased’s nails. This absence of biological linkage, they argued, was fatal to the prosecution’s claim that the accused was the perpetrator.
In conclusion, the defence maintained that there was no direct evidence connecting the accused to the crime. Every piece of circumstantial and scientific evidence either failed to meet the standard of proof or actually supported the accused’s innocence. The conviction, they argued, was a miscarriage of justice based on conjecture, flawed reasoning, and procedural irregularities.
Court’s Judgment:
After a comprehensive review of the evidence and submissions, the Division Bench of Dr. Justice Jayasankaran Nambiar and Justice Jobin Sebastian delivered a detailed judgment that strongly criticized the trial court’s approach. The Court held that the prosecution had failed to establish an unbroken chain of circumstances leading exclusively to the guilt of the accused.
The Court first examined the credibility of PW4, the intellectually disabled son of the deceased, whose testimony formed the cornerstone of the prosecution’s case. Referring to Section 118 of the Indian Evidence Act, the Court emphasized that the competency of such a witness must be tested through a voir dire examination before recording testimony. The absence of such an assessment was deemed a fatal irregularity. The Court noted that PW4’s cross-examination revealed incoherence and contradictions, suggesting he may have been tutored. Consequently, his evidence was held to be unreliable.
Next, the Court evaluated the extra-judicial confession made by the accused to the medical officers. The Bench accepted the defence’s argument that since the confession was made while the accused was under police escort, it fell within the ambit of Section 26 of the Evidence Act, which prohibits the use of confessions made in police custody. The Court observed that recent Supreme Court rulings had expanded the definition of “custody” to include situations where police control restricts an individual’s freedom, even without formal arrest. Thus, the alleged confession could not be relied upon.
Regarding the recovery of the weapon, the Court held that the stone (MO4) was recovered from an open area accessible to the public, and there was no evidence that it was concealed or known only to the accused. The Court remarked that the prior presence of police and local people at the scene raised serious doubts about the authenticity of the recovery. Therefore, the recovery under Section 27 of the Evidence Act lacked credibility.
The Court also discredited the evidence related to bite marks and nail clippings, observing that forensic analysis did not connect the accused with the deceased. The examination by a dentist, instead of a medical practitioner, and the lack of established reliability of bite mark comparison made the evidence scientifically unsound. Furthermore, the possibility that the accused’s injuries resulted from police torture could not be ruled out.
The Court found that other scientific and circumstantial evidence also failed to establish guilt. It observed that “the scientific evidence does not render any assistance to the prosecution to prove the involvement of the accused in the commission of the crime; rather, it tends to help the accused in establishing his innocence.”
Summing up, the Court declared that the prosecution had failed to discharge its burden of proof beyond reasonable doubt. The inconsistencies in the testimonies, the inadmissible confession, and the unreliability of the forensic evidence collectively destroyed the prosecution’s case. Accordingly, the Court set aside the conviction and acquitted the accused of all charges. It directed that Parimal Sahu be released forthwith, unless required in any other case.
This judgment underscores the judiciary’s responsibility to ensure that the right to a fair trial is never compromised, and that conviction for serious offences like rape and murder must rest solely on credible, corroborated, and legally admissible evidence.