Introduction:

In the case titled NMM vs State of Maharashtra (Criminal Application 1619 of 2023), the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court, comprising Justice Anil Pansare and Justice Mahendra Nerlikar, provided significant clarity on the definition of “relative” under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code. The bench quashed the FIR and chargesheet filed against a man accused under Section 498A—on the grounds that he was merely a friend of the husband, and not a relative as legally defined. While the FIR named the friend alongside the husband and his parents, the High Court held that a friend – unlike a blood relative, in-law, or adopted family member – is not covered under the statutory term “relative”, and thus cannot be prosecuted under the anti-dowry cruelty provision.

Facts & Relief Sought:

The FIR was lodged on June 13, 2022, by a woman alleging that her husband, his parents, and his male friend visited the matrimonial home and instigated demands for a car and a plot from her parents. The friend was accused of encouraging the husband to ostracize the wife, refuse cohabitation, and drive her back to her parental home upon failure of the demands. Criminal proceedings under Section 498A (cruelty) were launched against all named individuals. The friend filed an application under Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing of the FIR and chargesheet insofar as they pertained to him, contending that the statutory requirement of being a “relative” was not met.

Arguments of the Applicant (Friend):

Advocate S.A. Mohta, appearing for the applicant, argued that Section 498A criminal liability is strictly restricted to cruelty inflicted by a “husband or relative of the husband”. The applicant contended that he lacked any legal kinship—by blood, marriage, or adoption—with the husband and thus could not be classified as a “relative” under the statute. He relied on precedents including a recent Supreme Court ruling which held that even a girlfriend or concubine does not qualify as a relative. Therefore, applying the plain meaning rule and legislative intent, he asserted that the FIR against him was unsustainable in law.

Arguments of the Prosecution & Complainant:

The State, represented by Additional Public Prosecutor S.S. Jachack, and the complainant’s Advocate S. Patrikar, likely contended for a broader interpretation of “relative”, arguing that the legislative purpose of Section 498A is to protect women from cruelty. They may have argued that persons who assist the husband in perpetrating cruelty—regardless of legal kinship—should be held liable. They possibly urged the court to consider the substance of allegations: instigation, interference in matrimonial relations, and cruelty resulting from third-party influence as worthy of criminal action under Section 498A.

Legal Analysis & Judgment:

The Court relied on binding Supreme Court precedent which clarified that the term “relative” encompasses only individuals who share legal status through blood, marriage, or adoption. In particular, it emphasized that, under Section 498A, statutory definitions cannot be extended via implied or purposive interpretation to include friends or extramarital partners.

“Therefore, … a friend cannot be said to be a relative as he is neither a blood relative nor … through marriage or adoption … we come to the conclusion that a friend of husband will not fall under the definition of ‘relative’ of the husband … as contemplated under Section 498‑A IPC.”

Applying this legal test, the bench noted that the allegations hinged on instigation and influence, but without legal status, the friend could not be held liable under Section 498A. Consequently, the Court quashed the FIR and chargesheet lodged against him. The Court explicitly stated that the case against the husband and his parents would continue. The judgment stands as a reiteration of narrow statutory interpretation and as a safeguard against misuse of Section 498A to drag unrelated individuals into matrimonial disputes.

Legal & Social Implications:

This ruling reinforces a principled and textualist approach to Section 498A. It underscores that the definition of “relative” is restricted by law and cannot be expanded to include third parties, however complicit. The judgment helps prevent misuse of anti-dowry legislation—particularly as a tool to settle personal scores or implicate friends or acquaintances without legal standing. It also affirms the importance of ensuring that only those in a legally recognized familial role are exposed to criminal liability under Section 498A. The decision may discourage inclusion of extraneous parties in matrimonial FIRs and offers greater protection to individuals wrongly named in the heat of marital disputes.