Introduction:

The Gujarat High Court has reiterated an important principle governing the exercise of constitutional jurisdiction in criminal matters: a person cannot ordinarily approach the High Court directly under Article 226 of the Constitution of India seeking the registration of a First Information Report (FIR) when an effective alternative remedy is available under the applicable criminal procedure law. Emphasising the statutory mechanism established under the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (BNSS), the Court held that the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court should not be invoked before the complainant has exhausted the remedies specifically provided by law.

Justice J.C. Doshi dismissed a writ petition seeking directions to the police to register a criminal case against a former president of Gayatri Nagar Society. The petitioner alleged that the former office-bearer had illegally occupied a common plot belonging to the society. The dispute raised questions concerning the limits of the High Court’s writ jurisdiction, the procedural safeguards governing the registration of FIRs, and the obligation of a complainant to follow the statutory process before seeking constitutional intervention.

The petitioner approached the High Court seeking police action against the former president over the alleged unauthorised possession of the society’s common plot. The grievance essentially concerned the alleged failure of the police machinery to initiate criminal proceedings despite the allegations of wrongdoing. The petitioner sought judicial intervention to secure the registration of an FIR and thereby set the criminal law in motion.

However, the central question before the High Court was not merely whether the allegations concerning the common plot warranted investigation. The Court had to consider whether a writ petition under Article 226 was the appropriate remedy at that stage, particularly when the BNSS provides a prescribed course of action for a person whose request for registration of an FIR is not acted upon by the police.

Article 226 empowers High Courts to issue appropriate writs, directions and orders for the enforcement of fundamental rights and, where appropriate, for other legal purposes. This constitutional power is broad and serves as an important safeguard against arbitrary action, unlawful inaction and the failure of public authorities to discharge their statutory duties. Nevertheless, the existence of this power does not mean that every grievance involving a public authority must immediately be entertained through a writ petition.

The principle of an alternative statutory remedy plays a significant role in determining whether the High Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction in a particular case. Where the legislature has provided a clear and effective procedure for addressing a grievance, courts ordinarily expect the affected person to follow that procedure before seeking constitutional intervention. This approach respects the statutory framework, prevents unnecessary judicial intervention at an early stage and ensures that the authorities entrusted with specific responsibilities are given an opportunity to perform their duties.

Under the BNSS, a complainant who alleges that a police station has refused to register information concerning a cognisable offence is not left without a remedy. The law provides a sequential mechanism through which the complainant may approach a senior police officer and, if the grievance remains unresolved, seek appropriate directions from the jurisdictional Magistrate. These remedies are intended to address police inaction through established legal channels.

The Gujarat High Court relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage and Others (2016), along with the High Court ruling in Sujal Vishwas Attawar v. State of Maharashtra (2026). These decisions reinforce the principle that a complainant should ordinarily pursue the remedies available under criminal procedure before invoking the High Court’s writ jurisdiction for the registration of an FIR.

The Court also considered whether the petitioner had established any special circumstances that justified bypassing the statutory process. Finding no sufficient basis for such exceptional intervention, Justice Doshi concluded that the petition was premature and dismissed it. The decision underscores that constitutional remedies remain available where legally justified, but their exercise must be considered in the context of the remedies and procedures established by the legislature.

Arguments of the Parties:

The petitioner’s case was founded on the allegation that a former president of Gayatri Nagar Society had illegally occupied a common plot allegedly belonging to the society. According to the grievance raised before the High Court, the alleged occupation warranted criminal action, and the police ought to have registered an FIR and proceeded in accordance with law. The petition therefore sought a judicial direction requiring the police authorities to take the necessary steps to initiate criminal proceedings against the former office-bearer.

From the petitioner’s perspective, the alleged unauthorised occupation of a common plot was not merely a disagreement concerning the management of society property. The grievance was presented as conduct that called for the intervention of law-enforcement authorities. Where a complainant believes that an offence has been committed but the police do not take the requested action, approaching the High Court may appear to be a means of obtaining an enforceable direction and preventing the complaint from remaining unattended.

The petitioner’s request also implicated the broader legal principle that public authorities must discharge their statutory obligations. The power to investigate alleged criminal conduct cannot be exercised arbitrarily, and complaints concerning cognisable offences must be dealt with in accordance with the applicable legal framework. A person who approaches a constitutional court in such circumstances may seek to ensure that an allegation is considered by the competent authorities rather than being ignored.

However, the fact that a complainant seeks police action does not, by itself, establish that the High Court must issue a direction for FIR registration. The complainant must also satisfy the legal requirements governing the particular remedy invoked. In this case, the critical issue was whether the petitioner could seek immediate intervention under Article 226 without first pursuing the statutory remedies available under the BNSS.

The petitioner would have needed to demonstrate why the ordinary procedure was insufficient in the circumstances or why the case involved exceptional considerations warranting direct intervention by the High Court. Such circumstances may, depending on the facts and applicable law, include a demonstrable failure of the prescribed mechanism, a serious legal infirmity or another recognised ground for departing from the ordinary rule of exhausting alternative remedies. The Court, however, found that the petition did not establish the special circumstances necessary to justify bypassing the statutory process.

The respondent side, in substance, had the benefit of the objection that the petition was premature because the BNSS already provided an effective procedure for addressing an alleged refusal by the police to register an FIR. The precise submissions of the respondents are not set out in the available case summary; accordingly, the argument against immediate writ intervention is best understood through the legal principles on which the Court relied rather than attributed to any particular oral submission.

The principal legal objection was that Article 226 should not ordinarily be used as the first avenue for obtaining an FIR when the complainant has not exhausted the remedies prescribed by criminal procedure. The BNSS establishes a structured course of action intended to ensure that a complaint is first considered within the police hierarchy and, where necessary, brought before a judicial authority empowered to grant appropriate relief.

Under this approach, the complainant may first approach the Superintendent of Police or the competent senior police authority in accordance with the applicable statutory provision if the officer in charge of the police station refuses to record the information. If the grievance persists, the complainant may approach the jurisdictional Magistrate and seek the appropriate order under the BNSS. The availability of this procedure is significant because it provides a legal avenue for challenging police inaction without requiring immediate recourse to the High Court’s extraordinary constitutional jurisdiction.

The respondents’ position, viewed in the context of the Court’s reasoning, was therefore supported by the principle that statutory remedies should ordinarily be exhausted before constitutional jurisdiction is invoked. The existence of an allegation against a public authority does not automatically make a writ petition maintainable. Nor does an assertion that the police have failed to act necessarily justify bypassing the procedure specifically designed to address such failure.

The reliance on Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe was particularly relevant to this issue. The Supreme Court had emphasised that a person aggrieved by the police’s failure to register an FIR should ordinarily avail themselves of the remedies available under criminal procedure, including approaching the senior police officer and thereafter the Magistrate. The decision reflects a judicial preference for using the statutory framework before seeking direct intervention from a constitutional court.

The reliance on Sujal Vishwas Attawar further supported the proposition that the High Court is not automatically required to entertain a writ petition merely because a complainant alleges negligence or inaction by a statutory authority. Where the law provides a complete and efficacious remedy, the complainant must ordinarily pursue it before invoking extraordinary jurisdiction.

The dispute, therefore, involved two competing considerations. On one side was the petitioner’s request for police intervention in relation to the alleged illegal occupation of society property. On the other was the requirement that such a request be pursued through the procedural remedies established under the BNSS before the High Court is asked to intervene. The Court resolved this issue by prioritising the statutory mechanism, while leaving the petitioner to pursue the remedies available under law.

Court’s Judgment:

Justice J.C. Doshi of the Gujarat High Court dismissed the writ petition on the ground that it was premature and did not warrant the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution. The Court’s decision rested primarily on the availability of an effective alternative remedy under the BNSS and the petitioner’s failure to demonstrate exceptional circumstances justifying direct intervention by the High Court.

The Court’s approach reflects the distinction between the existence of constitutional jurisdiction and the circumstances in which that jurisdiction should ordinarily be exercised. Article 226 gives High Courts extensive powers to protect legal rights and ensure that public authorities act within the limits of the law. Nevertheless, the exercise of those powers is guided by settled judicial principles, including the rule that an effective statutory remedy should ordinarily be exhausted before a writ petition is entertained.

The alternative-remedy rule is not an absolute constitutional prohibition against writ jurisdiction. Rather, it is a well-established principle governing judicial discretion. A High Court may, in an appropriate case, entertain a writ petition despite the existence of another remedy, particularly where recognised exceptions are established. However, a litigant cannot assume that the constitutional court will intervene merely because the complaint concerns alleged inaction by a government authority or another statutory body.

In the present case, the petitioner sought a direction for the registration of an FIR against the former president of Gayatri Nagar Society over the alleged illegal occupation of a common plot. The Court considered the nature of the relief sought alongside the remedies provided under the BNSS. Since the statutory framework contained a procedure for addressing a refusal or failure by the police to register an FIR, the petitioner was expected to follow that process before approaching the High Court.

The Court relied on the Supreme Court’s ruling in Sudhir Bhaskarrao Tambe v. Hemant Yashwant Dhage and Others (2016). The decision is significant because it addresses the appropriate remedy available to a complainant who alleges that the police have failed to register an FIR. The Supreme Court indicated that the complainant should ordinarily approach the senior police authorities and, if the grievance remains unresolved, seek relief before the jurisdictional Magistrate rather than directly approaching the High Court for a writ.

The principle underlying this precedent is that criminal procedure provides its own mechanism for dealing with police inaction. A complainant is not required to begin with constitutional litigation when a statutory route is available. The prescribed process enables the complaint to be considered by the competent authorities and, where necessary, by the Magistrate exercising jurisdiction over the matter.

The Gujarat High Court applied this principle to the petition before it. The mere assertion that the police had failed to register an FIR did not establish that Article 226 should be invoked immediately. Instead, the Court examined whether the complainant had exhausted the statutory remedies available under the BNSS and whether any exceptional circumstances justified departing from the ordinary procedure.

The Court also placed reliance on the Gujarat High Court’s ruling in Sujal Vishwas Attawar v. State of Maharashtra (2026). The principle emerging from that ruling is that the High Court is not bound to entertain a writ petition simply because allegations of negligence or inaction have been made against a statutory authority. The availability of a complete and effective statutory remedy ordinarily requires the complainant to pursue that remedy before invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of the constitutional court.

The reasoning in Sujal Vishwas Attawar also emphasises the sequential nature of the remedies available under the BNSS. A complainant who alleges that the officer in charge of a police station has refused to register an FIR can approach the Superintendent of Police or the competent senior police authority. If the matter is not adequately addressed, the complainant may then approach the jurisdictional Magistrate for appropriate relief under the statutory framework.

This sequence is important because it preserves the respective roles of the police hierarchy, the Magistracy and the High Court. The police authorities are responsible for dealing with complaints in accordance with law, while the Magistrate provides judicial oversight through the powers conferred by criminal procedure. The High Court’s extraordinary jurisdiction remains available where its intervention is legally warranted, but it is not ordinarily intended to replace these established remedies at the outset.

The Court’s reliance on these precedents also demonstrates that the rule requiring exhaustion of alternative remedies is not confined to civil or administrative disputes. It has particular relevance in cases seeking directions for FIR registration, because criminal procedure expressly provides mechanisms for addressing allegations that the police have failed to act on information concerning a cognisable offence.

The BNSS, which replaced the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, retains a structured approach to complaints involving the refusal to record information about an alleged cognisable offence. Section 173 deals with information relating to cognisable offences, including the prescribed process for recording such information. Under Section 173(4), where an officer in charge of a police station refuses to record the information, the aggrieved person may send the substance of that information in writing and by post to the Superintendent of Police concerned. If the matter remains unresolved, Section 175(3) provides a mechanism for approaching the Magistrate empowered to take cognisance, subject to the statutory requirements governing such an application.

These provisions are central to understanding the High Court’s reasoning. The law does not leave a complainant entirely dependent on the discretion of the officer at the police station. Instead, it establishes further steps that may be taken when the initial complaint does not result in the expected action. By following these steps, a complainant can seek consideration of the grievance through the prescribed legal process.

The statutory scheme also helps distinguish between a complaint that has not yet been pursued through the available remedies and one in which those remedies have been exhausted or have proved ineffective. In the former situation, direct recourse to the High Court may be premature. In the latter, the circumstances may require a different assessment, depending on the nature of the grievance, the conduct of the authorities and the relief sought.

In the present matter, Justice Doshi observed that the petitioner had failed to establish any special circumstances warranting the exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226. The Court was not persuaded that the existence of the alleged police inaction, by itself, justified bypassing the remedies provided under the BNSS. The absence of a sufficient basis for exceptional intervention meant that the petition could not be entertained at that stage.

This aspect of the decision is important because it clarifies that allegations of official inaction and the maintainability of a writ petition are separate questions. A complainant may have a genuine grievance, but the existence of a grievance does not automatically determine the procedural route through which relief must be sought. The court must also consider whether the petitioner has complied with the applicable statutory framework and whether the circumstances justify an exception to the rule of alternative remedy.

The decision should not, however, be understood as a determination that the alleged occupation of the common plot was lawful or that the former president of Gayatri Nagar Society was not responsible for any wrongdoing. The High Court dismissed the petition because it was premature in light of the available statutory remedies. The dismissal did not, on the information available, amount to a final adjudication on the truth of the allegations concerning the property or on the criminal liability of the person against whom the complaint was directed.

Equally, the ruling does not mean that a complainant can never approach the High Court in a matter involving the registration of an FIR. Article 226 continues to confer constitutional powers on the High Court, and the existence of an alternative remedy does not extinguish that jurisdiction. The relevant consideration is whether the circumstances justify exercising it despite the availability of the statutory procedure. Where a legally recognised exception is properly established, the High Court may consider whether intervention is appropriate.

The judgment instead reinforces the ordinary rule that a complainant must first make use of the remedies specifically providd by law. This approach prevents constituti