Introduction:

In Sandeep Singh Thakur v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2025 LiveLaw (SC) 1251), the Supreme Court of India was confronted with an unusual and sensitive situation where a criminal prosecution for rape on the allegation of a false promise of marriage ultimately culminated in the marriage of the accused and the prosecutrix during the pendency of the appeal. A Bench comprising Justice B.V. Nagarathna and Justice Satish Chandra Sharma, exercising the Court’s extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution, quashed the FIR, conviction, and sentence of the appellant, holding that the case represented a consensual relationship that had been given a “criminal colour” owing to misunderstanding and subsequent events. The judgment is significant not merely for the relief granted but for the reasoning adopted by the Court, its reliance on subsequent conduct of the parties, and its candid acknowledgment of judicial intuition—described as a “sixth sense”—in exploring the possibility of reconciliation. The decision also engages deeply with the evolving jurisprudence on consent, false promise of marriage, and the limits of criminal law in regulating intimate relationships.

Background and Facts of the Case:

The prosecutrix and the appellant came into contact through a social media platform in 2015. Over time, their acquaintance developed into a romantic relationship and eventually turned physical. According to the prosecutrix, her consent to sexual relations was premised on the appellant’s promise to marry her. As years passed, differences arose regarding the timing of marriage. The appellant allegedly sought postponement, which caused insecurity and distress to the prosecutrix. Feeling deceived and betrayed, she lodged an FIR in November 2021 under Sections 376 and 376(2)(n) of the Indian Penal Code, alleging repeated rape on the false promise of marriage.

The trial court accepted the prosecution version and convicted the appellant for repeated rape and cheating. He was sentenced to ten years’ rigorous imprisonment for rape and two years’ imprisonment for cheating. Aggrieved, the appellant preferred an appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court. During the pendency of the appeal, he sought suspension of sentence, which was rejected by the High Court. This rejection prompted the appellant to approach the Supreme Court.

When the matter initially came up before the Supreme Court, the Bench noted peculiar factual circumstances suggesting that the dispute may not be irreconcilable. Acting on what Justice Nagarathna later described as a “sixth sense,” the Court suggested that counsel seek instructions from the parties as to whether an amicable resolution, including marriage, was possible. Subsequently, both the appellant and the prosecutrix were produced before the Court and were interacted with in chambers, in the presence of their respective parents. Both expressed willingness to marry each other. Interim bail was granted to the appellant, and the marriage was solemnised on 22 July 2025. The couple thereafter began living together as husband and wife.

Arguments on Behalf of the Appellant:

On behalf of the appellant, it was contended that the case was a classic example of the criminalisation of a consensual relationship. The appellant argued that from the inception, the relationship between the parties was voluntary, consensual, and based on mutual affection. There was no deception at the outset and no intention to dishonestly induce the prosecutrix into a sexual relationship under a false promise of marriage. It was submitted that mere postponement of marriage or failure to marry within an expected timeline could not automatically convert a consensual relationship into the offence of rape.

Counsel for the appellant further relied on settled Supreme Court jurisprudence which draws a distinction between a false promise to marry made with no intention of being fulfilled from the very beginning, and a breach of promise arising out of subsequent circumstances or misunderstandings. It was argued that the present case fell squarely within the latter category. The appellant had always intended to marry the prosecutrix, and the subsequent marriage during the pendency of proceedings conclusively demonstrated the bona fides of his intention.

It was also urged that the conviction had resulted in disproportionate hardship. The appellant, being a government servant, had been suspended from service following his conviction, thereby affecting not only his liberty but also his livelihood and dignity. The appellant emphasised that the prosecutrix herself no longer wished to pursue the criminal proceedings and had willingly entered into matrimony with him. In such circumstances, continuing the conviction and sentence would serve no purpose other than perpetuating injustice.

Finally, invoking Article 142, the appellant submitted that the Supreme Court possessed wide powers to do complete justice and could quash criminal proceedings even in non-compoundable offences where the facts so warranted, particularly when continuation of prosecution would be an abuse of process of law.

Arguments on Behalf of the State and the Prosecutrix:

The State initially defended the trial court’s judgment, contending that the offence under Section 376 IPC is grave and non-compoundable, involving not merely private wrongs but an offence against society at large. It was argued that rape on the false promise of marriage strikes at the autonomy and dignity of women, and courts must exercise extreme caution before quashing such convictions.

However, as the proceedings progressed and the Court facilitated interaction between the parties, the prosecutrix made a categorical statement before the Supreme Court that she no longer wished to pursue the criminal case. She affirmed that she had married the appellant of her own free will and was living with him happily. Her parents also expressed satisfaction with the development and supported the resolution arrived at through the Court’s intervention.

In light of these developments, the State did not seriously oppose the exercise of powers under Article 142, leaving the matter to the discretion of the Court, while emphasising that such an approach should be confined to rare and exceptional cases and not treated as a precedent for routinely quashing rape convictions on the basis of compromise or marriage.

Issues Before the Court:

The Supreme Court was essentially called upon to determine:

• Whether the conviction for rape on the allegation of false promise of marriage was sustainable in the facts and circumstances of the case.
• Whether the subsequent marriage between the appellant and the prosecutrix, along with her unwillingness to pursue the case, justified quashing the FIR, conviction, and sentence.
• Whether the exercise of extraordinary powers under Article 142 of the Constitution was warranted to do “complete justice.”

Judgment and Reasoning of the Court:

Justice B.V. Nagarathna, writing the judgment for the Bench, undertook a careful examination of the factual matrix and the course of proceedings. The Court candidly acknowledged that at the very first hearing, it had an intuitive sense that the dispute could potentially be resolved by bringing the parties together. This instinct led the Bench to explore the possibility of reconciliation rather than confining itself strictly to adversarial adjudication.

The Court noted that the relationship between the parties spanned several years and was not a case of a fleeting encounter induced by deception. Both parties had intended to marry, and the dispute appeared to have arisen primarily due to postponement and misunderstandings rather than a fraudulent promise from the inception. The Bench observed that in such circumstances, criminal law should not be used as a weapon to settle personal scores or address emotional insecurity.

Importantly, the Court reiterated the legal position that consent obtained on a false promise of marriage amounts to rape only when the promise was false from the very beginning and the accused never intended to marry. Where the intention to marry exists but the relationship later breaks down due to unforeseen circumstances or delays, the offence of rape is not attracted. Applying this principle, the Court held that the present case appeared to be one where a consensual relationship was wrongly criminalised.

The subsequent marriage between the appellant and the prosecutrix played a decisive role in the Court’s reasoning. The Bench recorded that the marriage was solemnised voluntarily, with the consent of both parties and their families, and that the couple had been living together peacefully. The prosecutrix’s unequivocal statement that she did not wish to pursue the criminal proceedings any further weighed heavily with the Court.

Invoking Article 142, the Supreme Court held that this was one of those rare cases where intervention was necessary to do complete justice. The Court emphasised that its power under Article 142 is not constrained by statutory limitations and can be exercised to transcend procedural barriers in exceptional situations. Accordingly, the FIR, the trial court’s judgment of conviction, and the sentence imposed on the appellant were quashed. As a natural consequence, the pending appeal before the Madhya Pradesh High Court was rendered infructuous.

The Court also addressed the collateral consequences of the conviction. It directed the Madhya Pradesh authorities to revoke the appellant’s suspension from government service and to pay him arrears of salary within two months, noting that interim orders had already enabled him to rejoin duty. The Bench observed that since the conviction itself had been set aside, there was no justification for continuing any adverse service-related action against the appellant.

While allowing the appeal, the Court was careful to clarify that its decision was based on the peculiar facts of the case and should not be treated as a precedent for mechanically quashing rape cases on the basis of compromise or marriage. The judgment underscored that offences of sexual violence are serious and must ordinarily be dealt with strictly, but where the very foundation of the prosecution is found to be shaky and continuation of proceedings would result in injustice, the Court would not hesitate to exercise its constitutional powers.

Significance of the Decision:

This judgment is significant for several reasons. First, it reinforces the nuanced distinction between false promise of marriage and breach of promise, a distinction that has often been blurred in criminal prosecutions. Second, it highlights the Supreme Court’s willingness to adopt a restorative and pragmatic approach in appropriate cases, rather than a purely punitive one. Third, it demonstrates the expansive yet cautious use of Article 142, reaffirming that the provision is meant to advance justice, not merely to fill procedural gaps.

At the same time, the judgment raises important questions about the role of courts in facilitating settlements in serious criminal cases and the extent to which subsequent marriage should influence the outcome of rape prosecutions. By explicitly stating that this was a rare and exceptional case, the Court attempted to strike a balance between individual justice and broader societal concerns.