Introduction:
A significant and somewhat unusual judicial development unfolded before the Allahabad High Court, where a division bench delivered a split opinion while hearing a writ petition that raised questions not only about administrative overreach but also about the broader functioning of human rights institutions in India. The case, Teachers Association Madaris Arabia v. National Human Rights Commission & Others, arose from an order issued by the National Human Rights Commission (NHRC) in February 2025, directing the Economic Offences Wing (EOW) to conduct an inquiry into allegations concerning 558 aided madrasas in the State of Uttar Pradesh.
The petitioner, Teachers Association Madaris Arabia, challenged the NHRC’s directive as being beyond its statutory jurisdiction, contending that the Commission had ventured into an area not properly within its mandate. The matter thus brought into focus the scope of powers exercised by the NHRC under the Protection of Human Rights Act, 1993, and whether such powers extend to ordering investigative inquiries into institutional functioning in the absence of clear human rights violations.
The bench comprised Justice Atul Sreedharan and Justice Vivek Saran. While both judges agreed on granting interim relief and issuing notice to the NHRC, they diverged sharply in their reasoning and observations regarding the conduct and priorities of human rights bodies. Justice Sreedharan made strong remarks suggesting that the NHRC and even the Uttar Pradesh State Human Rights Commission were selectively intervening in matters while allegedly ignoring more pressing concerns such as mob violence, lynching incidents, and harassment of interfaith couples. Justice Saran, however, expressed clear disagreement with these sweeping observations, emphasizing the need for judicial restraint, especially in the absence of representation from the affected parties.
This divergence transformed what could have been a routine jurisdictional dispute into a broader constitutional conversation about institutional accountability, judicial propriety, and the delicate balance between critique and adjudication within the framework of writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner, Teachers Association Madaris Arabia, primarily argued that the NHRC had acted beyond the limits of its statutory authority by directing an inquiry into allegations against a large number of aided madrasas. According to the petitioner, the Commission’s role is confined to addressing violations of human rights, particularly those involving state action or negligence. It was contended that the direction to the Economic Offences Wing to conduct a wide-ranging inquiry into financial or administrative irregularities did not fall within the domain of human rights enforcement, and therefore constituted an instance of jurisdictional overreach.
The petitioner further argued that the NHRC’s intervention had the potential to stigmatize educational institutions catering to minority communities without adequate basis. It was suggested that such actions could have a chilling effect on the functioning of madrasas and might lead to unwarranted scrutiny driven by generalized allegations rather than concrete evidence. The association maintained that regulatory and financial oversight of educational institutions falls within the competence of other statutory authorities, and not the NHRC.
Another significant dimension of the petitioner’s argument, as reflected in the observations recorded by Justice Sreedharan, was the perceived inconsistency in the NHRC’s exercise of its suo motu powers. It was pointed out that while the Commission had been proactive in directing inquiries into madrasa-related allegations, there appeared to be a lack of similar urgency in addressing incidents involving mob violence, lynching, or harassment of interfaith couples. The petitioner implied that such selective intervention undermines the credibility of human rights institutions and raises concerns about equal protection under the law.
On the other side, although the NHRC was not represented at the time of hearing, the position of the respondents, including the State, can be understood in light of the statutory framework governing the Commission. It is generally maintained that the NHRC possesses wide-ranging powers to inquire into matters where human rights concerns may be implicated, including situations where institutional practices might indirectly affect the rights of individuals. From this perspective, the direction to the Economic Offences Wing could be seen as part of a broader effort to ensure accountability and transparency in institutions receiving state aid.
The respondents would likely argue that the NHRC’s mandate is not narrowly confined to instances of direct physical harm or state excesses, but extends to systemic issues that may affect the dignity and rights of individuals. In this sense, allegations concerning irregularities in educational institutions could potentially have human rights implications, particularly if they impact access to education, equality, or non-discrimination.
However, the absence of the NHRC’s representation during the hearing became a central issue in the proceedings. Justice Vivek Saran emphasized that any adverse observations regarding the functioning of the Commission ought not to be made without affording it an opportunity to present its case. He underscored the principle of natural justice, which requires that no party should be condemned unheard, especially when judicial remarks could have institutional implications.
Justice Saran also noted that the petitioner itself had sought an adjournment and was not actively pressing the matter at that stage. In such circumstances, he questioned the propriety of making extensive observations on issues that went beyond the immediate scope of the writ petition. According to him, while a writ court possesses wide powers, those powers must be exercised with caution, particularly when dealing with matters involving public institutions and sensitive social issues.
Court’s Judgment:
The division bench of the Allahabad High Court delivered a split opinion, reflecting two distinct judicial approaches to the issues raised in the case. While there was consensus on certain procedural aspects, the judges differed significantly in their reasoning and observations.
Justice Atul Sreedharan adopted a critical stance towards the functioning of the NHRC and similar bodies. At the outset, he questioned the jurisdictional basis of the Commission’s directive to the Economic Offences Wing, suggesting that it amounted to an overreach into areas not directly connected with human rights violations. He appeared to take the view that the NHRC’s mandate should be exercised with restraint and should focus on core issues involving protection of fundamental rights and human dignity.
More strikingly, Justice Sreedharan used the occasion to comment on what he perceived as a pattern of selective intervention by human rights bodies. He expressed concern that while the NHRC was actively engaging in matters such as inquiries into madrasas, it had not demonstrated similar initiative in cases involving mob violence, lynching of members of minority communities, or harassment of individuals in interfaith relationships. He remarked that there were no instances before him where the NHRC or the Uttar Pradesh State Human Rights Commission had taken suo motu cognizance of such incidents.
These observations were framed as a critique of institutional priorities, suggesting that human rights bodies must act consistently and without discrimination in addressing violations. Justice Sreedharan highlighted the importance of ensuring that ordinary citizens, including those in interfaith relationships, are able to exercise their freedoms without fear or intimidation. His remarks underscored the broader constitutional values of equality, liberty, and secularism.
However, Justice Vivek Saran took a markedly different view regarding the propriety of such observations. While he did not necessarily engage with the substance of the allegations concerning the NHRC’s functioning, he focused on the procedural and institutional aspects of the case. He emphasized that the NHRC was not represented before the Court, and therefore, making adverse or sweeping observations about its conduct would be contrary to the principles of natural justice.
Justice Saran observed that even though a writ court has the authority to pass orders in the absence of a party, such power must be exercised judiciously, particularly when the order involves criticism of an institution. He stressed that fairness requires that all affected parties be given an opportunity to be heard before any conclusions are drawn about their conduct or functioning.
He also noted that the petitioner had sought an adjournment and was not actively arguing the case at that stage. In his view, this made it even more inappropriate to enter into a detailed examination of issues that were not fully argued or supported by submissions from all sides. Justice Saran cautioned against the tendency to expand the scope of proceedings beyond what is necessary for deciding the matter at hand.
Despite these differences, both judges agreed on the operative part of the order. The bench decided to issue notice to the NHRC and to extend the interim stay on the Commission’s February 2025 order directing the inquiry into the madrasas. This ensured that the status quo would be maintained until the matter is heard in detail with proper representation from all parties.
The split in reasoning highlights an important tension within judicial decision-making: the balance between addressing broader systemic concerns and adhering to procedural discipline. On one hand, courts play a vital role in holding institutions accountable and drawing attention to issues of public importance. On the other hand, they must do so within the confines of established legal principles, including fairness, restraint, and adherence to the issues directly before them.
The case thus remains pending for further consideration, with the final outcome likely to depend on a more comprehensive hearing involving all stakeholders. In the meantime, the interim order preserves the position of the petitioner while allowing the NHRC an opportunity to justify its actions.