Introduction:

In Tathya Pragneshbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (Criminal Revision Application No. 1406 of 2023) and Pragnesh Harshadbhai Patel v. State of Gujarat (Criminal Revision Application No. 1396 of 2023), the Gujarat High Court examined one of the most tragic and widely discussed incidents of 2023—the Iskcon Bridge hit-and-run incident in Ahmedabad which claimed nine lives—while deciding whether the accused, Tathya Patel, and his father, Pragnesh Patel, were entitled to discharge from the charges including Section 304 Part II IPC. The facts as recorded showed that on the night of the accident the applicant, Tathya, was driving his vehicle at an extremely high speed exceeding 130 km/h, and despite explicit requests by co-passengers to slow down, he continued driving rashly.

Arguments:

The prosecution’s case emphasized that the incident was not an ordinary case of negligence but one where the accused had consciously persisted with dangerous high-speed driving, thereby possessing the knowledge that such conduct was likely to cause death, thus attracting the last clause of Section 299 IPC and corresponding liability under Section 304 Part II IPC. The defence, however, sought discharge by arguing that the event was a tragic accident caused without criminal intent or knowledge, that high speed alone cannot constitute culpable homicide not amounting to murder, and that the incident fits squarely within rash and negligent driving punishable only under Sections 279, 337, 338 IPC and provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act.

The defence also argued that the car malfunction report and post-accident dragging distance could not be used to attribute greater culpability, and that the applicant had no Mens Rea necessary to invoke Section 304 Part II. For the father, the defence claimed that he had no role in the incident except arriving at the spot after receiving news of the accident, and thus should not be held liable for any major offence. The State, on the other hand, vehemently opposed the discharge plea by arguing that the evidence collected during investigation—including co-passenger statements, car manufacturer’s telematics report, and CCTV/spot evidence—demonstrated persistent high-speed driving in defiance of warnings, showing not mere negligence but knowledge of fatal consequences. The State emphasized that the car’s speed touching above 130 km/h even five minutes before the accident and dragging almost 40 meters after impact clearly demonstrated the extreme recklessness amounting to culpable homicide under Section 304 Part II. The prosecution also argued that the accused’s conduct before, during, and after the accident must be evaluated, particularly his refusal to heed repeated warnings to slow down, which showed that he consciously disregarded the likely fatal outcome. Concerning the father, the prosecution pointed out his alleged conduct at the spot—quarrelling with bystanders, using abusive language, threatening the gathered people, and forcibly taking his son away—thus making out offences under Sections 504, 506(2), 114 and 118 IPC, but conceded that major charges such as Section 304 or Motor Vehicles Act offences were not attracted in his case.

Judgement:

After examining the entire record, Justice P.M. Raval held that there existed strong prima facie material against Tathya Patel for culpable homicide not amounting to murder, rejecting the contention that this was a simple case of rash and negligent driving. The Court observed that the accused persisted with excessive speed despite being asked several times to drive slowly—a crucial element demonstrating knowledge as required under Section 304 Part II—and that the incident could not be viewed as a typical road accident. The Court clarified that for Section 304 Part II, it is not necessary for the prosecution to show that the case fits within exceptions to Section 300 IPC; it is enough if the accused had knowledge that his act was likely to cause death. Applying this principle, the Court reasoned that the applicant’s conduct—driving at extreme speed, ignoring warnings, and causing an accident leading to nine deaths—squarely brought the matter within the scope of culpable homicide. With respect to the father, the Court examined the charge-sheet and concluded that although certain misdemeanours were attributed to him, the ingredients of major offences such as Section 304, 308, or Motor Vehicles Act provisions were not made out. Instead, only minor offences such as Sections 504, 506(2), 114, and 118 IPC could be prima facie sustained. Hence, while dismissing Tathya’s revision application, the Court partly allowed Pragnesh Patel’s revision, discharging him from major offences but retaining minor charges. The Court concluded emphatically that the material on record, including vehicle telematics, witness statements, and accident dynamics, created a compelling prima facie case against Tathya for trial under Sections 304 Part II and 308 IPC, underscoring that the gravity of conduct and knowledge of consequences cannot be undermined at the discharge stage, thereby upholding the trial court’s decision to proceed against him.