Introduction:
In the recent case of Srinwati Mukherji vs State of Maharashtra (Writ Petition 424 of 2025), the Bombay High Court reaffirmed the principle that a residential unit still under construction and never occupied by the parties cannot be termed a “shared household” within the meaning of Section 2(s) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (PWDV Act). The decision rendered by Justice Manjusha Deshpande settled a contentious issue arising from a wife’s plea to compel her estranged husband to continue paying bank instalments for an under-construction flat in Malad, Mumbai, jointly registered in their names but never possessed or lived in. The High Court’s decision builds upon the jurisprudential framework defining the limits of shared household rights under Section 19 of the PWDV Act and protects respondents from unreasonable financial liabilities in the absence of occupancy or intent to reside.
The petitioner-wife challenged concurrent findings by the Magistrate and the Sessions Court, both of which had refused to direct the husband to pay EMIs on the flat. She asserted that the property, although not yet handed over, qualifies as a shared household because it was purchased jointly and intended for family residence. The relief sought included a direction to the husband or his employer to pay the instalments directly to the bank, despite the fact that neither party had ever lived in the premises.
Arguments:
The wife’s counsel, Advocates Archit Jaykar and Bhoomi Upadhyay, emphasized the social welfare objectives of the PWDV Act. They argued that denying her this protection undermines the spirit of the legislation aimed at ensuring shelter and dignity for women in domestic distress. According to their reading of the Act, ownership and intent to live in the flat sufficed to make it a “shared household,” and denying instalment payments from the husband effectively deprived her of financial stability and the right to secure housing. They contended that her status as an aggrieved person under the Act entitles her to the flat’s continued development and financial upkeep through her husband’s contribution.
On the other hand, the husband, represented by Advocates Raghavendra Mehrotra, Irfan Shaikh, Maddhat Shaikh, and Mohini Tekale, firmly opposed the relief sought. They argued that the property in question had never been occupied and was still under construction. Furthermore, the relationship between the parties had already soured, evidenced by the husband’s filing for divorce back in 2020. The property was neither a matrimonial home nor one intended for cohabitation in the foreseeable future. They argued that the PWDV Act’s provisions, particularly under Section 19, pertain strictly to premises in which the aggrieved person has resided or currently resides. Therefore, they contended, the wife’s claim was untenable in law.
Additional Public Prosecutor Dhanlakshmi Krishnaiyar appeared for the State and adopted a neutral stance, leaving the matter to the Court’s discretion while emphasizing the interpretative challenges that arise under protective legislations.
Judgement:
Justice Deshpande, in her reasoned judgment dated July 4, 2025, relied on the statutory language of Section 2(s) and Section 19 of the PWDV Act. She pointed out that a “shared household” must, by definition, be a household where the aggrieved person has lived or has a legal right to live. In the instant case, the couple had never resided in the property. The flat was still incomplete and the possession had not been handed over. Moreover, with divorce proceedings already initiated years earlier, there was no intent or possibility of joint habitation.
Justice Deshpande elaborated that the PWDV Act is designed to provide urgent, practical reliefs to women facing domestic violence and not to create broad financial obligations unrelated to cohabitation or occupancy. She emphasized the legislative intent, stating, “The provisions ensure that victims are provided financially as well as protection from being ousted from their ‘Shared Household’, where the victim is residing. The victim can even seek alternate accommodation, or direction to pay rent of the alternate accommodation.” However, such provisions cannot be stretched to include speculative claims on future or incomplete properties.
She held that the reliefs contemplated under Section 19—residence orders—cannot be extended to include direction to pay instalments for a flat where neither party ever resided, and where possession has not yet been taken. Since there was no actual or constructive possession of the flat, nor was it ever used as a shared living space, it falls outside the purview of a shared household. Further, there was no indication of the wife intending to take possession of the flat, especially when divorce proceedings were pending.
Justice Deshpande observed, “In the present case, the possession of the alleged ‘Shared Household’ is not yet handed over; the instalments are still not fully paid. It would be stretching it too far to direct the husband to pay the remaining instalments or direct the employer to deduct the instalments from his salary and pay it to the bank.” She underscored the potential for judicial overreach, cautioning courts against imposing financial obligations that the statute does not contemplate.
Citing precedent and legislative interpretation, the Court dismissed the wife’s plea and upheld the Sessions Court’s decision from October 19, 2024. The judgment establishes that financial liability under the PWDV Act arises only in the context of a genuine shared household or alternate accommodation actively being used or intended for residence. Abstract ownership or registration in joint names does not suffice.
This decision reinforces judicial clarity on the concept of a shared household and draws a definitive line between protection and overextension. It will likely serve as an important precedent in domestic violence jurisprudence and EMIs or financial claims related to real estate under the PWDV Act.