Introduction:

In the case titled Chief Administrative Officer & Another v. Mallappa Basappa Sajjan, Writ Appeal No. 860 of 2025, the Karnataka High Court, in a significant pronouncement, reaffirmed the principle that a conviction for a petty offence cannot be an adequate ground to cancel a candidate’s appointment to a lower-level government post. The division bench comprising Chief Justice Vibhu Bakhru and Justice C.M. Joshi dismissed an appeal filed by the Chief Administrative Officer of the Principal District and Sessions Court, Kolar, which challenged the decision of a single judge who had earlier set aside the cancellation of appointment of a candidate selected for the post of ‘Peon’ in the Judicial Department of Kolar District. The division bench’s judgment, delivered with reliance on the landmark Supreme Court judgment in Avtar Singh v. Union of India and Others (2016) 8 SCC 471, emphasized that employers must assess the gravity of an offence and the timing of the conviction while making employment-related decisions, particularly in cases involving lower posts in the public sector.

Arguments by the Appellants:

The appellants, represented by Senior Advocate Sriranha for Advocate Sumana Naganand, primarily contended that the respondent, Mallappa Basappa Sajjan, had concealed a material fact during the application process, and such concealment alone was sufficient grounds to cancel the appointment. It was submitted that the respondent was convicted under Section 87 of the Karnataka Police Act, 1963, and had paid a fine of ₹300 pursuant to that conviction before the JMFC Court at Muddebihal. According to the appellants, this conviction involved moral turpitude and disqualified the respondent from holding the post of Peon in a judicial office. Moreover, it was stressed that the concealment of the conviction itself was a matter of grave concern that undermined the integrity of the appointment process. The appellants sought to justify the cancellation of the respondent’s appointment through the issuance of an order dated 20.09.2018, wherein the offer of appointment was withdrawn following a police verification report. It was further argued that the question of whether the conviction was for a “petty” offence was immaterial when there had been suppression of material information by the candidate.

Arguments by the Respondent:

The respondent, represented by Advocate Tumbigi Prabhugouda Basavantarayagouda, countered the claims by pointing out that his conviction occurred after he had submitted his application for the post in response to the notification dated 11.11.2011. The respondent argued that since there was no requirement to update the application post-submission and the conviction happened on 28.12.2013, nearly two years after the application process, the question of concealment did not arise. Furthermore, he argued that the conviction under Section 87 of the Karnataka Police Act related to a minor or “petty” offence that did not warrant cancellation of employment. The respondent maintained that the cancellation was arbitrary and violative of his rights, particularly as the post in question—’Peon’—was not of sensitive or high-level administrative nature, and hence, should not attract harsh scrutiny. It was also emphasized that the appellants had failed to specify in their pleadings any assertion that the respondent had misrepresented facts in his application, nor was any evidence provided to support such a contention. Thus, the respondent prayed for the restoration of the appointment offer, which had been wrongly revoked.

Court’s Judgment and Observations:

After considering the rival submissions, the division bench concurred with the view of the learned single judge that a conviction for a petty offence does not automatically justify the cancellation of a public appointment, particularly when the role is non-sensitive in nature. The Court referred to the appellants’ initial stand, noting that their objections did not highlight the cancellation of the respondent’s appointment as being due to concealment of conviction. Rather, it was premised on the conviction itself being seen as disqualifying. Crucially, the bench highlighted that the conviction took place on 28.12.2013, while the application was submitted in response to a notification dated 11.11.2011. This chronological detail was vital in disproving the allegation of suppression of information, as no concealment could be attributed to a future event that had not occurred at the time of application. The court observed that “there is no material on record to support the contention that the respondent’s appointment was cancelled on account of non-disclosure of his conviction.” Consequently, the appellants could not retrospectively penalize the respondent for an act that occurred post-application and before formal appointment.

Further, the Court referred extensively to the Supreme Court’s ruling in Avtar Singh v. Union of India, which laid down the distinction between appointment to higher/sensitive positions versus lower-grade jobs. The apex court had ruled that while strict scrutiny may be justified in higher-level jobs involving trust and public interface, for lower-level appointments such as peons or group-D staff, a more humane and lenient approach should be adopted, especially in cases involving minor or petty offences. In light of these principles, the Karnataka High Court held that the respondent’s conviction under Section 87 of the KP Act, which attracts a fine of ₹300 and does not carry significant implications of moral turpitude, could not be a basis to terminate his offer of appointment.

Moreover, the division bench took note of the appellants’ failure to provide consistent or legally tenable grounds for the cancellation of the appointment. It found that the entire premise of the appeal lacked legal merit and failed to meet the test of proportionality. The Court reiterated that for any cancellation of appointment, the employer must clearly demonstrate that the candidate either misrepresented facts or was otherwise legally disqualified, which was not the case here. The Court therefore upheld the single judge’s earlier order that had set aside the cancellation of the respondent’s appointment and restored his candidacy for the post of Peon.

The appeal was thus dismissed in its entirety, and the Court concluded that there were no justifiable grounds to interfere with the impugned judgment. It reinforced the principle that administrative decisions affecting livelihoods must be guided by fairness, proportionality, and contextual understanding of the candidate’s background, particularly when involving minor offences.