Introduction:
In the landmark decision rendered in In Reference Vs. Memo No.454/2024 Bhopal Dated 23/11/2024, Misc. Criminal Case No.1133/2025, the Madhya Pradesh High Court, through Justice Sanjay Dwivedi, settled the jurisdictional conflict between the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015, and the National Investigation Agency Act, 2008, in cases involving juveniles accused of committing serious offences under Scheduled Acts such as the Explosive Substances Act and the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA). The Court held that the non-obstante clause in Section 1(4) of the Juvenile Justice Act overrides the provisions of the NIA Act. It declared that when a juvenile has been directed to be tried as an adult by the Children’s Court under Section 18(3) of the JJ Act, the jurisdiction vests exclusively in the Children’s Court and not the Special Court under the NIA Act, thereby affirming the primacy of child-centric rehabilitative justice over the rigid frameworks of national security legislation when a minor is involved.
Arguments of Both Sides:
The matter arose from a reference made to the Madhya Pradesh High Court to determine whether the trial of a juvenile, who was less than 18 years of age at the time of the alleged incident involving offences under the Explosives Substances Act and the UAPA, should be conducted by a Children’s Court or a Special Court constituted under the NIA Act. The FIR was initially registered by the National Investigation Agency and was pending before the Special Judge designated under the NIA Act. However, the accused had filed an application asserting his status as a juvenile on the date of the incident. Upon inquiry, it was determined that although he was 17 years old at the time, he was mentally and physically competent to understand the consequences of his actions, leading the Juvenile Justice Board to transfer the case under Section 18(3) of the JJ Act to a Children’s Court notified under the Commissions for Protection of Child Rights Act.
The complication arose from the fact that while the State Government had notified a Sessions Court as a Children’s Court for such matters, the same court was not a notified Special Court under the NIA Act. This triggered a jurisdictional dilemma. The reference was made seeking clarity on whether the Children’s Court had jurisdiction to try the case or whether it lay exclusively with the Special Court designated under the NIA Act.
Appearing for the NIA, Special Public Prosecutor Advocate Deepesh Joshi argued forcefully that the NIA Act, 2008, is a special legislation with a clear mandate regarding the prosecution of offences that threaten national security, including those under the UAPA and Explosives Substances Act. He submitted that Section 11 of the NIA Act empowers the Central Government to constitute Special Courts in consultation with the Chief Justice of the High Court to try scheduled offences. Furthermore, he relied on Section 13 of the NIA Act, which begins with a non-obstante clause and mandates that, not with standing anything in the Code of Criminal Procedure, every scheduled offence investigated by the NIA shall be tried only by a designated Special Court. He emphasised the seriousness of scheduled offences and the national interest they represent, arguing that juveniles tried for such crimes must also be tried in the same rigorous judicial framework to preserve the sanctity and seriousness of the law. The argument leaned heavily on the exclusivity of the NIA’s domain and the specialised nature of the Special Courts constituted under it.
On the contrary, Amicus Curiae Senior Advocate Anil Khare, assisted by Advocate A.J. Mathew, submitted that the Juvenile Justice Act is not only a special legislation itself but also a welfare legislation that takes precedence in all matters relating to children in conflict with law. He referred to Section 1(4) of the JJ Act, which includes a non-obstante clause that the Act shall apply to all matters concerning children in conflict with law, including apprehension, detention, prosecution, penalty or imprisonment, rehabilitation, and social re-integration. He asserted that the JJ Act was later enacted with a clear legislative intent to safeguard the best interests of children, irrespective of the offences involved. Therefore, once it was determined that the accused was a juvenile and the case had been transferred under Section 18(3) for trial as an adult to a Children’s Court, the jurisdiction of any other court stood ousted. He emphasised that the Children’s Court, though a Sessions Court, when acting under the JJ Act, derives exclusive jurisdiction to try the juvenile and no other court, not even a Special Court under the NIA Act, can usurp that jurisdiction.
Judgement:
Justice Sanjay Dwivedi, after carefully examining the submissions and the legal landscape, leaned into the jurisprudence surrounding non-obstante clauses and welfare legislation. The Court referred to the classic dictum in Union of India v. G.M. Kokil (1984), where the Supreme Court held that a non-obstante clause is employed to give overriding effect to the section it introduces, neutralising the effect of any conflicting law. The High Court noted that Section 1(4) of the JJ Act provides a broad, overriding clause that applies not only over the Code of Criminal Procedure but over all other laws “for the time being in force,” a phrasing wide enough to encompass the NIA Act. In contrast, Section 13 of the NIA Act only overrides the provisions of the CrPC and does not explicitly override any other special enactment, such as the JJ Act. Thus, when a conflict arises between the two, the JJ Act must prevail.
Justice Dwivedi highlighted that the purpose of the JJ Act is to ensure that children, even if involved in serious offences, are dealt with in a manner consistent with their developmental needs, emphasising reform and reintegration rather than retribution. This is a significant departure from the framework of the NIA Act, which focuses on national security and deterrence. The Court stated that while national interest is paramount, it cannot override the constitutional and legislative safeguards accorded to children in conflict with the law, especially when the legislature has spoken in unequivocal terms through the JJ Act, 2015.
Importantly, the Court noted that the Children’s Court, as envisaged under Section 25 of the Commission for Protection of Child Rights Act, operates not merely as another criminal court but as a specialised forum imbued with the spirit and objective of juvenile justice. The procedural safeguards, including assessment of mental and physical capacity under Section 15 and the specific trial provisions under Section 19 of the JJ Act, are designed to preserve the balance between justice and reform. Once the Juvenile Justice Board had determined that the accused was to be tried as an adult, the only competent forum was the Children’s Court, not a Special Court under the NIA Act.
In resolving the reference, the High Court decisively held that in cases where a juvenile is found to be involved in offences under scheduled Acts of the NIA and is to be tried as an adult, the jurisdiction would solely lie with the Children’s Court designated under the JJ Act. The NIA Act cannot displace the authority of the JJ framework in such instances. The verdict carries a strong reaffirmation of the principle that juvenile justice is a separate legal regime that must operate autonomously, even in the face of grave offences.
This judgment assumes considerable significance, especially in an age where juveniles are increasingly being alleged to participate in serious offences, including those under anti-terror laws. It draws a clear line that despite the gravity of the crime, the identity of the accused as a child at the time of the offence invokes a different procedural and jurisdictional mechanism, one which is geared toward protection and rehabilitation.
Justice Dwivedi’s ruling is thus not only consistent with the legislative scheme and constitutional principles under Article 15(3) and Article 39(e) & (f) of the Directive Principles of State Policy but also represents a compassionate interpretation of the law that balances the concerns of national security with the rights of children. By emphasising that the language of the non-obstante clause in the JJ Act is wider and specifically designed to override any conflicting statute, the Court has laid down a jurisprudential precedent that will govern future cases involving juveniles accused of serious offences.
The Court also noted that while the NIA Act and JJ Act may both be special statutes, the difference lies in the subject matter and intent. While one serves the interest of the State, the other serves the interest of the child. In a conflict, the latter must prevail where the individual is a minor. This principle ensures that the constitutional ethos of child protection is not lost even in the most challenging circumstances.