Introduction:

The Gujarat High Court has upheld the acquittal of a man accused of rape by his former live-in partner, observing that a prolonged relationship between two adults, entered into and terminated through mutually executed written agreements, may undermine an allegation that the relationship was founded on a false promise of marriage. The Court emphasised that the circumstances in which the parties began living together, their conduct during the relationship and the terms of the document through which they separated must be examined before criminal liability can be determined.

A Division Bench comprising Justice Ilesh J. Vora and Justice R. T. Vachhani dismissed the woman’s appeal against the trial court’s order of acquittal. The decision, reported as [2026 LiveLaw (Guj) 288], examined whether the parties’ relationship could be characterised as rape on the ground that the man had allegedly promised to marry the woman in order to obtain sexual favours.

The dispute arose from a relationship in which the woman and the accused had decided to live together under a written deed of understanding. The document recorded that she had chosen to reside with him voluntarily and that she could continue doing so for as long as she wished and trusted him. It also stated that she had not been induced or persuaded through any allurement or inducement to enter the arrangement. The parties further contemplated that they would marry by mutual consent after the man attained the legally prescribed marriageable age.

The relationship continued for a considerable period, during which the parties lived together in rented accommodation. According to the Court’s observations, the woman’s parents were aware of the arrangement. The parties subsequently executed another deed on January 29, 2020, recording their decision to live separately. The second document stated that they were pursuing their studies and had decided to end their arrangement voluntarily, without harassment, threats or coercion.

The woman later pursued criminal proceedings against her former partner, alleging that the relationship involved a false promise of marriage and sexual relations without genuine consent. The trial court acquitted the accused. The woman challenged that decision before the Gujarat High Court, bringing into focus the distinction between a relationship that begins with a dishonest intention to deceive and a consensual relationship that subsequently breaks down.

The distinction is important in cases involving allegations of rape on the basis of a false promise of marriage. A promise to marry does not automatically establish criminal liability merely because the relationship ends without marriage. The central question is whether the promise was dishonest from the outset and whether it induced the complainant to engage in sexual relations in circumstances where her consent was legally vitiated.

Consent must also be examined in its proper context. The existence of a romantic relationship, a shared residence or a written agreement cannot by itself conclusively establish consent to every sexual act. Equally, the subsequent failure of a relationship or the absence of a marriage cannot, without more, establish that the relationship was criminal from its inception. Courts must consider the evidence as a whole, including the parties’ conduct and the circumstances surrounding the alleged offence.

In the present case, the High Court attached significance to the two written deeds, the duration of the relationship, the circumstances in which the parties cohabited and the evidence concerning the woman’s decision to reside with the accused. It also considered the fact that the man was 20 years old when the first deed was executed and had not attained the legally prescribed marriageable age for a man.

The Bench nevertheless clarified that the first agreement could not be treated as an enforceable contract compelling the parties to marry. It considered the document legally unenforceable and opposed to public policy, while examining its evidentiary significance in determining the nature of the relationship.

The judgment therefore addressed a complex question at the intersection of criminal law, consent, personal autonomy and the evidentiary value of written agreements between adults. The Court ultimately concluded that the facts did not establish a case of rape founded on a false promise of marriage and dismissed the woman’s appeal, leaving the trial court’s acquittal undisturbed.

Arguments of the Parties:

The available case summary does not reproduce the complete written submissions of the woman, the accused or the State. Their respective positions must therefore be understood from the allegations, the evidence discussed by the Court and the legal issues addressed in the judgment. No unreported submissions or arguments should be attributed to either side as established fact.

The woman’s case, as reflected in the proceedings, was that the relationship had been established on the basis of a promise of marriage and that the accused’s conduct warranted criminal prosecution for rape. Her challenge to the acquittal required the High Court to examine whether the trial court had correctly assessed the evidence and whether the relationship could be treated as consensual despite the allegation that marriage had been promised.

The allegation raised a question familiar to courts dealing with complaints arising from relationships that do not culminate in marriage: whether the promise was a genuine expression of an intention to marry that subsequently failed, or whether it was a dishonest representation made from the very beginning to secure sexual relations. The latter situation may have criminal consequences where the evidence satisfies the applicable legal requirements. A genuine relationship that later deteriorates, however, does not become rape merely because one party had hoped or expected that it would lead to marriage.

From the complainant’s perspective, the existence of a written arrangement contemplating marriage could be relevant to understanding the expectations on which the relationship developed. The document referred to the parties marrying once the man attained the required age, and the relationship continued for a period after it was executed. The issue before the Court was whether this material supported the allegation of a dishonest promise or instead demonstrated that the parties had voluntarily entered into a live-in arrangement.

The High Court also considered the complainant’s allegations against the contents of the later deed. The second agreement recorded that both parties had decided to live separately of their own free will and without harassment or threats. It did not refer to alleged beatings, threats of suicide or forcible sexual intercourse during the period immediately preceding the separation.

The Court further referred to the evidence of the woman’s father and uncle, who acknowledged circumstances indicating that she had gone to stay with the accused voluntarily and that the agreement had subsequently been cancelled. This evidence formed part of the broader assessment of whether the relationship had been characterised by coercion or whether it had been entered into and ended through the parties’ own decisions.

The woman’s appeal consequently required the Bench to assess the significance of the written documents without treating them as automatically decisive. The central issue was whether the evidence, considered collectively, justified interfering with the acquittal and concluding that the relationship had been founded on a fraudulent promise of marriage.

The respondent, who had been acquitted by the trial court, was entitled to rely on the evidence supporting the finding that the relationship had been consensual. The first deed recorded that the woman had agreed to reside with him voluntarily, that she could continue doing so for as long as she wished and trusted him, and that no allurement or inducement had been offered to secure her participation in the arrangement.

The agreement also contemplated that the parties would decide matters concerning their lives independently and would marry by mutual consent after the man attained the prescribed age. The document therefore contained both a record of the woman’s stated willingness to live with the accused and a reference to the possibility of a future marriage.

The respondent’s position, as reflected in the Court’s reasoning, was supported by the fact that the arrangement had continued for several months and that the parties had lived together in rented accommodation. The Court noted that the relationship existed with the knowledge of the woman’s parents. These circumstances were considered relevant to determining whether the relationship had been maintained through coercion or had developed through the voluntary decisions of the two adults.

The subsequent deed, executed on January 29, 2020, provided further evidence for the respondent’s position. It recorded that the parties were pursuing their studies and had mutually decided to live separately without harassment or threats. The Court found that the document was consistent with the evidence indicating that the separation had been voluntary.

The respondent could also rely on the legal distinction between a promise that is dishonest from its inception and an expectation of marriage that does not materialise. A relationship may begin consensually even where the parties hope to marry in the future. If that hope later disappears or the parties decide to separate, the breakdown of the relationship does not by itself establish that the original promise was fraudulent.

Another important aspect was the age of the respondent when the first agreement was executed. He was 20 years old and had not attained the legally prescribed marriageable age for a man. The High Court held that the agreement could not be treated as an enforceable legal commitment to marry. This affected the legal status of the document, although the Court separately considered the circumstances recorded in it when assessing the parties’ conduct.

The State’s precise submissions are not set out in the available summary. It would therefore be inappropriate to suggest that the prosecution advanced particular arguments about the interpretation of the deeds, the legal test for consent or the applicable standard of appellate review unless those submissions are confirmed by the complete record.

Ultimately, the dispute required the High Court to determine whether the trial court’s acquittal was justified in light of the evidence concerning the beginning, continuation and termination of the relationship. The woman’s allegations had to be assessed against the written documents and surrounding circumstances, while the accused’s acquittal could not be displaced merely because the relationship had ended without marriage.

Court’s Judgment:

The Gujarat High Court dismissed the woman’s appeal and upheld the trial court’s acquittal. The Division Bench concluded that the evidence, viewed in its entirety, did not establish that the relationship was the product of a false promise of marriage made with dishonest intent from the beginning.

The Court’s reasoning focused on the nature and duration of the relationship, the parties’ voluntary decision to live together, the terms of the first deed of understanding and the subsequent written agreement through which they decided to separate. Rather than treating the failure to marry as sufficient proof of an offence, the Bench examined whether the evidence demonstrated that the promise of marriage had been fraudulent at the time it was made.

The first deed was central to this assessment. It recorded that the woman had chosen to reside with the respondent voluntarily and that she could continue doing so for as long as she wished and trusted him. It further stated that no allurement or inducement had been offered to persuade her to enter the arrangement. The parties had agreed to make decisions about their lives of their own free will and had contemplated marriage once the respondent reached the legally prescribed marriageable age.

The Bench considered these recitals alongside the fact that the parties had lived together for a considerable period in rented accommodation. The woman’s parents were aware of the arrangement, and the evidence referred to by the Court supported the conclusion that she had gone to live with the respondent voluntarily.

The Court observed that a prolonged relationship between two adults, accompanied by cohabitation and conduct consistent with a voluntary arrangement, may support an inference that the parties chose the relationship with an understanding of its consequences. It considered these circumstances inconsistent with the contention that the entire relationship had necessarily been established through deception and repeated force.

The Bench expressed the view that where two adults enter into a written arrangement declaring their free consent and later terminate that arrangement through another document affirming the absence of coercion, the prosecution’s case that the relationship was throughout based on a false promise of marriage becomes more difficult to sustain. In the Court’s assessment, the later deed lent support to the conclusion that the parties had voluntarily ended their relationship.

However, the evidentiary significance of such documents must be distinguished from their legal enforceability. The High Court made clear that the first deed could not be treated as a legally binding agreement requiring the respondent to marry the complainant. At the time of its execution, the respondent was 20 years old and had not attained the prescribed marriageable age.

The Bench reasoned that a person who has not attained the legally prescribed age for marriage cannot be treated as having entered into an enforceable agreement to marry merely because a document records such an intention. The agreement’s purpose was to contemplate marriage once the respondent reached the required age, but that stipulation did not transform the deed into a legally enforceable contract.

The Court consequently held that the agreement was opposed to public policy and could not be used as a legally binding instrument in the manner suggested by the complainant. It described the document’s probative value as a binding commitment to marry as nil. This finding did not mean that the document was irrelevant to every factual question. Rather, the Court distinguished its inability to create an enforceable obligation to marry from its potential relevance in understanding the circumstances in which the parties had chosen to live together.

That distinction is crucial to understanding the judgment. A document may be legally unenforceable as a contract while still providing evidence of what the parties stated or intended at a particular time. The Court considered the first deed’s recitals of voluntary participation as part of the surrounding circumstances, even while rejecting the idea that it could legally compel a future marriage.

The Bench also attached importance to the second deed, executed on January 29, 2020. The document stated that the parties were pursuing their studies and had decided, of their own free will and without harassment or threats, to live separately.

The Court observed that the document did not record allegations of beatings, threats of suicide or forced sexual intercourse. It considered the deed consistent with the evidence given by the woman’s father and uncle concerning her voluntary decision to stay with the accused and the cancellation of the earlier arrangement.

The timing and contents of the second deed were relevant to the Court’s assessment of the relationship. The document had been executed at the point when the parties were ending their arrangement and provided a contemporaneous record of their stated reasons for separating. The Bench found that this evidence supported the conclusion that the separation was voluntary rather than the result of the coercive circumstances alleged.

Nevertheless, the absence of allegations from a separation agreement cannot, as a universal rule, conclusively disprove an allegation of sexual violence. The evidentiary weight of such an omission depends on the circumstances of the particular case, the reliability of the document and the other evidence available. In the present matter, the Court relied on the deed as one part of a broader assessment that also included the length of the relationship and the surrounding testimony.

The Bench next considered the legal requirements governing allegations of rape based on a false promise of marriage. The central distinction is between a promise made dishonestly from the outset to obtain sexual relations and a relationship in which marriage is contemplated but the parties later separate or fail to marry.

For a promise of marriage to vitiate consent in this context, it is not enough to establish that a marriage did not eventually take place. The evidence must support the allegation that the promise was false when it was made and that the deception had the necessary connection with the complainant’s decision to engage in sexual relations. The precise statutory provisions applicable to an alleged offence depend on the date and circumstances of the alleged conduct.

Applying this distinction, the High Court found that the present case did not demonstrate a dishonest promise at the inception of the relationship. The parties had entered into a written arrangement by mutual consent, lived together for a substantial period and later executed a separate document recording their decision to part ways. The Bench therefore concluded that the circumstances did not bring the case within the category of rape based on a false promise of marriage.

The Court also observed that the complainant had not alleged, in the manner described in the judgment, that the relationship would not have been established at all had there been no promise of marriage. It considered this aspect alongside the respondent’s age at the time of the first deed and the parties’ conduct throughout the relationship.

The judgment further addressed the broader context of contemporary relationships. The Bench noted that adults may choose to enter live-in relationships after considering their personal circumstances, aspirations and preferences. Such relationships may continue for a considerable period, and the parties may subsequently express a wish to formalise their bond through marriage.

The Court cautioned against assuming that the desire to marry necessarily proves that the earlier relationship existed only because of that desire. In a long-standing relationship, the intention to marry may emerge or develop over time without having been the original or exclusive reason for entering the relationship.

The Bench also recognised that individuals, including women who possess financial independence and the ability to make their own decisions, may choose how they wish to organise their personal lives. The observation highlights the importance of respecting adult autonomy and avoiding assumptions that every live-in relationship must be understood as a concealed marriage arrangement or as a relationship dependent entirely on a promise of future marriage.

At the same time, the judgment should not be read as establishing that a woman’s decision to enter a live-in relationship amounts to blanket consent to sexual activity, or that a written agreement can defeat a genuine allegation of rape. Consent must remain specific to the conduct in question, and allegations of sexual violence must be assessed on their evidence. A person can withdraw consent and neither cohabitation nor a prior agreement re