Introduction:
In the case of Amanullah Khan v. Union of India & Ors, the Jammu and Kashmir and Ladakh High Court recently rendered a significant verdict that fortifies the rights of individuals affected by land acquisition for infrastructure development, even if they are not the landowners. The judgment, delivered by Justice Sanjay Dhar and cited as 2025 LiveLaw (JKL) 193, addressed the concerns of Amanullah Khan, a brick kiln operator, whose unit was rendered inoperative due to the widening of the Batote-Doda National Highway (NH-1B). The petitioner, though not the owner of the land, had leased it lawfully, obtained all necessary licenses and environmental clearances, and had operated a brick kiln from 1998 to 2008. The widening of the national highway in 2008, under the aegis of the Border Roads Organisation (BRO), allegedly destroyed major parts of his kiln, especially the approach road, thereby paralysing its operations despite the license being valid till 2009. Despite repeated representations to the authorities since 2008, the petitioner received no compensation for the extensive damage. This legal action culminated in a writ petition before the High Court, wherein the issues of locus standi, liability for damages, and the validity of a supplementary award under land acquisition law were rigorously debated.
Arguments of the Petitioner and Respondents:
The petitioner, Amanullah Khan, asserted that his brick kiln, established on leased land with due compliance to legal requirements, was extensively damaged during the widening of NH-1 B. He emphasised that despite holding a valid license and pollution clearance certificate, his unit was rendered inoperable due to the destruction of its essential components, including its access road, caused by the construction activity. Khan further noted that official inspections by revenue authorities corroborated his claims, acknowledging that portions of his kiln, including superstructures and machinery, were encroached upon or damaged due to the road development. These inspections, he contended, were never legally challenged by the BRO, and therefore, their findings were binding and undisputed. He challenged the inaction of the Collector, Land Acquisition (CLA), and the refusal of the BRO to accept responsibility or provide compensation. According to the petitioner, since the damage occurred due to a state infrastructure project, he was entitled to compensation, irrespective of his ownership status over the land.
The respondents, particularly the Border Roads Organisation (BRO), mounted a multi-pronged defence. Firstly, they contested the petitioner’s locus standi, arguing that as a lessee, Khan had no right to compensation typically reserved for landowners. Secondly, the BRO denied causing any damage, stating that the brick kiln was located outside the 61-feet road width acquired for the highway project. They dismissed the petitioner’s claims as unsubstantiated and insisted that no part of the kiln fell within the acquired land or was affected by the project. Moreover, they invoked the doctrine of functus officii, asserting that once the Collector had issued an award under the Land Acquisition Act, he was legally incapacitated from passing any supplementary or further awards. Finally, the BRO sought to shift the responsibility to the Public Works Department (PWD), arguing that since the highway had subsequently been handed over to the PWD, any compensation or remedial measures were outside the BRO’s purview.
Court’s Judgment:
The High Court, presided over by Justice Sanjay Dhar, undertook a meticulous analysis of the facts, statutory provisions, and relevant case law to arrive at its judgment. The Court rejected the BRO’s claim that the petitioner lacked locus standi merely because he was a lessee. Citing jurisprudence, the Court emphasised that compensation under land acquisition law is not exclusively reserved for landowners. Any individual who suffers damage or loss due to an acquisition process, particularly one with lawful possession and operations like the petitioner, is entitled to just compensation.
The Court also found the BRO’s denial of damage unconvincing. It underscored the fact that multiple inspections had been conducted by competent revenue officers, which established that part of the kiln, including structures and access paths, was affected by the highway expansion. These joint reports had not been contested through any formal legal channel. As such, the Court held that the BRO could not unilaterally repudiate the findings of these inspection reports without following due legal process.
Addressing the contention regarding the CLA’s authority to issue a supplementary award, the Court categorically held that such powers exist and are supported by precedent. Referring to the Supreme Court’s decision in Mohanji v. State of UP and a Division Bench ruling in Divisional Commissioner v. Ghulam Nabi Bhat, Justice Dhar affirmed that supplementary awards can be legitimately made to address components like trees, structures, and machinery that were either missed or inadequately addressed in the original award. He clarified that issuance of the primary award does not preclude the authorities from awarding additional compensation where warranted.
Crucially, the Court also rebuffed the BRO’s attempt to evade liability by asserting that the road had been transferred to the PWD. Justice Dhar observed that the damage in question occurred during the BRO’s project execution phase. Since the process of land acquisition, planning, and construction was initiated by the BRO, it remained responsible for addressing any claims arising from that phase, including compensation for affected parties. The Court declared that BRO could not wash its hands of its legal obligations simply by transferring ownership or management of the road to another authority.
The High Court directed the Collector, Land Acquisition, to initiate fresh proceedings to assess the extent of loss suffered by the petitioner and determine appropriate compensation. The Court emphasised that this process should be completed within six months from the date the judgment is made available to the parties. The ruling underscored the principle that governmental agencies engaged in infrastructure development must remain accountable for all consequential damages inflicted upon private entities and individuals, particularly when such damages are verified through formal administrative procedures.
The judgment stands as a reiteration of the legal right to be compensated for indirect yet tangible losses incurred due to land acquisition, including the destruction of livelihood-related infrastructure and superstructures. It is a significant reaffirmation of the constitutional and statutory protections extended to lessees, small operators, and others indirectly affected by state actions.