Introduction:
The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh has permitted the medical termination of pregnancy of a minor sexual-assault survivor even though the pregnancy had advanced beyond the twenty-four-week limit specified under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971. In Minor Victim X Through Father v. Union Territory of J&K and Others, a Bench of Justice Sanjay Parihar held that the statutory limit does not extinguish the constitutional jurisdiction of a High Court to grant relief in exceptional circumstances.
The case arose from a writ petition filed by the father of a minor girl who had become pregnant following an alleged sexual assault. An FIR had been registered at Police Station Uri. The pregnancy was reported to have progressed beyond twenty-six weeks, placing the request outside the ordinary statutory period applicable to the relevant categories under the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003.
The petition raised a difficult question at the intersection of reproductive autonomy, the health and welfare of a minor, and the statutory framework regulating termination of pregnancy. The Court had to consider whether the absence of an express statutory route for termination beyond twenty-four weeks necessarily prevented a constitutional court from granting permission, even where the pregnant minor did not wish to continue the pregnancy and medical advice indicated that termination could be undertaken subject to safeguards.
The Court answered that question in the negative. It emphasised that legislation may codify part of a constitutional remedy without exhausting the powers of a constitutional court. Where the statutory provisions do not cover the circumstances before it, the Court must still consider whether constitutional relief is warranted, having regard to the affected person’s circumstances, wishes, health and welfare.
The decision was also informed by the medical assessment placed before the Court. A Medical Board examined the victim and recorded that she was conscious and oriented, with regular fetal heart sounds. It advised that termination could be considered after transfusion of two to three units of packed red blood cells, if clinically indicated. The Court therefore had to balance the seriousness of the medical procedure at an advanced stage of pregnancy against the physical and psychological consequences of compelling a minor survivor to continue an unwanted pregnancy.
The High Court ultimately issued a writ of mandamus directing the authorities to take the necessary steps for termination at the earliest, subject to the minor’s medical fitness and the precautions recommended by the Medical Board. The ruling did not treat the statutory limit as irrelevant; rather, it held that the limit could not, by itself, foreclose constitutional consideration of an exceptional case involving a minor and an alleged sexual-assault survivor.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner approached the High Court through the victim’s father, seeking permission for immediate medical termination of the pregnancy. The central basis of the request was that the girl was a minor who had become pregnant as a result of the alleged sexual assault and was unable to bear the physical and psychological distress associated with continuing the pregnancy.
The petitioner’s case, as reflected in the material before the Court, was that the pregnancy had advanced beyond twenty-six weeks and that the victim did not wish to continue it. Her young age and the circumstances in which the pregnancy had occurred were significant to the request. The petitioner sought judicial intervention because the ordinary statutory period under the MTP framework had been crossed, notwithstanding the victim’s status as a minor and survivor of sexual assault.
The medical assessment became an important part of the petitioner’s case. The Medical Board recorded the presence of fetal heart sounds and described the victim as conscious and oriented. At the same time, it considered termination medically possible subject to preparation and clinical safeguards, including transfusion of packed red blood cells as required. The report therefore did not simply rule out the procedure because of the gestational age. It identified conditions under which the treating specialists could proceed.
The investigation and child-protection measures also formed part of the factual background. The Investigating Officer reported that, after the victim’s statement was recorded under Section 183 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, offences under Sections 3 and 4 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012, were found to be made out against the accused, who was identified as a juvenile. An application was moved before the Juvenile Justice Board for permission to collect DNA samples from the victim and the accused.
The victim was also produced before the Child Welfare Committee, Baramulla, for appropriate protection, care and intervention. The Committee counselled the victim and her family about the need for urgent medical attention and suitable legal and psychological support. These steps reflected the wider protective framework engaged by the case, beyond the immediate question of pregnancy termination.
The State’s position must be understood from the material provided with the case summary. The summary does not set out detailed submissions made by the respondents or record a separate argument opposing termination. It would therefore be inaccurate to attribute to the State a specific objection that is not reported. The statutory position itself, however, presented a legal issue for the Court: Rule 3-B of the MTP Rules identifies categories of women eligible for termination up to twenty-four weeks, and the medical report placed the pregnancy at approximately twenty-four to twenty-six weeks.
The Court considered this statutory framework alongside the medical report and the victim’s circumstances. The matter was not decided on the basis of a reported adversarial argument that the State had advanced against the petition. Instead, the Court examined whether the statutory threshold prevented it from granting constitutional relief and whether the medical evidence and the victim’s expressed wishes justified such relief in the particular circumstances.
Court’s Judgment:
Justice Sanjay Parihar began by examining the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, read with the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Rules, 2003. Rule 3-B specifies categories of women who may be eligible for termination up to twenty-four weeks, including survivors of sexual assault, rape or incest, and minors.
The Court noted that the victim fell within categories expressly recognised by Rule 3-B. However, the medical report described the uterine size as corresponding approximately to twenty-four to twenty-six weeks of gestation. The pregnancy had, therefore, reached or crossed the statutory threshold applicable to those categories. This meant that the request could not be resolved merely by applying Rule 3-B as though the pregnancy remained within the prescribed period.
The Court’s analysis turned on the distinction between the limits of a statutory scheme and the constitutional jurisdiction of a High Court. It reiterated that a person’s inability to obtain relief within the four corners of a statute does not automatically mean that constitutional relief is unavailable. The statute may codify part of a constitutional remedy, but it does not necessarily exhaust the remedies that a constitutional court can grant.
The Court expressed the principle in direct terms: “A lack of remedy under a statute does not bar a constitutional remedy.” It then asked whether a constitutional court should deny relief simply because the case falls outside the express terms of the statute. The Court held that it should not. Instead, the constitutional court must assess the facts and circumstances from the perspective of the person seeking termination and who is willing to undertake the medical risk, rather than compelling that person to carry the pregnancy to term and give birth to an unwanted child.
This reasoning placed the pregnant minor’s circumstances at the centre of the constitutional inquiry. The Court did not treat the gestational limit as a reason to stop examining the case. It considered the victim’s age, the alleged sexual assault, her unwillingness to continue the pregnancy, the advanced gestational stage and the medical advice on the feasibility of termination.
The Court also referred to the practical reality that a request for termination may arise after the statutory period for various reasons. It observed that, in cases involving unwanted pregnancy, the decision to seek termination may be made beyond the period prescribed under the MTP Act. In such circumstances, constitutional courts must examine the circumstances affecting the welfare of the pregnant woman rather than treating the statutory time limit as conclusive in every case.
The Court’s approach was especially significant because the petitioner was a minor. The judgment recognised that compelling a child to continue a pregnancy arising from an alleged sexual assault could prolong the consequences of the offence and expose her to further physical, emotional and psychological distress. The Court therefore considered the welfare and autonomy of the pregnant minor as central to deciding whether exceptional constitutional relief was justified.
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Parihar relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in S v. Union of India, SLP No. 14454/2026. As noted by the High Court, the Supreme Court had reiterated that a court should not compel a woman—and, with particular force, a minor child—to carry a pregnancy to full term against her express wishes. Such compulsion, the Court observed, would disregard decisional autonomy and could expose the pregnant person to serious mental, emotional and physical trauma.
The principle was not applied as an automatic rule that every request beyond twenty-four weeks must be allowed. Rather, the Court used it to explain why a constitutional court must consider the individual circumstances instead of treating the statutory threshold as an absolute bar to judicial examination. The medical risks remained relevant, but they had to be weighed against the consequences of requiring the minor to continue the pregnancy against her wishes.
The High Court also referred to a decision of a Coordinate Bench in Ms. X (Minor) v. Union Territory of J&K. In that matter, permission had been granted for termination of a minor victim’s pregnancy even though it had advanced to approximately thirty weeks. The Coordinate Bench had observed that a woman, whether married or unmarried, has a right to seek termination of an unwanted pregnancy, and that courts had in appropriate cases permitted termination beyond twenty-four weeks despite the absence of an express statutory provision authorising it.
That precedent reinforced the proposition that the statutory limit does not necessarily determine the outer boundary of constitutional jurisdiction. It also demonstrated that courts have previously considered requests involving pregnancies beyond twenty-four weeks, particularly where the circumstances called for an individual assessment of the pregnant person’s welfare and rights.
The medical report was a crucial consideration in the present case. The Board found the victim conscious and oriented and recorded regular fetal heart sounds. It also advised that termination could be undertaken after transfusion of two to three units of packed red blood cells, as clinically indicated. The Court treated this advice as evidence that termination was medically feasible subject to the safeguards identified by the Board and the assessment of the treating specialists.
The Court did not direct that the procedure be carried out regardless of medical condition. Its order expressly preserved the requirement that the victim be medically fit for the procedure and that the Medical Board’s recommendations and precautions be followed. This qualification reflected the need to respect the victim’s request while ensuring that the procedure was undertaken with appropriate clinical care.
The Court also considered the consequences of refusing relief. It observed that the victim had unequivocally expressed her unwillingness to continue the pregnancy and that the Medical Board had found termination feasible, subject to stipulated safeguards. In those circumstances, denying the request would compel her to endure the consequences of the alleged sexual assault for the remainder of the pregnancy and potentially for years thereafter.
The judgment thus connected the constitutional principle to the concrete circumstances before it. The question was not simply whether the pregnancy had crossed twenty-four weeks. It was whether that statutory fact, by itself, could justify requiring a minor sexual-assault survivor to continue an unwanted pregnancy when the medical assessment did not rule out termination and identified conditions for proceeding safely.
The Court concluded that the statutory threshold could not be used to deny constitutional relief in the circumstances. It allowed the writ petition and issued a writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to take all necessary steps for medical termination of the minor victim’s pregnancy, notwithstanding that the gestational age had crossed twenty-four weeks.
The Court specifically directed the Principal/Medical Superintendent of the Associated Hospital, Government Medical College, Baramulla, to ensure that the procedure was undertaken at the earliest. That direction was made subject to the victim’s medical fitness, as assessed by the treating specialists, and strict compliance with the recommendations and precautions stipulated by the Medical Board.
The decision is therefore an exercise of constitutional jurisdiction in an exceptional case, rather than a general amendment of the statutory gestational limit. The High Court did not hold that Rule 3-B’s twenty-four-week period had no legal significance. It held that where the statute does not provide a remedy in the circumstances presented, a constitutional court must still consider whether relief is required, taking into account the pregnant person’s wishes, welfare, medical condition and the risks of compelling continuation of the pregnancy.
For a minor who became pregnant following an alleged sexual assault, the Court found that the balance of circumstances warranted intervention. The order allowed termination beyond the statutory threshold while requiring the hospital to proceed only after the treating specialists assessed the victim’s medical fitness and in accordance with the Medical Board’s safeguards. The ruling underscores that constitutional protection cannot be reduced to a mechanical application of statutory limits when the welfare, autonomy and health of a vulnerable minor are directly at stake.