Introduction:
The Jharkhand High Court, in Bharat Pathak @ Bharat Kumar Pathak v. State of Jharkhand and Others (W.P.(S) No. 1833 of 2026), delivered a significant judgment reinforcing two well-established principles of service jurisprudence: first, that a disciplinary authority cannot impose punishment on the basis of allegations that never formed part of the charge-sheet, and second, that adultery, following the Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, is no longer a criminal offence and cannot be mechanically invoked as a ground for imposing the severest departmental punishment. Setting aside the dismissal of a Jharkhand Armed Police constable, the Court held that the disciplinary proceedings suffered from serious procedural irregularities, violated the principles of natural justice, and culminated in arbitrary and disproportionate punishment.
The case was decided by a Single Judge Bench of Justice Deepak Roshan while exercising writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court was called upon to examine the legality of the petitioner’s dismissal from service as well as the appellate order affirming that punishment. The judgment highlights the necessity of fairness in disciplinary proceedings and reiterates that constitutional guarantees under Articles 14 and 21 extend equally to public servants facing departmental action.
The petitioner joined the Jharkhand Armed Police as a constable in 2007 and served in the force for several years. The controversy arose after a married woman lodged a complaint alleging that despite both of them being married and having children, the petitioner had married her and maintained a physical relationship with her from October 2019 to April 2023. She further alleged that after promising to keep her as his wife, the petitioner eventually refused to do so. Based on these allegations, a preliminary enquiry was initiated by the department. Simultaneously, criminal proceedings were also set in motion, resulting in the registration of an FIR under Sections 417 and 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code.
Following the preliminary enquiry, departmental proceedings were initiated under the relevant provisions of the Police Manual. The disciplinary authority ultimately invoked Rule 824(b) of the Police Manual and imposed the extreme penalty of removal from service. The petitioner’s departmental appeal also failed, compelling him to approach the High Court.
The writ petition presented important questions concerning the scope of disciplinary jurisdiction, adherence to natural justice, the evidentiary standards applicable in departmental proceedings, the distinction between criminal allegations and departmental misconduct, and the continued relevance of allegations of adultery after the Supreme Court’s decision in Joseph Shine v. Union of India. The judgment therefore assumes significance not only for police disciplinary proceedings but also for service law generally, particularly where disciplinary authorities rely upon allegations involving personal relationships and moral conduct.
Arguments of the Parties:
On behalf of the petitioner, learned counsel challenged the dismissal order on several legal and procedural grounds. The principal submission was that the disciplinary authority had imposed punishment on a charge that was never framed against the petitioner in the departmental proceedings. According to the petitioner, the charge-sheet alleged that he had maintained a relationship with a married woman despite being married himself and that such conduct amounted to indiscipline and tarnished the image of the police force. However, the dismissal order was ultimately founded upon the registration of an FIR alleging offences under Section 376(2)(n) IPC, which had never formed part of the departmental charge-sheet.
It was argued that this amounted to a complete departure from the charges that the petitioner had been called upon to answer. Since no opportunity had been afforded to defend himself against this new allegation within the departmental enquiry, the punishment stood vitiated for violating the settled principles of natural justice. Counsel submitted that service jurisprudence consistently recognizes that no employee can be punished on allegations which were never included in the memorandum of charges.
The petitioner further contended that both the enquiry report and the orders passed by the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority were non-speaking in nature. It was submitted that neither authority meaningfully considered the petitioner’s defence nor recorded independent reasons while arriving at their conclusions. Instead, they merely reproduced the allegations and mechanically imposed the severest punishment without discussing the evidence on record.
The petitioner also questioned the evidentiary basis of the departmental proceedings. It was argued that the enquiry suffered from glaring deficiencies because there was virtually no independent material corroborating the complainant’s allegations. Counsel pointed out that there was no documentary evidence proving any marriage between the petitioner and the complainant, no hotel records or CCTV footage substantiating the alleged relationship, and no evidence demonstrating that the petitioner had ever resided in the rented accommodation allegedly shared with the complainant.
Relying upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, the petitioner submitted that adultery ceased to be a criminal offence after Section 497 IPC was declared unconstitutional. Consequently, allegations of an adulterous relationship could not automatically justify dismissal from service, particularly when the disciplinary proceedings themselves suffered from serious procedural defects.
It was further argued that the complaint itself had been lodged by a disgruntled individual after the relationship allegedly deteriorated. Therefore, the authorities ought to have examined the allegations with greater caution rather than treating them as conclusive proof of misconduct.
The State authorities defended the departmental action by contending that the petitioner’s conduct was wholly inconsistent with the discipline expected from a member of the police force. According to the respondents, maintaining an illicit relationship with a married woman while being married himself brought disrepute to the police department and constituted misconduct warranting disciplinary action.
The respondents maintained that departmental proceedings are distinct from criminal prosecutions and that strict rules of evidence applicable to criminal trials do not govern departmental enquiries. They argued that the material collected during the preliminary enquiry sufficiently established conduct unbecoming of a disciplined police officer.
The State also relied upon the registration of the criminal case to justify the seriousness of the allegations against the petitioner. According to the respondents, the disciplinary authority acted within its powers under Rule 824(b) of the Police Manual in concluding that the petitioner’s conduct justified removal from service.
The respondents further defended the appellate order by submitting that the appellate authority had independently examined the matter before affirming the punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority. It was argued that no interference was warranted in exercise of the High Court’s writ jurisdiction since departmental authorities enjoy considerable discretion in maintaining discipline within uniformed services.
Court’s Judgment:
After examining the entire record, Justice Deepak Roshan found substantial merit in the petitioner’s challenge and held that the disciplinary proceedings suffered from serious legal infirmities which rendered the dismissal unsustainable.
The Court first examined the departmental charge-sheet and compared it with the reasoning contained in the dismissal order. It found that the charge framed against the petitioner alleged that he had maintained a relationship with a married woman despite being married himself, thereby committing indiscipline and lowering the image of the police department. However, while imposing punishment, the disciplinary authority primarily relied upon the registration of an FIR under Section 376(2)(n) IPC—a circumstance that had never formed part of the charge-sheet.
The Court held that this constituted a fundamental violation of service jurisprudence. Reiterating a settled principle of disciplinary law, the Bench observed that an employee can be punished only on the basis of charges specifically framed against him. Any punishment founded upon allegations outside the charge-sheet deprives the delinquent employee of an effective opportunity to defend himself and therefore violates the principles of natural justice.
The Court emphasized that a charge-sheet serves a crucial purpose in disciplinary proceedings. It informs the employee of the precise allegations requiring explanation and enables him to prepare an appropriate defence. Once the disciplinary authority travels beyond those charges while imposing punishment, the entire proceedings become legally unsustainable.
The High Court further found that both the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority had failed to discharge their statutory obligations by passing reasoned orders. The dismissal order merely reproduced conclusions without analysing the petitioner’s defence or discussing the evidence objectively. Similarly, the appellate authority failed to independently examine the legality of the disciplinary proceedings and mechanically affirmed the punishment.
The Court observed that reasoned or speaking orders constitute an indispensable requirement of fair administrative decision-making. Recording reasons not only demonstrates application of mind but also enables judicial review by ensuring transparency and accountability. Orders affecting valuable civil rights such as public employment cannot rest upon vague conclusions unsupported by proper reasoning.
A detailed scrutiny of the departmental enquiry revealed several deficiencies in the evidentiary foundation of the charges. The Court noted that apart from the complainant’s own statement, no independent material had been produced to substantiate the allegations. The enquiry itself acknowledged that there was no documentary proof establishing the alleged marriage between the petitioner and the complainant.
The Court further noted that despite allegations regarding the parties staying together in hotels and residing in rented accommodation, no CCTV footage, hotel records, tenancy documents or independent witnesses had been examined. Even the enquiry report recorded that no evidence had been produced to establish these crucial allegations. These findings significantly weakened the evidentiary basis upon which the disciplinary authority proceeded.
Despite these acknowledged shortcomings, the disciplinary authority imposed the harshest possible penalty of removal from service. The High Court held that such an approach reflected non-application of mind and failure to appreciate the actual evidentiary record.
The Court also examined the impact of the Supreme Court’s landmark judgment in Joseph Shine v. Union of India, wherein Section 497 IPC criminalising adultery was declared unconstitutional. Referring to the principles laid down therein, the High Court observed that adultery is no longer recognised as a criminal offence in Indian law. The Court specifically noted that the Supreme Court had held that criminalising adultery could not be justified as a beneficial legislation under Article 15(3) of the Constitution.
While recognising that departmental misconduct and criminal offences operate in different spheres, the High Court nevertheless held that the respondents could not mechanically treat allegations of an adulterous relationship as constituting moral turpitude warranting dismissal from service. The authorities were required to independently assess whether the alleged conduct actually amounted to misconduct under the applicable service rules and whether the evidence adequately established such misconduct.
The Court found that no such independent assessment had been undertaken. Instead, the authorities appeared to have proceeded on the assumption that the allegations themselves justified dismissal without examining the legal implications flowing from the decision in Joseph Shine.
Another important aspect considered by the Court was the surrounding circumstances of the complaint itself. The Bench observed that the complaint had been lodged by a person who appeared to be aggrieved following the breakdown of the relationship. While the Court refrained from expressing any opinion on the truthfulness of the allegations pending criminal proceedings, it held that the disciplinary authorities were nevertheless required to examine the evidence with greater care rather than accepting the allegations at face value.
The Court also criticised the casual invocation of the expression “moral turpitude.” It observed that the concept cannot be mechanically applied to every allegation involving personal relationships. Whether particular conduct amounts to moral turpitude requires careful judicial and administrative evaluation based upon the applicable statutory provisions, factual circumstances and governing legal principles. Mere use of the expression cannot substitute reasoned decision-making.
The High Court ultimately concluded that the disciplinary proceedings stood vitiated by multiple defects. The punishment had been imposed on grounds never included in the charge-sheet, thereby violating natural justice. The enquiry itself lacked adequate evidentiary support. Both the disciplinary authority and the appellate authority failed to pass speaking orders. The respondents also ignored the legal consequences of the Supreme Court’s decision in Joseph Shine while treating allegations of adultery as sufficient justification for removal from service.
Considering the cumulative effect of these infirmities, the Court held that the impugned orders were arbitrary, disproportionate and violative of Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution. The constitutional guarantee of fairness extends to disciplinary proceedings, and any action affecting an employee’s livelihood must conform to the requirements of due process, reasoned decision-making and substantive fairness.
Accordingly, the High Court quashed the dismissal order, the consequential order implementing the punishment, and the appellate order affirming the disciplinary action.
The judgment serves as an important reaffirmation of fundamental principles governing disciplinary proceedings in public employment. It reiterates that departmental authorities must strictly confine themselves to the charges framed in the charge-sheet, provide meaningful consideration to the employee’s defence, base their conclusions upon reliable evidence, and record cogent reasons for their decisions. Equally significant is the Court’s reminder that after Joseph Shine, allegations of adultery cannot be treated as criminal misconduct, nor can concepts such as moral turpitude be invoked mechanically without careful legal analysis. The ruling strengthens procedural safeguards in service law while emphasizing that constitutional guarantees of fairness, equality and due process remain central to every disciplinary proceeding, regardless of the nature of the employment.