Introduction:
In a landmark judgment reaffirming the principle that statutory bodies cannot act beyond the framework of law, the Karnataka High Court, in Pranava K.N. & Others v. Karnataka State Law University & Others, delivered a significant verdict striking down the circular issued by Karnataka State Law University (KSLU) that had increased the registration fees for students of three-year and five-year law courses. Justice R. Devdas presided over the matter and allowed a batch of petitions filed by aggrieved students, including Pranava K.N., challenging the arbitrary enhancement of university registration fees from ₹3,700 to ₹8,580 through the impugned circular dated July 2, 2025. The petitioners contended that the circular was issued without any statutory backing or approval under the Karnataka State Law University Act, 2009, thereby violating the fundamental principles of legality and fairness in the exercise of administrative powers. The High Court, after examining the statutory provisions, notably Sections 5, 30, 33, and 34 of the KSLU Act, held that the University’s action was ultra vires and unsustainable in law, directing the institution to refund the excess fees collected within two months.
Arguments of the Petitioners:
The petitioners, represented by Senior Advocate K.G. Raghavan and Advocate Shankara J. Sreedhara, argued that while Section 5 of the Karnataka State Law University Act, 2009, empowers the University to demand and receive fees, this power is not absolute. It is conditional and must be exercised strictly in accordance with the provisions of the Act and subject to the Statutes, Regulations, and Ordinances framed thereunder. The petitioners emphasized that the impugned circular enhancing the registration fee lacked any such statutory backing. The University, according to them, had failed to demonstrate that any Statute, Regulation, or Ordinance had been enacted to authorize the increase. The counsel stressed that Section 5 does not operate in a vacuum—it necessitates procedural compliance through subordinate legislation, ensuring transparency and accountability. The sudden enhancement of registration fees from ₹3,700 to ₹8,580 without any consultative or legislative process was arbitrary, unreasonable, and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Furthermore, they pointed out that the Syndicate of the University, which is empowered under Clause (xxiii) of Section 30 to prescribe and collect fees, could not act independently of the Statutes. The absence of any such enabling provision rendered the University’s decision legally untenable.
The petitioners also contended that the circular violated the doctrine of ultra vires, which prohibits administrative authorities from exceeding their statutory mandate. They argued that such arbitrary fiscal measures directly burdened students, many of whom were already struggling with the high cost of legal education. The counsel submitted that education, particularly legal education, should not be treated as a commercial enterprise but as a constitutional instrument for social empowerment and justice delivery. The sudden and unjustified increase in fees not only violated statutory provisions but also infringed upon the petitioners’ right to education under Article 21A, read with Article 41 of the Constitution. The petitioners urged the Court to quash the circular and direct the University to refund the excess amounts collected.
Arguments of the Respondents:
The respondent-University, represented by Advocate Girish Kumar and Advocate Madhukar S, contended that the University was well within its authority to revise and collect fees. They relied on the provisions of Sections 30, 33, and 34 of the Karnataka State Law University Act, 2009, asserting that the Academic Council, under Section 34(2)(ii), is empowered to make regulations regarding the courses of study and other academic matters not covered by the Ordinances. The counsel emphasized that the Vice-Chancellor, as the ex-officio Chairman of the Academic Council, holds administrative discretion in such matters. It was further argued that the Syndicate, under Clause (xxiii) of Section 30, has the power to prescribe and collect fees as may be provided by the Statutes. Even if no specific Statute was placed before the Court, the power of the Syndicate should not be deemed redundant, as the authority to collect reasonable fees is inherent in the University’s functioning.
The respondents further contended that the students had never objected to the levy or collection of fees in prior years and had continued their studies without protest. The circular merely updated the fee structure to align with rising administrative and infrastructural costs. They maintained that such fiscal adjustments were necessary to ensure the University’s financial sustainability and the quality of legal education it provides. The counsel stressed that the circular was an administrative measure intended to maintain parity with other professional universities across the State. Moreover, the respondents argued that the petitioners had failed to demonstrate any element of mala fide intent or discrimination in the issuance of the circular. They also submitted that the petitioners’ grievance was limited to financial inconvenience and not a violation of any fundamental or legal right, thus not warranting judicial interference under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Court’s Judgment and Reasoning:
Justice R. Devdas, after considering the rival contentions, meticulously examined the statutory framework governing KSLU. The Court observed that while Section 5 of the Act indeed empowers the University to demand and receive fees, this power is circumscribed by the requirement that such levy must be “provided for by the Statutes, Regulations, or Ordinances.” The absence of any such subordinate legislative instrument meant that the University’s act of enhancing fees through an executive circular lacked legal foundation. The Court agreed with the petitioners’ argument that administrative convenience cannot override statutory compliance.
The judgment highlighted that the Syndicate’s power to charge and collect fees, as mentioned in Clause (xxiii) of Section 30, is conditional upon the framing of relevant Statutes. The Court observed that “no material has been placed by the respondent-University showing the enactment of such Statutes, Regulations, or Ordinances in the matter of levy and collection of fees and other charges.” This omission, the Court said, strikes at the root of the University’s authority to issue the impugned circular. Justice Devdas underscored that when the legislature prescribes specific procedures for the exercise of power, such procedures must be followed strictly. The Court reiterated the principle that “what cannot be done directly under the statute cannot be done indirectly through administrative instructions.”
Rejecting the University’s reliance on the powers of the Academic Council and Vice-Chancellor, the Court held that neither the Council nor the Vice-Chancellor possesses independent authority to impose or enhance fees. These powers are purely regulatory and must operate within the bounds of statutory authorization. The Court further observed that the University’s argument—that students did not object in previous years—was irrelevant because the legality of an administrative act does not depend on public acquiescence. “Silence or inaction of affected parties cannot legalize an otherwise unlawful act,” the Court noted.
Emphasizing the public law character of educational institutions, the judgment observed that universities, though autonomous, are bound by the rule of law and constitutional discipline. Justice Devdas remarked, “The power conferred upon a statutory body must be exercised in the manner prescribed by law, and not otherwise. Any deviation amounts to excess of jurisdiction and renders the action void ab initio.” The Court found that the University’s attempt to justify the enhanced fee structure on grounds of necessity or parity with other institutions could not substitute for statutory authorization. The circular, therefore, was declared ultra vires the Karnataka State Law University Act, 2009.
On the issue of relief, the Court directed the University to refund the excess amount collected from students pursuant to the impugned circular. Importantly, the Court extended this relief to all students, regardless of whether they were petitioners before the Court. This directive reflected the Court’s commitment to ensuring uniform justice and preventing administrative discrimination. The University was directed to complete the refund process within two months, emphasizing that educational institutions must maintain fiscal transparency and accountability in their dealings with students.
The Court also took note of the growing trend among universities to arbitrarily revise fees without statutory approval. Justice Devdas cautioned that “educational institutions established under legislative enactments cannot act as commercial entities. Their financial policies must reflect public accountability and legal propriety.” The Court’s reasoning echoed the Supreme Court’s consistent stance that the exercise of fiscal power by statutory bodies must be founded on explicit legal authority, not executive convenience. The ruling reaffirmed the judiciary’s role in safeguarding students from administrative arbitrariness and upholding the sanctity of statutory governance.
In conclusion, the Karnataka High Court’s decision not only invalidated the impugned circular but also reaffirmed a crucial principle of administrative law: that all fiscal and regulatory powers of statutory institutions must emanate from express legislative sanction. The verdict is a victory for students’ rights and a reminder that education must remain a domain governed by legality, not financial opportunism.