Introduction:
The Karnataka High Court has refused to quash criminal proceedings against a 22-year-old man accused of sending an email threatening bomb blasts at Kempegowda International Airport and several shopping malls in Bengaluru while falsely claiming to represent the banned terrorist organisation Jaish-e-Mohammed. The Court held that a false terrorism-related threat cannot be treated as harmless merely because the person issuing it allegedly had no intention of carrying out the threatened attack. Such conduct can generate widespread fear, disrupt public life and compel law enforcement agencies to divert substantial resources towards assessing and responding to a potential threat.
Justice M. Nagaprasanna, sitting as a single judge, delivered the ruling in a petition seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings initiated against the accused. The case was reported as [2026 LiveLaw (Kar) 427]. The Court emphasised that the alleged conduct involved more than issuing an empty threat or misusing another person’s identity. According to the prosecution, the accused had allegedly created multiple fake email accounts in the name of another individual, identified as Mohit Kumar, and used them to send threatening communications that purported to originate from a terrorist organisation.
The case arose from an email received by the Bengaluru City Police Commissioner on November 30, 2025. The message purportedly warned that bomb blasts would take place at Kempegowda International Airport and several shopping malls, including Orion Mall, Lulu Mall, Forum South Mall and Mantri Square Mall, from 7 p.m. onwards. The sender claimed to represent the Jaish-e-Mohammed White Collar Terror Team and identified himself as Mohit Kumar, providing a mobile number and inviting the police to make contact if they wished to avert the alleged danger.
Given the nature of the message and the locations identified, the communication required serious consideration by the police. An apparent threat against an international airport and multiple public venues cannot safely be dismissed without verification, particularly when it invokes the name of a banned terrorist organisation. The authorities were required to investigate the communication, assess the potential danger and determine who had sent it.
An FIR was initially registered under Section 66F of the Information Technology Act, 2000, which deals with cyber terrorism. During the investigation, however, the police allegedly discovered that the petitioner had created several fabricated email IDs in Mohit Kumar’s name to implicate him in a criminal case. The prosecution’s case was that the accused intended to frame another individual rather than actually carry out a terrorist attack.
Following the investigation, the police dropped the cyber-terrorism charge under Section 66F and filed a charge sheet invoking Section 351(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023, concerning anonymous criminal intimidation, and Section 66D of the Information Technology Act, which addresses cheating by personation using a computer resource or communication device.
The distinction between the initial allegation and the offences ultimately included in the charge sheet was significant. The prosecution did not proceed on the basis that the accused had necessarily intended to execute a terrorist act. Instead, the alleged conduct was examined in the context of anonymous criminal intimidation and electronic impersonation. Nevertheless, the High Court considered the seriousness of the threatened violence and the consequences of transmitting such a message while disguising the sender’s identity.
Before the High Court, the accused argued that the prosecution’s case was fundamentally unreliable because his internet connection was allegedly not functioning on the date of the incident. He contended that he could not have composed or transmitted the threatening emails if he did not have an active internet connection. The State opposed the petition, maintaining that the issue required evidentiary examination at trial and could not be resolved conclusively during proceedings seeking to quash the case.
The Court agreed with the State that the disputed assertion concerning internet connectivity did not justify terminating the prosecution at the preliminary stage. Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kaptan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, the High Court reiterated that a court considering a petition to quash criminal proceedings must not conduct a mini-trial or undertake a detailed assessment of contested evidence.
The ruling highlights two important legal principles. First, threatening communications involving alleged terrorist attacks may have serious consequences even where the alleged motive is personal hostility or the intention to frame another person. Second, disputed questions concerning electronic evidence, internet connectivity and the identity of the sender ordinarily require examination during trial when the prosecution material otherwise discloses a prima facie case.
By dismissing the petition, the Karnataka High Court allowed the criminal proceedings to continue, leaving the prosecution to establish the alleged offences in accordance with law. The decision does not amount to a finding of guilt against the accused; it establishes only that the material available at the quashing stage did not warrant terminating the proceedings.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner-accused approached the Karnataka High Court seeking to quash the criminal proceedings arising from the alleged bomb-threat emails. His principal contention was that the prosecution lacked a reliable factual foundation connecting him with the electronic communications. He specifically relied on the alleged failure of his internet connection on November 30, 2025, arguing that the absence of a functioning connection undermined the possibility that he had sent the threatening messages.
According to the petitioner, the condition of his internet connection was central to the prosecution’s theory. If the connection was not operational on the relevant date, he argued, the allegation that he had transmitted the emails could not be sustained. His challenge therefore sought to establish that the electronic communications could not reliably be attributed to him and that continuation of the proceedings would be unjustified.
The petitioner also relied on the circumstances surrounding his complaint to the internet service provider concerning the allegedly defunct connection. The complaint, in his submission, supported his contention that he lacked the means to transmit the threatening emails at the relevant time. The argument was directed at the very foundation of the prosecution’s case: whether the alleged communication could have originated from him at all.
Underlying the petition was the contention that criminal proceedings should not continue when a crucial factual premise of the accusation is allegedly contradicted by material concerning internet connectivity. From the petitioner’s perspective, the inability to access the internet weakened the prosecution’s claim that he had created or used the relevant email accounts to send the threats. He therefore sought judicial intervention before the matter proceeded to a full trial.
The petitioner’s position also raised an important evidentiary question concerning the attribution of electronic communications. An email account, the device used to access it and the network through which a message is transmitted are distinct elements of an electronic trail. Establishing that a particular person authored or sent a communication may require examination of technical records and other corroborating material. The petitioner’s challenge sought to use the alleged internet outage to cast doubt on that attribution.
The State, represented by the High Court Government Pleader, opposed the plea for quashing. It submitted that the alleged failure of the petitioner’s internet connection was a matter of defence that required verification through evidence during a full-fledged trial. According to the State, a complaint made to an internet service provider could not, by itself, conclusively establish that the threatening emails could not have been sent by the petitioner.
The prosecution’s position was that the technical circumstances surrounding the alleged communication could not be resolved merely by accepting the petitioner’s assertion. Whether the connection was actually inactive, whether other devices or networks could have been used, and whether the electronic trail connected the petitioner to the email accounts were matters requiring appropriate evidentiary examination.
The State further emphasised the seriousness of the alleged conduct. The email purportedly invoked the name of Jaish-e-Mohammed and threatened bomb blasts at an international airport and multiple shopping malls. Such communications, the prosecution maintained, could not be trivialised merely because the accused allegedly intended to implicate another person rather than execute a terrorist attack.
The prosecution also relied on the outcome of the investigation, which allegedly revealed that multiple fake email IDs had been created in Mohit Kumar’s name. According to the prosecution, the accused had used these fabricated identities to send the threats and divert suspicion towards another individual. This alleged impersonation formed an important part of the case under Section 66D of the Information Technology Act, while the anonymous nature of the threatening communication supported the charge under Section 351(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita.
The State’s argument was not that the accused had already been proved guilty, but that the material collected during the investigation provided a sufficient basis for the criminal case to proceed. It contended that the petitioner’s defence regarding internet connectivity should be assessed alongside the electronic evidence and other material during trial rather than being treated as conclusive at the stage of quashing.
The opposing submissions therefore presented the Court with a clear legal distinction. The petitioner sought to establish that a disputed technical circumstance undermined the prosecution’s case so fundamentally that the proceedings should be terminated. The State maintained that the same circumstance required factual investigation and that the seriousness of the alleged threats, together with the material gathered by the police, justified allowing the criminal proceedings to continue.
The High Court ultimately accepted the State’s position on the limited question before it. It declined to determine the truth of the petitioner’s defence at the quashing stage and instead examined whether the allegations and investigation material disclosed a prima facie basis for proceeding with the offences charged.
Court’s Judgment:
The Karnataka High Court dismissed the petition seeking quashing of the criminal proceedings, holding that the allegations against the accused disclosed a prima facie basis for a trial. Justice M. Nagaprasanna observed that the alleged conduct could not be reduced to an empty threat or an attempt merely to misuse another person’s identity. The accusation involved the creation of electronic identities in another individual’s name, the transmission of threats invoking a banned terrorist organisation and the triggering of a response from public safety authorities.
The Court placed particular emphasis on the consequences of issuing a false threat of terrorism. It observed that the seriousness of such conduct does not depend exclusively on whether the sender intended to carry out the threatened attack. Even when the alleged objective is to implicate another person in a criminal case, the threat may generate public fear, cause disruption and require law enforcement agencies to take precautionary measures. The absence of an intention to execute the threatened violence does not automatically make the alleged conduct harmless.
The Court explained that the public authorities cannot assume that a threat involving an airport or crowded public places is merely a hoax without first assessing its credibility. A failure to respond to a genuine warning could have catastrophic consequences. Consequently, the police must investigate threats of this nature and take appropriate precautions, even when subsequent investigation may reveal that the sender did not intend to carry out the threatened act.
The judgment observed that the alleged wrongdoing extended beyond the personal dispute that may have motivated the accused. According to the prosecution, the petitioner intended to implicate Mohit Kumar by creating fake email accounts in his name. However, by allegedly sending bomb threats against an airport and several shopping malls, the petitioner brought public safety concerns into the matter. The Court considered the fear generated by the communication, the potential disruption to public activity and the diversion of police resources to be important aspects of the alleged conduct.
The Court’s reasoning distinguished between the intention behind a threat and its broader consequences. A person may allegedly issue a threat to settle a personal score or falsely implicate another individual, yet the communication may still require a substantial response from the State. Authorities cannot ignore such a message simply because the alleged sender may not intend to carry out the threatened attack. The consequences of the communication must be assessed in light of the potential danger it appears to present.
This reasoning did not mean that the accused had been found guilty of every offence initially alleged against him. The police had initially registered the case under Section 66F of the Information Technology Act, relating to cyber terrorism. However, after investigation, the charge of cyber terrorism was dropped, and the charge sheet proceeded under Section 351(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita and Section 66D of the Information Technology Act.
The distinction is legally important. Section 66F concerns cyber terrorism and carries specific statutory requirements. Section 66D addresses cheating by personation through a computer resource or communication device, while Section 351(4) of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita concerns anonymous criminal intimidation. The offences ultimately invoked in the charge sheet therefore required examination according to their respective statutory ingredients. The fact that the investigation did not retain the cyber-terrorism charge did not, by itself, eliminate the possibility that the alleged conduct could constitute other criminal offences.
The Court considered whether the material collected during the investigation was sufficient to permit the prosecution to proceed under the provisions invoked in the charge sheet. At the quashing stage, the relevant question was not whether the prosecution had already proved the allegations beyond reasonable doubt. Rather, the Court had to determine whether the proceedings should be terminated at the outset or whether the allegations and supporting material warranted examination at trial.
A central aspect of the judgment concerned the petitioner’s defence that his internet connection was defunct on the date of the alleged incident. The Court regarded this contention as insufficient, by itself, to justify quashing the proceedings. It observed that the assertion was particularly fragile in the context of electronic communications, where an email account is not necessarily confined to one computer, one internet connection or one geographical location.
The Court noted that an email account may potentially be accessed through different devices and networks. Consequently, an allegation that a particular internet connection was not functioning does not necessarily establish that the account could not have been accessed or that the email could not have been transmitted through another means of connectivity. The technical circumstances surrounding the alleged communication would have to be evaluated on the evidence available in the case.
The Court also addressed the petitioner’s complaint to his internet service provider. It held that such a complaint could constitute a circumstance available to the accused in his defence, but it could not automatically be treated as conclusive proof that the alleged emails had not originated from him. The evidentiary value of the complaint, its timing, the condition of the connection and its relationship to the electronic records would have to be considered alongside the other material.
The judgment did not establish that the petitioner’s internet connection was operational or that he had necessarily used another device or network. Those questions remained matters for factual determination. The Court’s point was narrower: the alleged failure of one internet connection did not, without further examination, conclusively disprove the prosecution’s case.
In reaching this conclusion, the High Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Kaptan Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh. The principle drawn from that decision is that a court exercising its jurisdiction to quash criminal proceedings must not conduct a mini-trial or undertake a detailed assessment of disputed evidence. The court must examine the allegations and the material placed before it within the limited scope of the quashing jurisdiction, rather than deciding contested factual questions that properly belong to the trial.
Applying this principle, Justice Nagaprasanna declined to determine whether the petitioner’s internet connection had actually failed, whether the electronic trail conclusively established his involvement or whether his defence would ultimately succeed. Those matters required an assessment of evidence and could not be resolved merely on the basis of the assertions advanced in the petition.
The Court’s approach reflects the established distinction between testing whether a prosecution can legally proceed and deciding whether the accused is guilty. Quashing proceedings at an early stage may be justified where the allegations, even if accepted as stated, do not disclose an offence or where a recognised legal ground for intervention is established. However, where the prosecution material provides a prima facie foundation and the defence depends on disputed facts, the court ordinarily should not terminate the case by weighing competing evidence as though conducting a trial.
The Court also rejected the suggestion that electronic communications should receive less serious treatment because they are transmitted remotely or through digital platforms. It observed that a threat communicated through a keyboard can produce consequences as real as a threat delivered in person. The medium of communication does not necessarily diminish the seriousness of the conduct or the disruption that it may cause.
This observation is particularly relevant to allegations involving impersonation and anonymous electronic threats. Digital platforms may allow communications to be transmitted under assumed identities, but the use of an electronic medium does not provide immunity from criminal investigation. Where a person is alleged to have used fabricated identities to transmit threats, the circumstances must be examined through the applicable criminal law and the evidence collected during investigation.
At the same time, electronic evidence must still be proved and evaluated in accordance with law. The prosecution will have to establish the necessary ingredients of the offences charged, including the accused’s connection to the communications and the relevant elements of criminal intimidation and cheating by personation. The High Court’s refusal to quash the roceedings does not relieve the prosecution