Introduction:

The debate surrounding the Uniform Civil Code (UCC) in India continues to generate intense academic, political, and constitutional discourse, and the judiciary has frequently been called upon to examine the contours of State power in this context. In a significant development, the Gujarat High Court, comprising a Division Bench of Chief Justice Sunita Agarwal and Justice DN Ray, dismissed a Letters Patent Appeal challenging a single bench order that had upheld the validity of a committee constituted by the State Government to examine the necessity and feasibility of implementing the UCC in Gujarat. The appellant, Abdul Vahab Mohammed Shabbir Sopariwala, had questioned the constitution of this committee and the appointment of its members, contending that the State could not form such a body without proper statutory backing or a notified framework. The State, however, invoked its constitutional authority under Article 162, asserting that the formation of committees falls squarely within the executive domain and is not amenable to judicial scrutiny, barring cases of illegality, arbitrariness, or constitutional violation. The Division Bench upheld the single judge’s ruling, reiterating that judicial intervention under Article 226 cannot extend into areas constitutionally reserved for the executive. The judgment underscores a critical constitutional principle: the separation of powers is not a ceremonial doctrine, but a foundational norm essential to maintaining institutional balance within Indian democracy.

Arguments of the Appellant:

The appellant’s principal grievance was premised on the alleged illegality in the formation of the committee responsible for examining the UCC. He argued that the State Government had constituted the committee without any statutory notification or legislative sanction and, therefore, the selection of committee members was arbitrary, opaque, and unconstitutional. According to the appellant, such committees cannot be formed merely through executive fiat, especially in a matter as sensitive as UCC, which affects personal laws, cultural identities, and religious practices across diverse communities. He contended that the State was exceeding its constitutional limits by entering an arena traditionally governed by legislation, thereby bypassing democratic consultative mechanisms. The appellant further submitted that the committee lacked representation of individuals possessing specialized knowledge of personal laws, religious doctrines, and sociocultural practices, rendering the committee’s constitution flawed from inception. He claimed that the single judge, instead of appreciating this illegality, took an unduly narrow view of judicial review by holding that committee formation belongs exclusively to the executive sphere. The appellant insisted that the judiciary ought to intervene when the executive exercises power without procedural safeguards and without disclosure of relevant criteria for selecting committee members. He argued that an unnotified executive order affecting constitutional rights and religious autonomy cannot escape judicial scrutiny simply by invoking Article 162. The appellant thus sought issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the State to reconstitute the committee with experts from diverse cultural and religious backgrounds, ensuring a participatory and inclusive consultative process. Additionally, he urged the Court to restrain the State from taking any preparatory steps towards implementing UCC until such constitutionally compliant reforms were undertaken.

Arguments of the Respondents:

The State of Gujarat, represented by its counsel, defended the committee’s formation by asserting that Article 162 confers broad executive powers, permitting the State to take actions on subjects within its legislative competence unless expressly barred by law. The respondents maintained that the committee was constituted through a legitimate exercise of executive discretion to study, recommend, and examine potential frameworks for UCC implementation—functions that precede the legislative process, not supplant it. They emphasized that the Constitution neither mandates statutory sanction for forming such expert committees nor prescribes any specific mode for their establishment. The respondents rejected the claim that the absence of a notification vitiates the committee’s legality, arguing that procedural formats cannot override substantive constitutional authority. The State drew attention to the doctrinal limits of judicial review, noting that the Courts may scrutinize executive decisions only where they violate constitutional provisions, statutory mandates, or principles of natural justice. Formation of a research or advisory committee—without affecting legal rights or imposing obligations—does not trigger any cause of action that warrants writ jurisdiction. The respondents emphasized that the committee had no power to legislate; its role was merely consultative, and the legislative prerogative would remain exclusively with the State Assembly. Furthermore, the State asserted that the appellant’s grievance was speculative and anticipatory, as no prejudice had been caused to any individual or community by the committee’s formation. The respondents thus argued that interference would undermine the foundational constitutional principle of separation of powers, enabling the judiciary to trespass into executive prerogatives and pre-empt policy evolution without factual injury or legal infringement.

Court’s Judgment:

The Division Bench upheld the reasoning of the single judge and categorically refused to interfere with the formation of the UCC committee. The Court began by examining Article 162 of the Constitution, which defines the scope of State executive power. It held that the State’s authority to constitute committees flows directly from its executive competence, especially where no statutory prohibition exists. The Bench reiterated that judicial review under Article 226 is not an open-ended supervisory jurisdiction permitting courts to sit in appeal over executive decisions, policy formations, or administrative discretion. The judiciary can intervene only where executive action infringes fundamental rights, violates statutory limitations, or is tainted by mala fides. In this case, none of these conditions were met. Addressing the appellant’s contention regarding the lack of notification, the Court observed that such procedural objections do not constitute constitutional violations. A committee tasked merely with recommending policy cannot be equated with a statutory authority exercising coercive powers. The Court emphasized that permitting courts to scrutinize committee membership or procedural modalities would result in judicial encroachment into policy spheres, contravening the doctrine of separation of powers—acknowledged as a basic feature of the Constitution. The Bench further noted that the appellant had not demonstrated any concrete prejudice, nor had he challenged the substantive legality of UCC itself. The prayers sought—such as reconstitution of the committee with selected experts and restraining the State from proceeding further—presupposed judicial authority to micromanage executive action, which the Constitution does not envisage. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the single judge correctly refused to interfere, as committee formation is a pure executive function. The appeal was dismissed, reaffirming the constitutional boundary between judiciary and executive and reiterating that courts cannot preempt or anticipate policy outcomes merely because they generate public debate or ideological disagreement.