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The Legal Affair

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The Legal Affair

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Habeas Corpus Cannot Override Child Welfare Committee’s Protective Custody Order: Punjab and Haryana High Court

Habeas Corpus Cannot Override Child Welfare Committee’s Protective Custody Order: Punjab and Haryana High Court

Introduction:

The Punjab and Haryana High Court has held that a writ of habeas corpus cannot ordinarily be issued to secure the release of a minor placed in a Children Home pursuant to an order passed by a competent Child Welfare Committee (CWC), unless the order is shown to be without jurisdiction, wholly illegal or otherwise legally unsustainable. The Court emphasised that the statutory framework governing the protection of children must be respected and that a minor’s expressed preference to live with a particular person cannot, by itself, override the safeguards enacted for the child’s welfare.

Justice Manisha Batra made the observation while dismissing a habeas corpus petition filed by a woman seeking custody of a 17-year-old girl and her infant daughter, who had been placed in a Children Home at Gandhi Vanita Ashram, Jalandhar, under an order of the CWC. The petitioner was the mother of a man facing trial for offences under Section 64 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (BNS), and Section 6 of the Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (POCSO Act), in connection with the alleged sexual assault of the minor.

The petitioner claimed that her son and the girl had fallen in love and married against the wishes of the girl’s parents. A daughter was born from their relationship. However, following a complaint lodged by the girl’s father, an FIR was registered in August 2025. During the investigation, offences under Section 64 BNS and Section 6 of the POCSO Act were subsequently added.

According to the State, the girl was recovered from the company of the accused in February 2026, when she was approximately 16 years and three months old, along with her two-month-old child. Her age was determined with reference to her school records. At the time of the High Court proceedings, she was approximately 17 years and five months old.

Since the girl was unwilling to return to her parents, the CWC passed an order dated March 2, 2026, directing that she and her infant daughter be placed in the Children Home at Gandhi Vanita Ashram, Jalandhar. The criminal proceedings against the accused had progressed: he was on bail, the police report had been filed, and charges had been framed.

When the minor was produced before the High Court, she expressed her wish to live with the petitioner, whom she described as her mother-in-law. Relying upon this preference, the petitioner sought her release from the Children Home, contending that the girl should not be kept in an institutional facility against her wishes.

The High Court, however, examined the matter not merely as a dispute over the minor’s preferred place of residence but within the statutory framework of the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2015 (JJ Act), and the POCSO Act. These enactments provide protective mechanisms for children who have suffered abuse and empower the CWC to make decisions concerning their care, protection and rehabilitation.

The Court considered the jurisdiction and powers of the CWC under Sections 27 and 37 of the JJ Act, the definition of a child in need of care and protection under Section 2(14), and the statutory obligation under Section 19(6) of the POCSO Act to report cases involving sexual offences against children to the CWC. It also examined the appellate remedy under Section 101 of the JJ Act.

An important question before the Court was whether habeas corpus could be invoked against a placement order passed by a competent CWC, particularly when the petitioner had neither placed the CWC order on record nor challenged it through the statutory appellate mechanism. The Court was also required to determine whether handing over the minor to the mother of the accused would serve her best interests, especially when the criminal trial was pending and the girl was a material witness.

Ultimately, the High Court held that the minor’s expressed preference could not be considered in isolation from her safety, welfare and the circumstances of the pending criminal proceedings. It dismissed the petition while preserving the liberty of the petitioner or the girl to approach the CWC for review or pursue the statutory appeal.

Arguments of the Parties:

Advocate Ashok Kumar Khunger, appearing for the petitioner, sought the release of the minor girl and her infant daughter from the Children Home. The petitioner’s case was that her son and the girl had fallen in love and had married against the wishes of the girl’s parents. According to the petitioner, the girl had willingly chosen to live with her son and had subsequently given birth to their daughter.

Counsel submitted that the girl had consistently expressed her desire to reside in her matrimonial home and had communicated the same preference before both the CWC and the High Court. It was argued that her wishes should be given due importance while deciding where she should live.

The petitioner contended that a minor girl could not be confined in a Nari Niketan or Children Home against her wishes, particularly when she had clearly stated that she wanted to live with her mother-in-law. According to the petitioner, continued institutional placement despite the girl’s expressed preference was unjustified.

Reliance was placed on earlier decisions of the Punjab and Haryana High Court, including Preeti v. State of Haryana and Chhalo Rani v. State of Punjab. The petitioner argued that in comparable circumstances, the High Court had permitted minor girls to reside with their mothers-in-law or in their matrimonial homes after considering their wishes.

The petitioner therefore urged the Court to follow the approach adopted in those cases and direct that custody of the girl and her infant daughter be handed over to her.

The State, represented by Additional Advocate General Sakshi Bakshi, opposed the petition and defended the CWC’s placement order.

The State submitted that the order dated March 2, 2026, had been passed by a competent statutory authority exercising powers under the JJ Act. The CWC was empowered to assess the circumstances of children requiring care and protection and to determine an appropriate placement in accordance with their welfare.

It was further argued that the petitioner was neither the natural guardian nor the de facto guardian of the minor. Her relationship with the accused through the alleged marriage did not automatically confer an enforceable legal right to claim custody of the girl or her infant child.

The State also disputed the assertion that a legally established marriage existed between the girl and the accused. It was submitted that no documentary evidence demonstrating that the marriage had been solemnised had emerged during the investigation.

A significant objection concerned the pending criminal proceedings. The State pointed out that the accused was facing trial under Section 64 BNS and Section 6 of the POCSO Act and that the girl was the most material witness in the case. The charges had already been framed, and the trial was at a crucial stage.

According to the State, handing over the girl to the mother of the accused could expose her to influence or pressure, potentially affecting her ability to depose freely and the fairness of the criminal trial. The State maintained that the apprehension was particularly relevant because the petitioner was closely connected with the accused, who was on bail and residing in the same locality.

The State therefore contended that the minor’s expressed preference could not be the sole consideration when deciding her placement. Her safety, welfare, the circumstances of the alleged offence and the possibility of interference with the pending trial had to be considered together.

The competing submissions required the High Court to balance the minor’s expressed wishes against the statutory responsibility of the CWC to protect children who have allegedly suffered sexual abuse. The Court also had to decide whether the petitioner’s request could be entertained through habeas corpus without first challenging the underlying order through the statutory remedies provided under the JJ Act.

Court’s Judgment:

The Punjab and Haryana High Court dismissed the habeas corpus petition, holding that the minor’s placement in the Children Home pursuant to an order of the CWC did not constitute illegal detention warranting the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.

Justice Manisha Batra held that the CWC was a competent statutory authority empowered to pass protective orders concerning children in need of care and protection. Unless its order was demonstrated to be without jurisdiction, wholly illegal or otherwise legally unsustainable, the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus could not be used simply to secure a different placement for the minor.

The Court also found that handing over the girl to the petitioner would not serve her best interests, particularly because the petitioner was the mother of the accused facing trial for offences arising out of the alleged sexual relationship with the minor.

Habeas corpus against an order of the Child Welfare Committee

The High Court first examined the legal nature and powers of the CWC under the JJ Act.

Section 27 of the JJ Act provides for the constitution of a Child Welfare Committee in every district. The Committee functions as a Bench and exercises the powers conferred upon it by the Act in relation to children in need of care and protection. Its statutory role includes examining the circumstances of such children and passing appropriate orders concerning their care, protection, treatment, development and rehabilitation.

The Court explained that the CWC is not an ordinary private body or an informal administrative authority. It is a statutory institution entrusted with specific responsibilities under the child protection framework.

A child who has suffered sexual abuse may fall within the definition of a “child in need of care and protection” under Section 2(14) of the JJ Act. The Court also considered Section 19(6) of the POCSO Act, which requires that cases involving sexual offences against children be reported to the CWC so that appropriate protective measures may be considered.

Section 37 of the JJ Act empowers the CWC to pass orders after inquiry concerning the care and protection of a child. Depending on the circumstances and the child’s needs, such orders may include placement in a Children Home or another appropriate facility.

The Court observed that where a child is placed in a Children Home under an order passed by the CWC in exercise of its statutory jurisdiction, the resulting custody cannot automatically be characterised as illegal detention.

To explain the limits of habeas corpus jurisdiction, the High Court relied upon the Supreme Court’s decision in Manubhai Ratilal Patel v. State of Gujarat. In that case, the Supreme Court recognised that habeas corpus ordinarily cannot be issued where a person is held in custody pursuant to an order of a competent court, unless the order is without jurisdiction, mechanical in nature or wholly illegal.

The High Court applied the same principle to an order passed by the CWC. Since the Committee exercises statutory powers under the JJ Act, a placement order passed by it cannot be displaced through habeas corpus merely because a relative or another person prefers a different arrangement.

The Court also relied upon the Allahabad High Court Full Bench decision in Km. Rachna v. State of U.P., which held that even an irregular exercise of jurisdiction by a CWC in directing the placement of a victim in a protective home would not, by itself, make the resulting custody illegal for the purpose of habeas corpus.

A further reference was made to the coordinate Bench decision in Harish v. State of Haryana, which supported the legal position concerning the limited scope of habeas corpus in matters involving placement orders passed by child welfare authorities.

Applying these principles, the Court held that the petitioner had not established that the CWC’s order was without jurisdiction or wholly illegal. The minor’s placement had been directed by a statutory authority under the child protection legislation, and the petitioner could not secure her release merely by relying upon the girl’s preference to live with her.

Failure to challenge the CWC order through the prescribed remedy

The High Court also took note of the manner in which the petition had been filed.

The petitioner had not placed the CWC’s order dated March 2, 2026, on record. Nor had she sought to have that order quashed through the habeas corpus petition.

The Court further observed that the petitioner had not availed herself of the statutory appellate remedy available under Section 101 of the JJ Act.

Section 101 provides an appeal mechanism against specified orders passed by the CWC and other authorities under the Act. The existence of this statutory remedy was relevant because the petitioner was effectively seeking to challenge the decision placing the minor in the Children Home.

The Court rejected the suggestion that the non-supply of a copy of the CWC order, by itself, rendered the girl’s custody illegal. The absence of a copy did not automatically invalidate an order passed by a competent statutory authority or convert the placement into unlawful detention.

The appropriate course was to seek a copy of the order and pursue the remedies available under the JJ Act, rather than invoke habeas corpus without demonstrating the jurisdictional or legal defect necessary to justify such intervention.

The Court’s reasoning therefore distinguished between a challenge to the merits of a CWC placement decision and a case of unlawful detention. A person who disagrees with the placement ordered by the Committee must ordinarily use the statutory process, unless the order suffers from a fundamental illegality that brings the case within the scope of habeas corpus.

Best interests of the child must remain paramount

Apart from the maintainability of the petition, the High Court independently examined whether handing over the minor to the petitioner would serve her welfare.

The Court emphasised that the child’s wishes are relevant when the CWC considers a placement under Section 37 of the JJ Act. However, those wishes are not the only factor that determines the appropriate arrangement.

The Social Investigation Report, the child’s circumstances and the overall welfare assessment must also be considered. Section 3 of the JJ Act lays down fundamental principles governing the implementation of the legislation, including the principle that the best interests of the child must remain paramount in every decision concerning the child.

The Court therefore held that the minor’s preference to reside with the petitioner could not be treated as decisive by itself.

It observed:

“the wish of a minor cannot, by itself, override the statutory scheme framed for her own protection.”

The Court considered the relationship between the petitioner and the accused particularly significant. The petitioner was the mother of the man facing trial under Section 64 BNS and Section 6 of the POCSO Act. The accused was on bail and resided in the same locality.

In these circumstances, handing over the girl to the petitioner would effectively place her back within the family of the accused.

The Court was also mindful that the girl was the central witness in the pending criminal proceedings. The charges had been framed, and the trial was at the threshold. The State had expressed apprehension that placing the girl in the accused’s family could expose her to influence or pressure before she testified.

The High Court considered this concern legitimate in the circumstances and observed that the apprehension that the girl could be influenced “cannot be said to be unfounded.”

The Court was not required to conclude that the petitioner would necessarily attempt to influence the girl. The relevant consideration was whether the proposed placement would create a risk to the child’s independent participation in the criminal proceedings and whether such an arrangement was consistent with her protection and welfare.

The Court accordingly found that the proposed transfer of custody would not serve the minor’s best interests.

Alleged marriage does not remove the protection available under child welfare laws

The petitioner had also relied upon the alleged marriage between her son and the minor girl. Her case was that the two had fallen in love, married against the wishes of the girl’s parents and had a child together.

The High Court found that no document had been produced to establish that the alleged marriage had been solemnised.

More importantly, the Court clarified that even assuming such a marriage had taken place, it would not remove the minor from the protective framework of the JJ Act and the POCSO Act.

The Court observed:

“a claimed marriage does not take a child out of the protective scheme of the JJ Act and the POCSO Act.”

This observation reflects the distinction between a claimed marital relationship and the statutory protection available to a person who was below eighteen years of age at the relevant time.

The fact that a minor may describe another person as her husband or express a desire to live with his family does not automatically displace the responsibilities imposed upon the CWC under child protection legislation.

The petitioner also did not acquire an enforceable right to custody merely because she was described by the girl as her mother-in-law. Any decision to place the child with a fit person or facility must follow the inquiry and assessment contemplated by the JJ Act.

The Court therefore rejected the argument that the alleged marriage, by itself, justified handing over the minor to the petitioner’s custody.

Distinguishing Preeti and Chhalo Rani

The High Court also examined the earlier decisions relied upon by the petitioner, particularly Preeti v. State of Haryana and Chhalo Rani v. State of Punjab.

It held that those decisions could not be applied mechanically to the facts of the present case because the factual and legal circumstances were materially different.

In Preeti, the case did not involve an offence under the POCSO Act. The boy concerned was approximately eighteen years old, and a marriage was prima facie shown. The circumstances were therefore different from those before the Court, where the accused was approximately 37 years old and faced charges under Section 64 BNS and Section 6 of the POCSO Act.

In Chhalo Rani, the proceedings involved an offence under Section 8 of the POCSO Act. The Court noted that a marriage had prima facie been established in that matter and that the circumstances did not involve the same combination of a pending trial, the framing of charges and the apprehension that the victim could be influenced before giving evidence.

The High Court also considered the condition imposed in Chhalo Rani, restraining the accused from consummating the marriage until the girl attained majority. It held that such a condition would be meaningless in the present case because the alleged cohabitation itself formed the subject matter of the criminal charges.

The Court further observed that neither Preeti nor Chhalo Rani had considered the maintainability of a habeas corpus petition against a CWC placement order in light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Manubhai Ratilal Patel, or the statutory appellate remedy available under Section 101 of the JJ Act.

The Court also distinguished Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab, in which it had been held that a minor could not be detained in a Nari Niketan against her wishes. That decision predated both the POCSO Act and the JJ Act, 2015. The later statutory framework provides a specific mechanism for assessing he circumstances of children requiring care and protection and for deciding thei