Introduction:

The Karnataka High Court has quashed criminal proceedings against a man booked by Athani Police after he allegedly made insulting remarks about the Prime Minister when questioned by a social worker over barricades placed outside his shop. The Court held that the allegations in the complaint did not disclose the essential ingredients of intentional insult under Section 352 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), particularly because there was no allegation that the petitioner had intentionally insulted the complainant with the intention or knowledge that such insult would provoke a breach of peace.

Justice Venkatesh Naik T passed the order while allowing Criminal Petition No. 101720 of 2026 filed by Imtiyaz Nuruddin Chinchali in Imtiyaz Nuruddin Chinchali v. State of Karnataka & Anr., reported as 2026 LiveLaw (Kar) 378. The Court consequently quashed the proceedings pending before the Principal Civil Judge and JMFC, Athani.

The case arose from an incident allegedly involving the petitioner placing barricades in front of his shop and thereby causing inconvenience to members of the public. According to the complaint, the complainant, described as a social worker, questioned the petitioner about the alleged obstruction. During the exchange, the petitioner allegedly made certain insulting remarks concerning the Prime Minister.

The complaint was subsequently registered invoking Section 285 of the BNS, which deals with causing danger, obstruction or injury to a person in a public way or line of navigation, along with Section 352 of the BNS concerning intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace or knowing that such provocation is likely to cause breach of peace.

The proceedings before the High Court raised an important question concerning the distinction between offensive or discourteous speech and criminally punishable intentional insult. The Court was required to examine whether the allegations, even if taken at face value, satisfied the statutory ingredients of the offences invoked against the petitioner.

The prosecution case originated from an incident said to have occurred on January 7, 2026. According to the complaint, the complainant and others were near the BJP office when they received information regarding a video circulating in a WhatsApp group. The video allegedly showed the petitioner having placed barricades near his shop on the road, resulting in inconvenience to the public and allegedly obstructing traffic.

After learning about the incident, the complainant went to the spot and questioned the petitioner regarding the alleged obstruction. It was alleged that during the exchange the petitioner used insulting words against the Prime Minister. The complainant, claiming to have been aggrieved by the incident, approached the police.

The complaint, however, was lodged on January 11, 2026, four days after the alleged incident. The High Court took note of the delay and observed that the same had not been satisfactorily explained.

The petitioner approached the High Court under its inherent jurisdiction seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings. His principal contention was that the complaint did not contain the necessary allegations to constitute an offence under Section 352 BNS. In particular, there was no assertion that the petitioner had abused or intentionally insulted the complainant himself.

The case therefore required the Court to examine not simply whether the words allegedly spoken by the petitioner could be considered offensive, but whether those words, in the circumstances alleged, fulfilled the specific legal ingredients required for criminal liability.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioner contended before the Karnataka High Court that the criminal proceedings were legally unsustainable because the complaint itself did not disclose the ingredients of the offences alleged. Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the central allegation concerning Section 352 BNS was that the petitioner had made certain statements against the Prime Minister.

According to the petitioner, the complaint did not allege that he had intentionally insulted the complainant or that his conduct was directed at the complainant with the requisite intention to provoke him into causing a breach of peace. The mere fact that the complainant found the alleged statement offensive or objectionable could not, by itself, satisfy the statutory requirements of Section 352 BNS.

The petitioner further argued that the criminal law could not be invoked merely because a person had made an allegedly offensive political statement. Unless the words and conduct alleged in the complaint established the specific ingredients prescribed by the penal provision, continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

The defence also drew attention to the nature of the allegations. According to the petitioner, the complaint was essentially based on a verbal exchange arising after the complainant questioned him about the barricades. The allegation concerning the Prime Minister did not transform the exchange into an offence against the complainant, particularly when there was no specific assertion that the petitioner intended to provoke the complainant into breaking the peace.

The petitioner also relied upon the delay in lodging the complaint. The incident was alleged to have taken place on January 7, 2026, whereas the complaint was filed on January 11. It was argued that the four-day delay had not been properly explained and that the unexplained delay assumed significance when the allegations themselves were general in nature.

With regard to Section 285 BNS, the petitioner questioned whether the allegations were sufficient to sustain the prosecution in the absence of the necessary factual foundation demonstrating that the statutory offence had actually been committed. The defence maintained that the prosecution could not be permitted to continue merely on the basis of broad and omnibus allegations.

The State and the complainant opposed the petition and defended the continuation of the criminal proceedings. Their case was that the complaint disclosed prima facie material requiring investigation and trial, and that the High Court should not conduct a detailed assessment of the evidence at the stage of considering a petition for quashing.

It was submitted that the barricades allegedly placed by the petitioner had caused inconvenience to the public and obstructed the road. Such conduct, according to the respondents, provided the factual basis for the allegation under Section 285 BNS.

The respondents further contended that the words allegedly used by the petitioner, although purportedly directed against the Prime Minister, were made during an interaction in which the complainant had questioned him regarding the public obstruction. According to the State and the complainant, the circumstances surrounding the alleged remarks could establish the necessary intention or knowledge required under Section 352 BNS.

The respondents argued that questions relating to intention, knowledge, the circumstances in which the words were spoken and whether the conduct was likely to provoke a breach of peace were essentially factual matters. Such questions, it was submitted, should ordinarily be determined after evidence is led rather than at the preliminary stage.

The State therefore urged the High Court to permit the criminal proceedings to continue and allow the trial court to assess the evidence in accordance with law. It was argued that the petitioner should not be permitted to rely upon disputed factual circumstances to obtain an order quashing the proceedings at the threshold.

The respondents also maintained that the alleged obstruction of the public road and the alleged remarks should be examined together. According to their submission, the prosecution case was not limited to the alleged statement concerning the Prime Minister but also included conduct that allegedly interfered with the movement of members of the public.

The competing submissions consequently required the High Court to determine whether the allegations, even if accepted in their entirety for the limited purpose of considering the quashing petition, disclosed the statutory ingredients of the offences invoked.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice Venkatesh Naik T examined the complaint and the material placed before the Court and found that the allegations were insufficient to sustain the criminal proceedings against the petitioner. The Court’s central consideration was whether the complaint disclosed the essential ingredients of Section 352 BNS.

Section 352 BNS concerns intentional insult with intent to provoke breach of peace, or conduct where the accused knows that such provocation is likely to cause a breach of peace or commission of another offence. The provision therefore does not criminalise every instance of abusive, discourteous, rude or offensive speech. The prosecution must establish the statutory mental element and the connection between the alleged insult and the intended or known consequence of provoking a breach of peace.

The Court found that this essential element was absent from the complaint.

The allegation against the petitioner, as noticed by the Court, was essentially that when the complainant questioned him about the barricades, he made certain statements concerning the Prime Minister. There was no specific allegation that the petitioner had abused or intentionally insulted the complainant with the object or knowledge of provoking a breach of peace.

This distinction was central to the Court’s reasoning. The identity of the person allegedly insulted and the intention behind the words are important considerations under Section 352 BNS. Merely establishing that certain words were spoken during an argument does not automatically establish that the statutory offence of intentional insult has been committed.

The Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Mohammad Wajid v. State of Uttar Pradesh, decided in 2023, while considering the ingredients of the relevant offence. The principle emerging from that decision was applied to emphasise that mere abuse, discourtesy, rudeness or insolence does not necessarily constitute criminal intentional insult.

For criminal liability to arise, the prosecution must demonstrate the requisite intention or knowledge that the alleged insult was likely to provoke the person insulted to cause a breach of peace or commit another offence.

Applying this principle to the facts before it, the High Court found that the complaint did not contain the necessary factual assertions. The alleged remarks concerning the Prime Minister could not, without more, establish that the petitioner intended to insult the complainant or provoke him into causing a breach of peace.

The Court therefore declined to treat the alleged offensive language as sufficient, by itself, to constitute an offence under Section 352 BNS.

The judgment is significant because it reiterates that penal provisions must be applied according to their statutory ingredients. The criminal process cannot be sustained merely because conduct is considered impolite, discourteous or objectionable. Where the legislature has prescribed a specific intention or knowledge as an ingredient of the offence, that requirement must be reflected in the allegations.

The Court also examined the nature of the complaint and described the allegations as general and omnibus. The absence of specific allegations establishing intentional insult, coupled with the circumstances in which the alleged words were spoken, persuaded the Court that the continuation of the prosecution would not be justified.

The Bench observed that the allegations were insufficient to establish the essential ingredients of the alleged offences and consequently held that allowing the proceedings to continue would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

The Court’s approach also reflects the established principle governing the exercise of inherent jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings. While a High Court ordinarily does not conduct a mini-trial at the stage of considering a quashing petition, it can intervene where the allegations, even if accepted at face value, fail to constitute the offence alleged.

In the present case, the Court considered that the basic statutory ingredients were absent from the complaint itself. It was therefore unnecessary to require the petitioner to undergo the full criminal trial merely to establish a deficiency that was apparent from the allegations forming the foundation of the prosecution.

The Court additionally took note of the four-day delay between the alleged incident and the lodging of the complaint. The incident was stated to have occurred on January 7, 2026, whereas the complaint was filed on January 11, 2026. The Court noted that this delay had not been properly explained.

Although delay in lodging a complaint does not automatically render a criminal case false or legally unsustainable, the Court considered the unexplained delay in the overall context of the allegations. When the complaint itself failed to disclose the essential ingredients of the principal offence, the unexplained delay became another circumstance relevant to the Court’s assessment of whether the proceedings should continue.

The Court also considered the allegation concerning the barricades. The complaint alleged that the petitioner had placed barricades in front of his shop and caused inconvenience to the public. Such conduct was relied upon by the prosecution for invoking Section 285 BNS.

However, the existence of an alleged obstruction does not automatically establish every offence with which a person may be charged. Each penal provision contains its own statutory requirements, and the prosecution must demonstrate the factual foundation necessary to bring the alleged conduct within those requirements.

The High Court’s order consequently focused upon whether the complaint disclosed the ingredients of the offences rather than accepting the prosecution’s characterization of the conduct at face value.

An important aspect of the decision is the distinction between political speech and personal criminal liability. The Court did not undertake an assessment of whether the alleged remarks about the Prime Minister were politically appropriate or offensive. Instead, the legal question was whether those remarks, in the circumstances alleged, constituted the specific criminal offence invoked against the petitioner.

The Court found that they did not.

The judgment thus avoids converting a disagreement or objectionable verbal exchange into a criminal prosecution without establishing the statutory mental element. Criminal law requires more than proof that words were unpleasant or offensive. Where the offence requires intentional insult accompanied by an intention or knowledge that breach of peace is likely, those requirements must be present in the allegations.

The Court accordingly concluded that the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the petitioner would amount to an abuse of the process of law.

The criminal petition was allowed, and the proceedings pending before the Principal Civil Judge and JMFC, Athani, were quashed.

The ruling in Imtiyaz Nuruddin Chinchali v. State of Karnataka & Anr. therefore reinforces an important principle concerning offences based upon allegedly insulting speech. The mere use of harsh, rude, discourteous or offensive language does not automatically attract criminal liability under Section 352 BNS. The prosecution must establish the specific intention or knowledge contemplated by the statutory provision.

At the same time, the judgment does not mean that every obstruction of a public road or every statement made during a dispute is immune from criminal scrutiny. Where the ingredients of a statutory offence are properly alleged and supported by material, the criminal process may proceed. The High Court’s intervention in the present case was based upon its finding that the foundational allegations did not satisfy the requirements of the offences invoked.

The decision also demonstrates the continuing importance of the High Court’s inherent jurisdiction in preventing criminal proceedings from being used where the allegations, taken at their highest, fail to disclose an offence. Such jurisdiction is exercised cautiously, but it remains available where allowing the prosecution to continue would itself amount to an abuse of the process of law.

In the final analysis, the Karnataka High Court’s ruling underscores that criminal liability cannot be founded merely upon the subjective offensiveness of a statement. Section 352 BNS contains a specific requirement of intentional insult coupled with the requisite intention or knowledge concerning breach of peace. Where those ingredients are absent from the complaint, a prosecution cannot be sustained simply because the words alleged to have been spoken were considered insulting or objectionable.

The Court’s decision therefore places emphasis on the substance of the statutory ingredients rather than the emotional or political character of the alleged statement. By quashing the proceedings, the High Court reaffirmed that criminal law must be invoked only when the allegations disclose the offence prescribed by the legislature, and that mere rudeness, discourtesy or an offensive exchange cannot, without the requisite intention, automatically become a criminal offence.