Introduction:
The Telangana High Court has reaffirmed that although inclusion in a panel prepared for appointment as a Government Pleader does not create an enforceable right to appointment, the State cannot arbitrarily discard an already prepared panel and substitute it with a fresh one without recording valid reasons or following a fair, transparent, and legally sustainable procedure. In Varikota Ramgopal v. State of Telangana & Ors. (W.P. No. 31400 of 2024), reported as 2026 LiveLaw (Tel) 94, Justice N. Tukaramji emphasized that every exercise of executive discretion must conform to the constitutional mandate of fairness, transparency, and non-arbitrariness under Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
The writ petition was filed by a senior advocate who had previously served as an Assistant Government Pleader at Jangaon. The petitioner challenged the decision of the authorities to exclude his name from a revised panel prepared for appointment as Government Pleader before the Principal District Court, Jangaon. According to him, his name had originally been included in the first panel jointly prepared by the District Collector and the District Judge after following the prescribed procedure. However, before any appointment could be made, the authorities allegedly prepared a fresh panel excluding his name without cancelling the earlier panel, issuing any fresh notification, inviting new applications, or providing him an opportunity to explain the circumstances leading to his exclusion.
The dispute raised important questions concerning the scope of executive discretion in appointing Government law officers, the legal effect of empanelment, and the procedural safeguards that must accompany administrative decisions affecting the rights of candidates. The High Court was therefore required to balance the Government’s discretion in selecting its legal representatives with the constitutional obligation to ensure fairness and transparency in administrative action.
The Court examined the statutory framework governing the appointment of Government Pleaders under G.O.Ms. No.187 dated December 6, 2000, which prescribes the procedure for preparation of panels by the District Collector and the District Judge. While recognizing that these recommendations are advisory and that the Government retains the ultimate discretion regarding appointments, the Court held that such discretion is not absolute and cannot be exercised arbitrarily or in a manner that defeats an already completed selection process without lawful justification.
Arguments of the Parties:
The petitioner contended that the entire process adopted by the authorities in preparing the revised panel was arbitrary, unfair, and contrary to the constitutional guarantee of equality under Article 14. He submitted that after due consideration of the eligible candidates, the District Collector and the District Judge had prepared the first panel in which his name was duly included for appointment as Government Pleader. Having successfully undergone the prescribed process, he legitimately expected that his candidature would be fairly considered by the Government.
According to the petitioner, instead of taking a decision on the first panel, the authorities abruptly initiated the preparation of a second panel without cancelling or superseding the earlier one. He argued that no fresh notification inviting applications was issued, no fresh selection process was undertaken, and no opportunity was granted to him before his name was omitted from the revised panel. He further asserted that advocates possessing comparatively lesser professional experience were recommended in his place without any objective assessment or recorded reasons.
The petitioner argued that even though empanelment may not create an absolute right to appointment, it certainly entitled him to fair, transparent, and non-arbitrary consideration. By excluding him without notice or justification, the authorities violated the principles of natural justice as well as the constitutional mandate of equality before law.
The State opposed the writ petition by submitting that appointments of Government Pleaders fall squarely within the executive’s discretionary powers. It argued that the petitioner had no vested or enforceable right merely because his name appeared in an earlier panel. Relying upon settled principles governing public appointments, the respondents contended that inclusion in a panel does not compel the Government to make an appointment from that panel.
The State further submitted that the petitioner had earlier been discontinued pursuant to a policy decision of the Government and that the revised panel had been prepared only after verifying the antecedents of the eligible candidates. It was argued that during such verification certain adverse material came to light, including the pendency of a criminal case against the petitioner, which had not been properly disclosed by him. Consequently, the authorities considered it appropriate to prepare a revised panel and ultimately appointed Respondent No.4 as Government Pleader.
The respondents also maintained that the Government possesses complete discretion either to appoint a candidate from the recommended panel or to seek preparation of a fresh panel whenever circumstances so require. According to them, such decisions form part of executive policy and ordinarily do not warrant judicial interference unless demonstrated to be patently illegal or mala fide.
Court’s Judgment:
The Telangana High Court allowed the writ petition and held that although the petitioner did not possess an indefeasible right to appointment, he certainly enjoyed a constitutional right to be considered through a process that is fair, transparent, and free from arbitrariness. The Court therefore set aside the revised panel to the limited extent that it adversely affected the petitioner’s right to fair consideration and directed the authorities to undertake the selection process afresh.
At the outset, the Court agreed with the well-settled principle laid down by the Supreme Court in Shankarsan Dash v. Union of India, wherein it was held that mere inclusion of a candidate in a select list does not confer an indefeasible right to appointment. The Court observed that empanelment only gives rise to eligibility for consideration and does not automatically entitle a candidate to appointment.
However, the Court clarified that the absence of a vested right to appointment does not absolve the Government from complying with constitutional requirements while exercising its discretion. Administrative decisions affecting public appointments must satisfy the test of fairness under Article 14 and cannot be based on arbitrary or unexplained departures from established procedure.
Examining G.O.Ms. No.187, the Court observed that the District Collector and the District Judge play a recommendatory role in preparing the panel of eligible advocates. Although the Government retains the discretion either to appoint a candidate from the panel or to seek a fresh panel, such discretion is circumscribed by procedural safeguards and must be exercised on cogent, rational, and legally sustainable grounds.
Justice N. Tukaramji observed that the power to call for a fresh panel cannot be exercised casually or arbitrarily so as to nullify an already completed selection process without adequate justification. Any such exercise of discretion must be supported by valid reasons capable of withstanding judicial scrutiny.
The Court closely examined the sequence of events leading to the preparation of the revised panel. It found that the authorities were already aware of the petitioner’s alleged adverse antecedents, including the pending criminal case, at the time the first panel was prepared and forwarded to the Government. Despite possessing such knowledge, they had consciously included the petitioner’s name in the original panel.
The Court found it particularly significant that shortly thereafter the authorities sought preparation of a fresh panel, obtained it within a single day, completed antecedent verification within two days, and finalized the revised panel within what the Court described as an “extremely compressed timeframe.” According to the Court, such unusual haste created serious doubts regarding the fairness, genuineness, and transparency of the entire process.
Another important factor considered by the Court was the complete absence of any formal decision cancelling or superseding the first panel. The record disclosed no order explaining why the original panel was discarded, nor did it reveal any reasons justifying the exclusion of the petitioner from the revised panel. The authorities also failed to provide the petitioner an opportunity to explain or respond to the alleged adverse material relied upon against him.
The Court held that these omissions amounted to a violation of the principles of natural justice. Even where no statutory hearing is expressly prescribed, administrative authorities are expected to adopt a fair procedure whenever their decisions adversely affect the legitimate interests of individuals.
The High Court emphasized that executive discretion cannot operate as an unfettered power. Every administrative action must be informed by reason, transparency, and procedural fairness. Arbitrary departures from an established process undermine public confidence in governance and offend the constitutional guarantee of equality.
The Court observed that although appointments of Government Pleaders involve a degree of executive choice based upon confidence and suitability, such discretion must nevertheless remain subject to constitutional limitations. The Government cannot disregard an already completed panel merely because it wishes to substitute another panel unless it records valid reasons and follows a transparent process.
Finding the revised panel legally unsustainable, the Court set it aside only to the extent that it prejudiced the petitioner’s right to fair consideration. At the same time, the Court made it abundantly clear that it was not directing the appointment of the petitioner as Government Pleader.
Instead, the respondents were directed to undertake the process afresh in accordance with G.O.Ms. No.187 and constitutional principles. The authorities were instructed to provide fair consideration to all eligible candidates, including both the petitioner and the advocate who had already been appointed, while independently assessing their qualifications, suitability, professional merit, and antecedents before arriving at a fresh decision.
The judgment serves as an important reminder that while empanelment does not guarantee appointment, it certainly guarantees fair consideration. Administrative convenience or executive discretion cannot justify arbitrary departures from prescribed procedures. Whenever the State exercises discretionary powers affecting public appointments, it must do so with transparency, objectivity, and fairness consistent with Article 14 of the Constitution. By insisting upon these constitutional safeguards, the Telangana High Court has reinforced the principle that even where no vested right exists, every candidate has a legitimate expectation that the selection process will be conducted honestly, fairly, and in accordance with law.