Introduction:
The case titled Jayna Kothari v. Manish Kumar & Anr. emerged from a professional dispute that reached the Karnataka High Court, where Senior Advocate Jayna Kothari, a distinguished member of the legal fraternity with an extensive track record in gender justice and constitutional law, challenged the maintainability of a complaint lodged against her before the Karnataka State Bar Council (KSBC) by Manish Kumar, a former employee of Zoomcar India Pvt. Ltd. The controversy arose after a female employee of the company made allegations of sexual harassment against Manish Kumar, and the company’s Internal Complaints Committee (ICC), constituted under the Sexual Harassment of Women at Workplace (Prevention, Prohibition and Redressal) Act, 2013 (popularly known as the POSH Act), found him guilty and recommended his termination. Jayna Kothari had been appointed as an external member of the ICC based on her expertise in matters relating to workplace gender rights and compliance with sexual harassment laws. This appointment, done without honorarium or contractual payment, made her an independent subject-matter expert rather than an employee or representative of the company. Yet, after his dismissal, the aggrieved respondent sought to accuse her before the KSBC alleging misconduct, bias, and professional impropriety, thereby converting a workplace grievance into a Bar Council disciplinary proceeding. This gave rise to a critical legal question before the High Court: Does an Advocate’s participation as an external ICC member constitute professional misconduct under the Advocates Act, 1961, especially when there exists no advocate-client relationship or professional engagement?
Arguments of the Petitioner:
Senior Advocate Jayna Kothari, represented by Senior Advocate K.N. Phanindra and Advocate Aditya Narayan, passionately argued that the complaint was wholly untenable in law and a calculated attempt to harass her for fulfilling a statutory role mandated by the POSH Act. It was contended that she was appointed solely in her individual capacity as an expert to assist the ICC, that she neither represented the company in any litigation nor entered into an Advocate-client relationship with any party involved in the dispute. Her role as an external member did not involve legal representation but rather adherence to principles of workplace fairness under the 2013 Act. Counsel for Kothari emphasized that Section 35 of the Advocates Act confers jurisdiction upon Bar Councils to initiate disciplinary proceedings only where an Advocate is alleged to have committed misconduct in the discharge of professional legal services rendered to a client. They argued that Kothari’s involvement in the ICC proceedings was not legal representation but a statutory compliance mechanism completely outside the purview of the Advocates Act, rendering the complaint not only misconceived but malicious. They further stressed that the Labour Commissioner’s observations, initially made against Kothari, had already been expunged by a coordinate bench of the Karnataka High Court, thereby nullifying any foundation upon which the Bar Council complaint could rest. It was argued that permitting such complaints would result in deterring qualified legal professionals from participating in ICCs — a role essential for maintaining gender dignity and complying with national workplace safety norms. Thus, the petitioner asserted that her personal integrity, career, and reputation were wrongfully targeted in retaliation to the ICC’s findings.
Arguments of the Respondent:
The first respondent, Manish Kumar, represented by Advocate Harsha Swaroop P, vehemently opposed the petition and defended the maintainability of the Bar Council complaint. He argued that the constitution of the ICC itself was flawed and alleged that Kothari’s actions were motivated by malice and bias. It was alleged that she had acted not as an impartial external member but as an agent of the company, having allegedly “orchestrated” his termination and engaged in acts tantamount to prejudging him. The respondent contended that her brother, a practicing lawyer, had served a caveat notice on behalf of Zoomcar, thereby creating a conflict of interest that should have disqualified her from the ICC composition. The respondent submitted that the ICC proceedings were merely a façade designed to remove him from employment, and that Kothari, instead of functioning independently, had deliberately acted in collusion with company management. He further alleged that her conduct during the inquiry amounted to professional misconduct as defined under the Bar Council Rules, arguing that Advocates are required to uphold neutrality and dignity in all proceedings. He maintained that the ICC was improperly constituted, contrary to the provisions of the 2013 Act, and that the decision against him was predetermined. As such, he claimed that a complaint before the Bar Council was the only legitimate course available to him to expose her alleged impropriety.
Court’s Judgment:
Justice M. Nagaprasanna, delivering a detailed and reasoned judgment, emphatically rejected the respondent’s arguments and quashed both the complaint before the Karnataka State Bar Council as well as the notice issued to Jayna Kothari. The Court held that the Bar Council cannot entertain complaints that do not arise from a professional engagement governed by the Advocates Act, and that no Advocate-client relationship existed between the complainant and Kothari. Therefore, the entire proceedings initiated before KSBC were without jurisdiction, unsustainable, and amounted to an abuse of the legal system. The Court highlighted that Section 35 of the Advocates Act empowers the Bar Council to proceed only where there is reason to believe that an Advocate engaged in professional misconduct. Here, however, Kothari had merely acted as an external ICC member — a statutory role that many advocates undertake without remuneration, not as an extension of their professional practice but as an effort to enhance workplace gender justice. The Court further observed that the respondent’s actions were mala fide, vexatious, and tainted with the intention of vengeance, especially considering he had already pursued remedies before the Labour Commissioner while simultaneously dragging Kothari into disciplinary proceedings. Justice Nagaprasanna clarified that if such complaints were allowed to persist, they would not only deter professionals from accepting ICC responsibilities but also undermine the purpose of the POSH Act. Reminding that the ICC mechanism exists to protect women employees from harassment and equip workplaces with remedies that are swift, non-adversarial, and independent from legal intimidation, the Court warned that frivolous litigation weaponizing professional misconduct allegations is inherently destructive. Therefore, the writ petition was allowed, the impugned notice was quashed, and a precedent was set reaffirming that participation in a POSH committee is not a professional activity governed by the Advocates Act and cannot be equated with misconduct in legal practice.